2017 Freightliner Cascadia Recalls

On May 26, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23010) to assess reports of false positive activation of the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2017-2022 Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA) vehicles. The reports alleged that activation of the AEB system occurred while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration. DTNA indicated that it received of a total of 315 reports that may relate to the alleged defect in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. DTNA stated that the vast majority of false positive activation of the subject systems occur in very limited durations and result in a five mile per hour deceleration. ODI considered four AEB systems offered by DTNA: Detroit Assurance 2.0, Detroit Assurance 4.0, Detroit Assurance 5.0, and Wabco OnGuard.  ODI’s analysis shows that of the Detroit Assurance versions, all are failing at similar rates. The OnGuard AEB systems equipped on the same model and model year vehicles have experienced a significantly lower claim rate. To date, ODI has received a total of 32 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of AEB in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. In total, ODI reviewed 347 unique (i.e., non-duplicative Vehicle Identification Numbers) reports that may relate to the alleged defect, which include 24 reports involving a crash, 13 reports involving an alleged injury and one report with a fatality. PE23010 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On May 26, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23010) to assess reports of false positive activation of the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2017-2022 Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA) vehicles. The reports alleged that activation of the AEB system occurred while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in unexpected and sudden vehicle deceleration. ODI sent an information request letter to DTNA on June 15, 2023.In its September 1, 2023, response, DTNA indicated that it received of a total of 315 reports that may relate to the alleged defect in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. DTNA stated that the vast majority of false positive activation of the subject systems occur for very limited durations and result in a five mile per hour deceleration. ODI considered four AEB systems offered by DTNA: Detroit Assurance 2.0, Detroit Assurance 4.0, Detroit Assurance 5.0, and Wabco OnGuard. ODI’s analysis shows that of the Detroit Assurance versions, all fail at similar rates. The Wabco OnGuard AEB systems equipped on the same model and model year vehicles have experienced a significantly lower claim rate. To date, ODI has received a total of 32 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of AEB in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. In total, ODI reviewed 347 unique (i.e., non-duplicative Vehicle Identification Number) reports that may relate to the alleged defect, which include 24 involving a crash, 13 reports involving an alleged injury and one report with a fatality. PE23010 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25006) to further assess the scope, frequency, and nature of the inadvertent AEB activations in MY 2017-2022 Freightliner Cascadia and Western Star 5700 vehicles.In particular, this EA will assess the safety consequences likely to arise in the scenarios during which the AEB inadvertently and unexpectedly activates, such as the speeds and conditions during which the activation occurs. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate reports of engine electrical wiring harness chafe on the subject vehicles.ODI analysis found thousands of unique harness part numbers, spanning the two generations of vehicle chassis assembled at multiple vehicle assembly plants in two different countries, with multiple sub-models, incorporating over thirty powertrain choices.Each wiring harness could contain several dozen individual wires for power, ground and communication purposes depending on the multitude of equipment options available for custom vehicle configuration. ODI identified three primary areas where a wiring harness bundle may chafe: the air compressor support bracket, the transmission case, or the coolant surge tank. In each case, the root cause was some combination of inadequate design clearance, installation variability and relative motion between the wiring harness and the point of contact, such as from vibration. The chafing could result in a range of consequences from none to various diagnostic fault codes, telltale illumination, driver warning center messages, erratic electrical component operation, difficult or no engine start condition, engine de-rate (power reduction), engine shut down, inoperative transmission gear selection, or an unexpected shift to neutral.These potential consequences vary depending on the specific damaged wire in the harness and the exact failure mode, such as intermittent short circuit to ground or open circuit. Generally, the chafing resulted in a progressive series of driver warnings with high levels of detectability over the course of several days and ignition cycles. Drivers usually heed warnings before an engine shutdown condition occurs and the driver may override an engine shutdown countdown timer using the override switch. If the driver allows the shutdown event to occur, the engine can almost always be immediately restarted. Incident rates for an engine shutdown with no warning or a transmission shift to neutral while driving are both very low. ODI received one complaint (NHTSA ID Number 11366557) from a fleet mechanic, who reported in a subsequent interview that he repaired at least six subject vehicles that experienced the alleged defect condition. However, there have been no new Vehicle Owner Questionnaire complaints received by ODI since opening this investigation, and there are no known crashes, fires or thermal events, or injuries or deaths related to the alleged defect. Accordingly, no safety-related defect trend has been identified. Based on available information, this investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI report cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Numbers document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On August 31, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a recall query, RQ20001, to investigate the allegations of water intrusion into the truck cab signal-detect and activation module (SAM cab).The investigation further evaluated the effectiveness of the original recall remedy, and the installation of an updated drip shield as it relates to continual water intrusion resulting in the loss of electrical functions