2013 Kia Optima Recalls

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received eight Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai) and eight Kia America, Inc. (Kia) Part 573 Recall Reports between 2016 and 2023. The combined 16 safety recalls all involve the antilock braking system (ABS) modules or Hydraulic Electronic Control Units (HECU) manufactured by the equipment supplier Mando. The Part 573 Recall Reports contain varying defect descriptions and differing remedy descriptions for the same or similar equipment supplied by Mando. Safety recalls included in this Audit Query (AQ) review include: Hyundai recalls 20V-520, 20V-543, 21V-161, 21V-160, 21V-303, 22V-056, 22V-810, and 23V-651. Kia recalls 16V-815, 20V-518, 20V-519, 21V-137, 21V-331, 22V-051, 22V-800, and 23V-652 The purpose of this AQ is to evaluate the timeliness and scoping of Hyundai and Kia’s defect decision making and adherence with reporting requirements; and understand the varying defect descriptions and remedies between these recalls.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) received a letter dated July 13, 2022, petitioning the Agency to initiate a safety defect investigation into loss of motive power allegations attributed to oil drain pan assembly failures on certain Hyundai Motor America, Inc. and Kia America, Inc. vehicles spanning Model Years (MY) 2005-2021. The Petitioners cited examples of complaints indicating that the subject vehicles were experiencing rapid loss of engine oil due to oil drain plug back outs, resulting in loss of motive power and/or catastrophic engine damage. Additional complaints were provided which alleged that the oil drain pans lack sufficient structural integrity and are susceptible to cracking. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11481745. On September 12, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition (DP22-003) to evaluate the Petitioners’ request. The Petitioners have provided additional complaints within four supplemental letters dated January 31, 2023, March 21, 2023, May 23, 2023, and August 4, 2023. ODI’s evaluation included the review and analysis of the complaints and supporting information submitted by the Petitioners, as well as additional complaints submitted directly to NHTSA which referenced either the oil drain plug or a crack in the oil pan. After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into the oil drain pan assemblies of the subject vehicles. Based on a review of the available information, a loss of motive power resulting from an oil drain plug back out has not occurred between the initial sale of a vehicle and the completion of its first oil change. If during an oil change service, a technician fails to remove the existing drain plug gasket before installing a new gasket, it is likely that a proper seal between the drain plug and the oil pan will not be made. An improper seal between the drain plug and oil pan could lead to the backing out on the drain plug, resulting in the sudden loss of oil while driving. Additionally, the provided examples of oil pan cracks were localized to the immediate vicinity of the oil drain plug and/or appeared to be the result of direct-contact with a tool during servicing.  There is no information to support that a vehicle-based defect exists relating to the oil pan assembly, and instead the documented incidents are related to the failure to follow the proper maintenance procedures during oil change service. In October 2023, Hyundai published a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) that provided detailed instructions for oil change service on its gasoline powered vehicles, specifically highlighting the need to remove and replace the existing drain plug gasket prior to reinstalling the drain plug. After a thorough review of the material submitted by the petitioner, the information already in NHTSA's possession, and the potential risks to motor vehicle safety implicated by the petitioners' allegations, NHTSA does not believe that a formal investigation is warranted. Therefore, the petition is denied. A Federal Register Notice (FRN) further detailing NHTSA’s reasons for denial of the petition will be published. The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP22-003. To review those complaints and the additional complaints ODI added to its evaluation which are cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On March 29, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened two Preliminary Evaluations (PE19-003 on Hyundai and PE19-004 on Kia) to broadly investigate incidents of non-crash fires (regardless of origin or operational status of the vehicle) on various model year Hyundai and Kia vehicles.  During the PE investigations, Hyundai and Kia issued several recalls to address vehicle fires, including those due to engine failures involving various engine types.  The remedies for the engine failure recalls typically involve engine inspection (to detect existing damage), and if necessary, engine replacement.  Additionally, both manufacturers have been installing an engine control software modification known as Knock Sensor Detection Software (KSDS) which is intended to detect impending engine failure, alert the driver, and limit engine power (to lessen likelihood of engine failure).KSDS is being installed under recalls and non-safety field actions, and both companies have extended limited engine warranties (see recall files). On December 22, 2021, ODI upgraded PE19-003 and PE19-004 to this Engineering Analysis (EA21-003, covering both Hyundai and Kia) to evaluate the scope of the prior recalls related to engine failures/fires and the efficacy of the recall remedies for the recalls, as well as the long-term viability of related programs and non-safety field actions being conducted by Hyundai and Kia.  The former issue involved approximately 550,000 MY 2013 Hyundai Elantra, MY 2011 Kia Sorento, and MY 2012-2015 Kia Rio.  The latter issue involved approximately 2.5 million recalled vehicles, which have been identified as displaying potential remedy concerns: Hyundai recalls 15V-568, 17V-226, 20V-746, and 21V-727; and Kia recalls 17V-224, 19V-120, 20V-750, and 21V-844. Regarding the recall scope issue, among all of the scope vehicles identified at EA opening, ODI found only the MY 2011 Kia Sorento vehicles equipped with both the Theta II 2.4L 4-cylinder Multi-Point Injection (MPI) and the Lambda II 3.5L 6-cylinder MPI engines experienced relatively high rates of reported fires.  In December 2023, Kia issued recall 23V-877 that will cover about 80,000 MY 2011 Kia Sorento vehicles equipped with the Theta II 2.4L MPI engines.  The remedy will involve an inspection, and if necessary, a replacement of the engine, as well as the installation of KSDS.  It should be noted that in 2021 these vehicles were included in a KSDS product improvement campaign with warranty extension.  