2007 Saab 9-3 Recalls

From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.

THE OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION (ODI) IS AWARE OF 7 SUBJECT VEHICLES THAT HAVE ALLEGEDLY EXPERIENCED ENGINE COMPARTMENT FIRES ORIGINATING AT THE COIL-ON-PLUG (COP) IGNITION COIL ASSEMBLY AND 28 ALLEGED NON-FIRE THERMAL EVENTS RESULTING IN DAMAGE LIMITED TO THE SUBJECT COMPONENT AND ASSOCIATED WIRING. ALL REPORTED INCIDENTS OCCURRED WHILE THE VEHICLES WERE ATTENDED AND IN ALL BUT ONE CASE THE SUBJECT VEHICLES WERE REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE AFTER THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE ALLEGED DEFECT. ACCORDING TO GENERAL MOTORS (GM), A CERAMIC CAPACITOR USED IN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC NOISE FILTER CIRCUIT INSIDE THE SUBJECT COMPONENT MAY HAVE BEEN DAMAGED DURING THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. A FRACTURE INSIDE THE CAPACITOR MAY, DEPENDING ON ITS SIZE AND LOCATION, RESULT IN A RESISTIVE SHORT CIRCUIT. WHEN ENERGIZED, THE RESISTIVE SHORT CIRCUIT MAY CAUSE HEAT THAT CAN MELT THE POTTING EPOXY AROUND THE CIRCUIT BOARD AND LEAD TO SMOKE, ODOR AND IN SOME INSTANCES FIRE. OTHER SYMPTOMS MAY INCLUDE A MISFIRE CONDITION RESULTING IN ROUGH RUNNING AND/OR ILLUMINATION OF THE SERVICE ENGINE SOON TELLTALE LIGHT. ALL 7 FIRES OCCURRED RELATIVELY EARLY IN THE SERVICE LIFE OF THE VEHICLE AT 120, 171, 198, 207, 297, 365 AND 394 DAYS IN SERVICE, RESPECTIVELY. ODI ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT APPROXIMATELY 98% OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLE POPULATION IS NOW BEYOND THE EXPOSURE AGE AT WHICH FIRE INCIDENTS WERE OBSERVED. THE LAST KNOWN FIRE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN MAY 2009 ON A VEHICLE THAT HAD 394 DAYS IN SERVICE AND THE LAST KNOW FIRE INCIDENT PREVIOUS TO THAT OCCURRED IN DECEMBER 2008 ON A VEHICLE THAT HAD 198 DAYS IN SERVICE. A SAFETY-RELATED DEFECT HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AT THIS TIME AND FURTHER USE OF AGENCY RESOURCES DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WARRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THIS INVESTIGATION IS CLOSED. THE CLOSING OF THIS INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINDING BY NHTSA THAT A SAFETY-RELATED DEFECT DOES NOT EXIST. THE AGENCY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE FIELD EXPERIENCE OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLES AS IT RELATES TO THE ALLEGED DEFECT AND WILL TAKE FURTHER ACTION IF WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ADDITIONALLY, THE MANUFACTURER WILL PROVIDE THE AGENCY WITH AN UPDATE OF COMPLAINT AND WARRANTY INFORMATION IN 6 MONTHS FROM THE CLOSING DATE OF THIS INVESTIGATION AND UNTIL THAT TIME IT WILL NOTIFY THE AGENCY WITHIN 5 BUSINESS DAYS OF ANY FIRE INCIDENTS IT BECOMES AWARE OF THAT RELATES, OR MAY RELATE, TO THE ALLEGED DEFECT IN THE SUBJECT VEHICLES.

