2022 Ford Mustang Mach E Recalls

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Engineering Analysis (EA) is being opened to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25001) to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

On August 17, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened RQ23-004 to investigate instances of loss of motor power due to overheating high voltage battery contactors in model year (MY) 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (subject vehicles). This Recall Query (RQ) was opened after receiving 12 consumer complaints alleging a high voltage battery main contactor failure in subject vehicles that were included in Recall 22V-412 and remedied prior to the reported incidents. The remedy in 22V-412 was a Secondary On-Board Diagnostic Control Module (SOBDMC) software update to monitor contactor temperature and reduce battery power to prevent damage to the contactor, and a Battery Energy Control Module (BECM) software update to monitor contactor resistance to identify an overheated contactor and reduce vehicle power to prevent further damage. On October 13, 2023, Ford filed Recall 23V-687 of 34,762 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles produced from May 27, 2020 to May 24, 2022 with recalled Bussed Electrical Center parts NK48-10C666-AA, NK48-10C666-BA, or LK98-10C666-AB. Affected vehicles are equipped with the extended range battery. Ford stated that preexisting damage to the contactors caused by heat and accumulated wear may reduce the effectiveness of the software update remedy in 22V-412. The remedy of 23V-687 is to complete a replacement of the Bussed Electrical Center, or High Voltage Battery Junction Box. In addition, Ford stated that subject vehicles equipped with standard range batteries, in comparison to vehicles equipped with extended range batteries, are less at risk of experiencing this failure due to their smaller battery capacity and lower output electric drive motors. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI will continue to monitor reports of this failure in both extended range and standard range models. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.