For the MY 2011 Sorento vehicles equipped with the Lambda II 3.5L engines, ODI believes that future engine failures/fires involving these vehicles will likely be due to a lax in adhering to the proper or scheduled engine maintenance (regular engine oil changes), rather than a design or manufacturing engine issue. Regarding the issue of the efficacy of the recall remedies, ODI found the majority of the recalled Hyundai and Kia vehicles, by model, experienced lower reported fire rates after the remedies were applied.  Furthermore, ODI found that for most vehicles that did not receive the recall remedies, by model, experienced relatively high fire rates.  To address this problem, Hyundai informed ODI in December 2023, that it will renotify all of its owners covered by the Hyundai recalls of engine failures/fires every 8 months for the next 3 years.  In December 2023, Kia stated that it will renotify the majority of its owners every 8 months for the next 3 years.Several previously recalled Kia models are excluded from the renotification due to their lower reported rates of engine fires.  Overall, the renotification actions will help to increase the recall completion rates, thus reduce the frequency of engine fires in the future. In view of the recall action being taken by Kia and renotification actions being taken by both Kia and Hyundai, ODI is closing this Engineering Analysis.  Also, both companies have been released from the 2020-iniated Consent Orders (Kia since November 2022 and Hyundai since November 2023).  The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.  To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) received a petition letter dated October 10, 2021, requesting an investigation of possible defects in the electronic throttle control (ETC) system on certain Kia vehicles resulting in the opening of DP21-003. Accordingly, Model Year (MY) 2005-2016 Kia Optima/K5, MY 2006-2015 Kia Sorento, MY 2007-2016 Hyundai Elantra, MY 2007-2016 Hyundai Santa Fe, MY 2006-2015 Hyundai Sonatas are all part of the subject population. The petition was originally filed as a Vehicle Owner Questionnaire that can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under reference (ODI) number 11439675.On November 12, 2021, ODI opened Defect Petition DP21-003 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI performed trend analyses of the VOQs related to vehicle speed control issues for all the subject vehicles and found that none of the 52 Model/Model Year Hyundai/Kia vehicles demonstrated any actionable trend that warranted an investigation.Petitioners submitted 1119 VOQs and non-VOQ cases in which sudden uncommanded acceleration (SUA) or loss of motive power (LOMP) incidents were alleged.For the 1119 reports, 220 were incidents involving crashes, from which 69 subject Hyundai-Kia vehicles were inspected by Hyundai/Kia dealer technicians, Hyundai/Kia engineers, and/or third-party representatives.ODI found the inspections identified no vehicle defects related to the ETC system.Of the 220 crash-involved reports, 13 Event Data Recorder (EDR) records were downloaded successfully and 11 of those indicated driver error: (i.e.) pedal misapplication.A condition where the accelerator pedal is mistakenly applied instead of the brake pedal when the driver wants to stop the vehicle.In addition, ODI reviewed a scientific journal paper published in Forensic Science International in 2016 by Mr. Park et al ., as well as related test videos. ODI does not believe there is any evidence of uncontrollable SUA occurrences in any of the tests reviewed. NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) reviewed the allegations regarding the potential noncompliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 124.Based on the information provided, the Agency concludes there is insufficient information for us to determine if a possible non-compliance exists.Finally, both Hyundai and Kia informed ODI that all their vehicles manufactured after 2012 were equipped with an ETC management system, in which the engine speed will go to idle when the system sees signals from both the brake pedal and accelerator pedal at the same time; this is commonly known as the brake-throttle override system.After thoroughly assessing the material submitted by the petitioner, information already in NHTSA's possession, information submitted by Hyundai and Kia in response to an Information Request letter, and the potential risks to safety implicated by the petitioner's allegation, NHTSA does not believe that a formal investigation is warranted. After full consideration of appropriate factors, the petition is denied. A Federal Register Notice (FRN) further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition will be published.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect.  During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment.  FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW.  These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes.  An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.   In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU.  This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation.  The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage.  There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation.  The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU.  If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC.  Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC.  All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled.  In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024.  With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

During this Preliminary Evaluation (PE), the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) assessed the scope, frequency and potential safety-related consequences of non-crash vehicle fires caused by both engine failures and failures of other vehicle systems/components in model year (MY) 2011-2014 Kia Optima, MY 2011-2014 Kia Sorento and MY 2010-2015 Kia Soul vehicles equipped with Theta II, Gamma, Nu and Lambda II engines (approximately 1.7 million vehicles). ODI also reviewed field and other data on other Kia vehicles (approximately 3.6 million additional vehicles) equipped with the same engines used in the above-mentioned vehicles.As a result of this PE, Kia has issued NHTSA Recalls 20V-750 and 21V-844 to address potential engine failures and fires in certain Kia vehicles equipped with various engine types.Additional information on these and other related recall actions is available in the downloadable version of this resume available at NHTSA.gov.In addition, ODI has upgraded this PE to an Engineering Analysis (EA) 21-003 which will focus on potential recall scope concerns and recall remedy concerns related to the engine failure-related recalls mentioned above and conducted previously.See the EA21-003 Opening Resume available at NHTSA.gov for more information.Also available in the downloadable version of this resume is a list of the reference numbers for the 444 ODI reports, or Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs), cited above which ODI received through mid-November 2021.Note that the Manufacturer reports cited above are customer complaints received through March 2019.