and potential fire.The potential hazard was the increased risk of a crash and injury in certain model year (MY) 2007-2021 Freightliner Cascadia P3 vehicles manufactured by Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA). ODI sent DTNA an information request (IR) letter on September 29, 2020.DTNA's November 20, 2020, IR response detailed how the company had implemented various improvements through recall 09V024 and multiple technical service bulletins (TSBs) to mitigate water intrusion.The effectiveness of new windshield seals and revisions to the drip shield is evident by the downward trend in claims rate from an average high of 7.64% in the beginning product life of Cascadia P3 (MYs 2007-2009), to 1.79% average for MYs 2011-2018, and down to 0.49% towards the end of the Cascadia P3 production.Moreover, the data shows that most failures occurred within the first three years of service with a significant downward trend thereafter. In view of the current overall low failure rate, the nature of early-life failure, and failure rate trending downward since model year 2017, this Recall Query (RQ) is closed.  The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On May 1, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE20006 to investigate complaints of intermittent loss of power steering assist in Daimler Truck North America (DTNA), Volvo Trucks of North America (Volvo) and PACCAR vehicles equipped with a ZF/TRW (TRW) THP60 steering gear.  The investigation focused on 2010-2020 DTNA Freightliner Cascadia, M2 and WST; Volvo VN, VAH and VHD and PACCAR 337, 365, 389, 567, 579 model vehicles.Field reports and interviews with fleet drivers allege that high power steering fluid temperatures could result in internal seal and bearing failures causing pressure fluctuation, affecting left and right-hand turns.  The inability of the driver to steer the vehicle as intended can increase the risk of a crash and injury. ODI analyzed data provided by TRW, DTNA, Volvo, and PACCAR in response to individual information request letters.ODI found that most failures occurred within the first two years and/or 50,000 miles of service.  The claim rate decreased with time and miles in service and remained less than 0.5%. ODI normalized data from each of the manufacturers and determined that there was not a substantial difference in the failures.Additionally, TRW improved a seal in the steering gear in December 2015.Trucks built on or after 2016 (as 2017 and newer model years) show a decreasing trend of failures. In view of the overall low failure rate, the nature of early-life failure, and failure rate trending downward for model years 2017 and newer, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed.  The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist.The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On April 23, 2018, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) opened Audit Query (AQ18002) to assess the timeliness and scope of four recalls filed by Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (“DTNA”). NHTSA subsequently expanded AQ18002 to examine the timeliness and scope of three additional DTNA recalls and compliance with early warning reporting and manufacturer communications reporting requirements. NHTSA and DTNA entered into a Consent Order on December 29, 2020, to resolve NHTSA’s assertions that certain recalls within the scope of AQ18002 were untimely, DTNA failed to timely submit certain manufacturer communications to NHTSA, and DTNA failed to submit field reports to NHTSA as required. As part of the Consent Order, DTNA agreed to a total civil penalty of thirty million dollars ($30,000,000), of which ten million dollars ($10,000,000) was paid on January 12, 2021. Also, of that total civil penalty, DTNA agreed to spend five million dollars ($5,000,000) on the specific performance obligations to develop advanced data analytics capabilities to enhance its ability to detect and study emerging safety-related defect trends on its vehicles (“Safety Data Analytics infrastructure”) and an advanced data analytics and reporting platform that integrates data on emerging safety-related defect trends on its vehicles and recall lessons learned (“Safety Communications Platform”). The Consent Order also held fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000) of the civil penalty in abeyance pending DTNA’s satisfactory completion of the requirements of the Consent Order, and its compliance with the Safety Act, and regulations thereunder. NHTSA and DTNA agreed to a two-year term for the Consent Order—with an option for NHTSA to extend the Consent Order for an additional year, if warranted. In the Consent Order, DTNA agreed to numerous performance obligations, including monthly meetings with NHTSA to discuss potential safety issues, recent manufacturer communications, and recall decision-making, among other things; quarterly meetings with NHTSA to discuss DTNA’s progress on the performance obligations under the Consent Order, including the Safety Data Analytics infrastructure and Safety Communications Platform, and any issues related to compliance with the Consent Order, Safety Act, or regulations; development of written procedures and employee training materials to help DTNA comply with its legal obligations to timely identify and report safety defects and noncompliances, submit complete and accurate recall filings, and timely submit manufacturer communications and field reports to NHTSA; and identifying and reporting previously unreported manufacturer communications and field reports. Also, via the Consent Order, DTNA acknowledged that the failure or inability to identify a specific root cause, develop an adequate remedy or repair, or confirm the affected population of vehicles are not bases for delaying filing a recall with NHTSA. On December 22, 2022, NHTSA extended the Consent Order for a term of one year due to concerns about DTNA’s compliance with its recall-related obligations. Specifically, NHTSA expressed concerns about the completeness of DTNA’s recall reports and issues identified with owner notification letters during the term of the Consent Order, as well as the length of time that DTNA took to consider a straightforward noncompliance issue before filing a recall and DTNA’s interactions with NHTSA during the term of the Consent Order. NHTSA addressed these concerns with DTNA during the third year of the Consent Order. The extended term of the Consent Order expired on December 28, 2023. Based on the Consent Order, this investigation, AQ18002, is closed. Closure of this AQ has no bearing on the terms of the Consent Order or DTNA’s ongoing legal obligations, and it does not represent a determination by NHTSA as to DTNA’s performance under the Consent Order.