SAAB AUTOMOBILE AB, A SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (GM), MANUFACTURED 12,317 SUBJECT VEHICLES THROUGH FEBRUARY 15, 2008, EQUIPPED WITH THE HIGH FEATURE V6 TURBOCHARGED ENGINE IDENTIFIED BY REGULAR PRODUCTION OPTION LP9.A TANDEM VACUUM BRAKE BOOSTER ASSEMBLY PROVIDES BRAKE POWER-ASSIST.THE ENGINE IS THE PRIMARY VACUUM SOURCE TO THE BOOSTER AND ITS EFFECT IS AMPLIFIED BY A VENTURI.UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, SUCH AS A COLD ENGINE START OR AT HIGH ALTITUDES, AN ELECTRIC VACUUM PUMP (EVP) SUPPLEMENTS ENGINE VACUUM.A PRESSURE SWITCH MEASURES BRAKE BOOSTER VACUUM AND COMMANDS THE EVP WHEN TO TURN ON/OFF.CHECK VALVES ARE LOCATED AT THE INTAKE MANIFOLD, VENTURI, AND PRESSURE SWITCH. GM IDENTIFIED TWO ISSUES THAT AFFECT EVP PERFORMANCE: CORROSION OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS INSIDE THE PUMP CAUSED BY MOISTURE INGRESS THROUGH THE AIR OUTLET WHEN THE EVP SHUTS OFF AND THE VACUUM IN A SECTION OF PIPING BETWEEN THE EVP AND THE PRESSURE SWITCH IS RELEASED TO THE ATMOSPHERE; AND SILICONE CONTAMINATION OF THE ELECTRICAL CONTACTS INSIDE THE PRESSURE SWITCH RESULTING IN A NOISY OR IMPEDED ELECTRICAL SIGNAL.GM ADDRESSED EVP PERFORMANCE WITH TWO DESIGN CHANGES.IN NOVEMBER 2007, GM MODIFIED THE RUBBER PROTECTIVE CAP THAT COVERS THE EVP AIR OUTLET TO IMPROVE SEALING AND IN FEBRUARY 2008, GM ADDED A CHECK VALVE TO THE SECTION OF PIPING BETWEEN THE EVP AND THE PRESSURE SWITCH AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE EVP IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE BACK FLOW OF MOISTURE THROUGH THE PUMP. IN TOTAL, THE OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION (ODI) IS AWARE OF 240 SUBJECT VEHICLES AFFECTED BY THE ALLEGED DEFECT.COMPLAINANTS REPORT THAT SYMPTOMS OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER A COLD ENGINE START AND ONLY FOR A SHORT DURATION (30 TO 60 SECONDS), DURING WHICH PERIOD THE AMOUNT OF BRAKE POWER-ASSIST PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR MAY BE REDUCED DUE TO AN INOPERATIVE EVP.THE SYMPTOMS MAY BE MORE PRONOUNCED THE LONGER THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN PARKED AS THERE IS A NATURAL TENDENCY FOR THE BRAKE BOOSTER TO SLOWLY RELEASE THE VACUUM OVER TIME IF IT IS NOT REPLENISHED.FULL BRAKE POWER-ASSIST CAPABILITY RESUMES AFTER THIS BRIEF COLD START PERIOD OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER A WARM ENGINE START.THE THREE REPORTED CRASHES ALL OCCURRED AT LOW SPEEDS (< 5MPH) WHILE REVERSING FROM A GARAGE OR PARKING SPACE AND RESULTED IN MINIMAL TO MINOR PROPERTY DAMAGE. THE SUBJECT ISSUE DIFFERS FROM A PREVIOUS SAFETY RECALL (05V-236) AFFECTING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR (MY) 2003-2005 SAAB 9-3 VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH A DEFECTIVE CHECK VALVE THAT COULD BECOME BRITTLE AND FRACTURE, RESULTING IN A LASTING AND TOTAL LOSS OF BRAKE POWER-ASSIST AT ANY TIME.THE DEFECTIVE CHECK VALVE DID NOT MEET LIFETIME DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND GM PREDICTED A 100% FAILURE RATE AT LESS THAN 4 YEARS OF SERVICE.IN COMPARISON, GM PREDICTS AN EVP FAILURE RATE OF APPROXIMATELY 6.4% AT 3 YEARS IN SERVICE FOR THE SUBJECT VEHICLES RESULTING IN REDUCED BRAKE POWER-ASSIST FOR A SHORT DURATION.THE SUBJECT ISSUE ALSO DIFFERS FROM A PREVIOUS ODI INFLUENCED SAFETY RECALL (03V-474) TO ADDRESS EVP MOISTURE INGRESS IN CERTAIN MY 2000 VOLVO S40 AND V40 VEHICLES.THE RECALLED VOLVO VEHICLES UTILIZED A STEEL VACUUM PIPE BETWEEN THE EVP AND THE BRAKE BOOSTER.MOISTURE INGRESS AND SUBSEQUENT CORROSION COULD COMPROMISE THE VACUUM PIPE RESULTING IN A LASTING AND TOTAL LOSS OF BRAKE POWER-ASSIST.MOISTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE POLYETHER-ESTER PLASTIC VACUUM PIPE USED IN THE SUBJECT VEHICLES. A SAFETY-RELATED DEFECT HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AT THIS TIME AND FURTHER USE OF AGENCY RESOURCES DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WARRANTED.ACCORDINGLY, THIS INVESTIGATION IS CLOSED.THE CLOSING OF THIS INVESTIGATION