2015 Freightliner Cascadia Recalls

On August 31, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a recall query, RQ20001, to investigate the allegations of water intrusion into the truck cab signal-detect and activation module (SAM cab).The investigation further evaluated the effectiveness of the original recall remedy, and the installation of an updated drip shield as it relates to continual water intrusion resulting in the loss of electrical functions and potential fire.The potential hazard was the increased risk of a crash and injury in certain model year (MY) 2007-2021 Freightliner Cascadia P3 vehicles manufactured by Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA). ODI sent DTNA an information request (IR) letter on September 29, 2020.DTNA's November 20, 2020, IR response detailed how the company had implemented various improvements through recall 09V024 and multiple technical service bulletins (TSBs) to mitigate water intrusion.The effectiveness of new windshield seals and revisions to the drip shield is evident by the downward trend in claims rate from an average high of 7.64% in the beginning product life of Cascadia P3 (MYs 2007-2009), to 1.79% average for MYs 2011-2018, and down to 0.49% towards the end of the Cascadia P3 production.Moreover, the data shows that most failures occurred within the first three years of service with a significant downward trend thereafter. In view of the current overall low failure rate, the nature of early-life failure, and failure rate trending downward since model year 2017, this Recall Query (RQ) is closed.  The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On May 1, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE20006 to investigate complaints of intermittent loss of power steering assist in Daimler Truck North America (DTNA), Volvo Trucks of North America (Volvo) and PACCAR vehicles equipped with a ZF/TRW (TRW) THP60 steering gear.  The investigation focused on 2010-2020 DTNA Freightliner Cascadia, M2 and WST; Volvo VN, VAH and VHD and PACCAR 337, 365, 389, 567, 579 model vehicles.Field reports and interviews with fleet drivers allege that high power steering fluid temperatures could result in internal seal and bearing failures causing pressure fluctuation, affecting left and right-hand turns.  The inability of the driver to steer the vehicle as intended can increase the risk of a crash and injury. ODI analyzed data provided by TRW, DTNA, Volvo, and PACCAR in response to individual information request letters.ODI found that most failures occurred within the first two years and/or 50,000 miles of service.  The claim rate decreased with time and miles in service and remained less than 0.5%. ODI normalized data from each of the manufacturers and determined that there was not a substantial difference in the failures.Additionally, TRW improved a seal in the steering gear in December 2015.Trucks built on or after 2016 (as 2017 and newer model years) show a decreasing trend of failures. In view of the overall low failure rate, the nature of early-life failure, and failure rate trending downward for model years 2017 and newer, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed.  The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist.The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On April 23, 2018, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) opened Audit Query (AQ18002) to assess the timeliness and scope of four recalls filed by Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (“DTNA”). NHTSA subsequently expanded AQ18002 to examine the timeliness and scope of three additional DTNA recalls and compliance with early warning reporting and manufacturer communications reporting requirements. NHTSA and DTNA entered into a Consent Order on December 29, 2020, to resolve NHTSA’s assertions that certain recalls within the scope of AQ18002 were untimely, DTNA failed to timely submit certain manufacturer communications to NHTSA, and DTNA failed to submit field reports to NHTSA as required. As part of the Consent Order, DTNA agreed to a total civil penalty of thirty million dollars ($30,000,000), of which ten million dollars ($10,000,000) was paid on January 12, 2021. Also, of that total civil penalty, DTNA agreed to spend five million dollars ($5,000,000) on the specific performance obligations to develop advanced data analytics capabilities to enhance its ability to detect and study emerging safety-related defect trends on its vehicles (“Safety Data Analytics infrastructure”) and an advanced data analytics and reporting platform that integrates data on emerging safety-related defect trends on its vehicles and recall lessons learned (“Safety Communications Platform”). The Consent Order also held fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000) of the civil penalty in abeyance pending DTNA’s satisfactory completion of the requirements of the Consent Order, and its compliance with the Safety Act, and regulations thereunder. NHTSA and DTNA agreed to a two-year term for the Consent Order—with an option for NHTSA to extend the Consent Order for an additional year, if warranted. In the Consent Order, DTNA agreed to numerous performance obligations, including monthly meetings with NHTSA to discuss potential safety issues, recent manufacturer communications, and recall decision-making, among other things; quarterly meetings with NHTSA to discuss DTNA’s progress on the performance obligations under the Consent Order, including the Safety Data Analytics infrastructure and Safety Communications Platform, and any issues related to compliance with the Consent Order, Safety Act, or regulations; development of written procedures and employee training materials to help DTNA comply with its legal obligations to timely identify and report safety defects and noncompliances, submit complete and accurate recall filings, and timely submit manufacturer communications and field reports to NHTSA; and identifying and reporting previously unreported manufacturer communications and field reports. Also, via the Consent Order, DTNA acknowledged that the failure or inability to identify a specific root cause, develop an adequate remedy or repair, or confirm the affected population of vehicles are not bases for delaying filing a recall with NHTSA. On December 22, 2022, NHTSA extended the Consent Order for a term of one year due to concerns about DTNA’s compliance with its recall-related obligations. Specifically, NHTSA expressed concerns about the completeness of DTNA’s recall reports and issues identified with owner notification letters during the term of the Consent Order, as well as the length of time that DTNA took to consider a straightforward noncompliance issue before filing a recall and DTNA’s interactions with NHTSA during the term of the Consent Order. NHTSA addressed these concerns with DTNA during the third year of the Consent Order. The extended term of the Consent Order expired on December 28, 2023. Based on the Consent Order, this investigation, AQ18002, is closed. Closure of this AQ has no bearing on the terms of the Consent Order or DTNA’s ongoing legal obligations, and it does not represent a determination by NHTSA as to DTNA’s performance under the Consent Order.

