2011 Mci D4000

By letter dated April 15, 2013, Motor Coach Industries (MCI) notified the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of a safety defect that may exist in certain model year (MY) 2012 and 2013 MCI D-model coaches built from December 22, 2011 to May 19, 2012 equipped with the Cummins 2010 EPA ISX 12 Liter engine.These vehicles may have had an incorrect installation of the exhaust pipe.If installed incorrectly, the elbow pipe may prematurely fail and if a Diesel Particulate Filter regeneration event occurs, the hot exhaust gases could cause a fire, resulting in injury to persons and/or damage to property.MCI conducted an inspect and repair if necessary recall campaign identified by NHTSA Recall No: 13V-142. At the time MCI believed that 13V-142 covered all the vehicles potentially having the safety defect. However, ODI review of EWR data indicated that other vehicles outside the scope of 13V-142 also experienced the same defect condition. Subsequently, in May 2017, MCI expanded the scope of the previous recall to include certain MY 2011-2012 MCI D-model coaches manufactured from January 31, 2011 to May 19, 2012, identified by NHTSA Recall No: 17V-337.In April 2013 when MCI conducted recall 13V-142 to remedy incorrectly installed bellows pipes on certain MCI model year 2012 and 2013 D model vehicles they also changed the bellows pipe assembly process in then current production.With recall 17V-337 MCI expanded the first recall by an additional 178 vehicles they felt also had not had the bellows pipe properly installed.Following the receipt of complaints and EWR data alleging bellows pipe failures on vehicles built after the implementation of the improved assembly process, NHTSA opened this Recall Query to assess the scope and adequacy of these two safety recalls and MCI's recall decision making process.Analysis of the failure data provided by MCI to this investigation found that the improved assembly process reduced the failure rate but did not eliminate the defect all together.In response to this investigation, MCI agreed to conduct recall 18V-309. This latest recall includes and expands upon the vehicle population of the prior recalls, and implements a new remedy that adds a mesh component to the bellows assembly to reduce vibration.This remedy was also implemented in production in 2015.Vehicles built after this date do not have an elevated failure rate even with a significant amount of time in service.With recall action 18V-309 taken by MCI this investigation is closed. Further use of agency resources does not appear to be warranted. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist on other model or MY vehicles outside of the recall scope. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

In the fall of 2011, network contacts made ODI aware of four (4) incidents of drive shaft failure on the subject buses involving a loss of vehicle control.Two of the incidents were relatively low speed non-crash events; and two resulted in motor coach rollovers.All four events showed signs of a common failure mode.The incidents and crashes studied during this investigation all resulted from a series of complex events that began with the the yoke journal ears on the drive shafts fracturing.Once the drive shaft failed. it was not adequately contained by a drive shaft safety loop or structure.The spinning and unrestrained drive shaft caused severe damage to components on the steerable tag axle at the rear of the vehicle and created a forced steering condition.Once the rear of the bus was being forcibly steered by the tag axle, the driver lost control of the vehicle.These conclusions are based on the forensics evidence and testing conducted by the Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC).The VRTC test report is attached to this closing resume that provides details on how the test center was able to conclusively identify the defective components on the buses and demonstrate the sequence of events that caused the buses to crash.Prior to the drive shaft failure events, there were no indications of improper maintenance or that maintenance was required that would have prevented the incidents.Additionally, the U-joints on the incident vehicles were found to be in good working condition at the time of the failure. Finally, records of driver interviews indicated a sudden onset of the failure with no warning.Following the VRTC testing, MCI issued recall 14V-335 involving certain model year 1993-1995 102DL3 motor coaches manufactured November 1992 to January 1995, and 2006 and 2008 D4505 motor coaches manufactured June 2005 to April 2008.The affected buses are equipped with a drive shaft with a compressed length of 30 inches or less (allowing it to escape containment if it fails), a steerable trailing tag axle equipped with a system that changes the axle caster when the vehicle is in reverse travel and no electronic stability control (ESC).Recall 14V-335 addresses the concerns of this investigation.The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.

ODI has identified certain MCI coaches with powertrain configurations that may allow a driveshaft separated at the rearward universal joint to escape the guardian structure of the steerable tag axle and damage steering and braking components.The damaged components may increase the risk of a loss of vehicle control. The subject coaches include 806 model year 1992 through 2012 MCI D and E series motor coaches with steerable tag axles.This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA12-007) to further study the alleged defect and to determine if a safety defect exists. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID: ODI Number 10447575.

Technical Service Information Bulletin describing the replacement of seating backrest attachment hardware with the addition of a mechanical lock nut on specifically equipped buses manufactured prior to model year 2020.

This Technical Service Information Bulletin (TSIB) describes an update from Meritor for the bolt torque application requirements on hub-to-rotor bolts for the front, drive and tag axles, on specific coaches equipped with Meritor EX225 disc brakes, on either Conventional, PreSet or Unitized Wheel-End hubs.

This Service Bulletin provides a checklist of actions to perform on a daily, weekly and monthly basis for parked coaches before they are considered ready for driving.

This Procedure outlines the steps to install a relief valve on the air compressor for coaches equipped with DD13 engines.

This Service Bulletin informs owners of the procedure to clean the batteries and reapply corrosion inhibitor every 6000 miles or 3 months, whichever first occurs.

MOTOR COACH INDUSTRIES (MCI): RED 185 DUROMETER POLYURETHANE BUSHINGS WERE REPLACED WITH 288 POLYURETHANE BUSHINGS IN SHOCK ABSORBERS THAT IN COLD TEMPERATURES, WILL FAIL, CAUSING ABSORBER STUD TO BREAK, AT BUSHING, AND COACH IS NOT OPERATIONAL DUE TO RISK OF DAMAGE TO SUSPENSION COMPONENT. MODEL D SERIES. *PE