On April 23, 2018, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE18-004) to investigate certain alleged defects affecting the Powernet Distribution Box (PNDB) and associated wiring on certain model year (MY) 2011-2016 Freightliner Cascadia (P3 platform) truck tractors that may result in disruption or loss of electrical power to the PNDB itself and other electrical circuits, thermal events, and/or vehicle fires.On May 7, 2018, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Daimler Trucks North America LLC (DTNA). On June 19, 2018, ODI received an IR response from DTNA that included vehicle production, consumer complaint, field report, warranty, manufacturer actions, changes and other data related to the alleged defects. On April 8, 2019, ODI received a supplemental IR response from DTNA that included their assessment of the alleged defects. Furthermore, ODI engaged in discussions with the manufacturer about the alleged defects on multiple occasions during the course of this investigation. ODI analysis of all available data indicates there is not an apparent defect trend. The most recent field report data reviewed was from 2017Q1 and the most recent complaint data was received by ODI in 2019Q1. The complaint rate is low. Most warranty claims occurred early in the vehicles' service life, and with the newest of the subject vehicles being over four years old, they are all now beyond that point. The warranty claim rates for loose input or output terminals (0.16%), loose fuses (0.25%), PNDB power (B+) supply cable corrosion or improper PNDB power (B+) supply cable routing and/ or securement (0.00%) are all low.The most serious consequence in the warranty claim data alleged engine shutoff with a vehicle in motion. While some vehicles did experience a loss of electrical power resulting in loss of motive power with no immediate restart capability, the bulk of the warranty claims were for vehicles equipped with an optional cab power disconnect switch solenoid with an automatic reset feature that may exhibit a brief, intermittent loss of power. If the input and output voltages differ by an unacceptable amount, potentially due to foreign object debris or corrosion on the solenoid's contacts, the PNDB senses the difference and enters an auto-reset mode in an attempt to correct the condition. The internal contacts open for one second, stopping the flow of electricity, and then close, restoring the flow for two seconds. This cycle is repeated for up to five times; after a maximum of thirteen seconds, the PNDB defaults to the on position and electrical power is restored. This condition exhibits a transient loss of power but it does not cause any permanent engine disablement. As a precaution, the solenoid-equipped PNDB part was modified in August 2017 to eliminate the auto-reset feature. Since 2010, there has been only 1 report of vehicle fire and zero reports of crash, injury or death. Accordingly, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

On February 26, 2016, Bergstrom Inc. notified NHTSA of a safety defect in approximately 10,819 of its ParkSmart auxiliary electrical temperature management units. These units were installed on Freightliner Cascadia Class 8 trucks that may overheat due to high resistance, resulting in possible fires. One of the contributing factors which led to this recall was a plastic vented cap covering the compressor connectors allowing increased flow of air to the overheated connectors, which increased the risk of a fire.ParkSmart units equipped with non-vented caps, according to Bergstrom, were not affected. See Bergstrom recall 16E-017.On March 7, 2016, Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA), the parent company of Freightliner, filed its corresponding defect decision as to the impacted Freightliner trucks.DTNA identified 8,865 model year 2015-2016 Freightliner Cascadia trucks installed with the ParkSmart units.On September 18, 2017, the Recall Management Division (RMD), opened this investigation to resolve the discrepancy between the larger number of units Bergstrom recalled with the smaller number of trucks DTNA identified as impacted, and to pursue additional recall actions as needed. RMD issued an information request to DTNA on Oct. 26, 2017 inquiring about the discrepancy, as well as field experience information.DTNA filed several responses of different dates that provided shipping and distribution information as well as field reports.DTNA explained that their recalled population was comprised only of vehicles they had produced for the U.S. market.They identified that 1,282 vehicles were produced for the Canadian market, and 122 vehicles for the Mexican market.DTNA said that the remaining balance of parts were likely supplied to parts depots for service (service loops) for other purchasers, such as Freightliner dealers sourcing custom vehicle requests. RMD also requested and reviewed shipping and distribution materials from Bergstrom. These materials identified Park Smart units intended for MY 2014 Cascadia trucks (e.g., vehicles outside the DTNA recall population).RMD confirmed with DTNA that the MY 2014 trucks had the non-vented cap design used on them and so were properly excluded from the recall population.In addition to collecting information and documentation from the involved companies, ODI reviewed early warning reporting information. This search identified nine reports of thermal events. All events, however, occurred on MY 2014 Cascadia trucks that, for reasons explained above, were not part of the DTNA recall and the event linked to other causes. In view of the information available to it at this time, RMD is satisfied that the scope of the DTNA recall is adequate.Accordingly, this RQ is closed.

On April 3, 2017, the Office of Defects investigation (ODI) opened Engineering Analysis (EA17-001) as an upgrade to a Preliminary Analysis (PE16-005). The investigation focused on alleged windshield wiper failures on 2015-2016 MY Freightliner Cascadia trucks. ODI received Early Warning Reporting (EWR) field reports from the manufacturer describing wipers that intermittently failed to operate, causing a loss of visibility for the driver while driving in rain or snow. Several of the reports alleged multiple vehicles experiencing the failure, while multiple failures also happened on the same vehicle. Many of the field reports indicated the windshield wiper problem was resolved once the wiper motor was replaced.Following a detailed analysis of data collected by ODI it was determined that a low failure rate for a complete loss of wiper function existed on the subject vehicles. Given this low failure rate and the Technical Service Bulletins (TSBs) to address this issue released by DTNA, this investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.For a detailed summary of the investigation see attached closing resume document.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at: http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID using the following complaint identification number: 11141519