2022 Ford Mustang Mach E

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Engineering Analysis (EA) is being opened to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25001) to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

On August 17, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened RQ23-004 to investigate instances of loss of motor power due to overheating high voltage battery contactors in model year (MY) 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (subject vehicles). This Recall Query (RQ) was opened after receiving 12 consumer complaints alleging a high voltage battery main contactor failure in subject vehicles that were included in Recall 22V-412 and remedied prior to the reported incidents. The remedy in 22V-412 was a Secondary On-Board Diagnostic Control Module (SOBDMC) software update to monitor contactor temperature and reduce battery power to prevent damage to the contactor, and a Battery Energy Control Module (BECM) software update to monitor contactor resistance to identify an overheated contactor and reduce vehicle power to prevent further damage. On October 13, 2023, Ford filed Recall 23V-687 of 34,762 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles produced from May 27, 2020 to May 24, 2022 with recalled Bussed Electrical Center parts NK48-10C666-AA, NK48-10C666-BA, or LK98-10C666-AB. Affected vehicles are equipped with the extended range battery. Ford stated that preexisting damage to the contactors caused by heat and accumulated wear may reduce the effectiveness of the software update remedy in 22V-412. The remedy of 23V-687 is to complete a replacement of the Bussed Electrical Center, or High Voltage Battery Junction Box. In addition, Ford stated that subject vehicles equipped with standard range batteries, in comparison to vehicles equipped with extended range batteries, are less at risk of experiencing this failure due to their smaller battery capacity and lower output electric drive motors. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI will continue to monitor reports of this failure in both extended range and standard range models. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.

1) The high voltage junction box failed causing the vehicle to abruptly stall on a public road. The part will be available for inspection through contacting a local dealership. 2) The vehicle completely stalled at night in the middle of a 6 lane intersection. This posed a hazard for myself as well as for on coming and cross traffic. 3) The dealer has confirmed the failure of this component. 4) The vehicle component is being order of replacement at the dealership. The manufacture has also been informed via their corporate customer service line. 4) 5 seconds before the stall, the vehicle user interface displayed the message "please pull over safely". 10 minutes after the stall the Ford My Pass App showed three error messages: “High-Voltage Battery Warning”, “Powertrain Malfunction/Reduced Power” “Charge System Fault”

NHTSA ID

11765353

Incident

Sep 16, 2026

I had put the vehicle into One Pedal Drive mode for the first time on the morning of Aug 29th. Vehicle operated as it should for first few places I drove to and stopped, but then I approached a red light, removed foot slowly from accelerator and vehicle came to a full stop as it should. Approximately 2-5 seconds later, without warning or even the collision avoidance system activating, my vehicle suddenly accelerated into the rear of the stopped truck in front of me. Fortunately no serious injuries but someone could have been killed. My foot was NOT on the accelerator at the time - it was hovering over it while waiting for the light to change to green. My vehicle was taken to Ford for evaluation, but they claim it has to be repaired before they can diagnose/confirm the issue. I am the original owner with no previous accidents or incidents.

NHTSA ID

11764955

Incident

Aug 29, 2026

Spot welds have failed on the drivers side door. This is a known issue with multiple ford vehicles, though they have not issued a recall for this specific model.

NHTSA ID

11762501

Incident

Sep 6, 2026

I just had the High voltage battery junction box replaced after being in shop 16 days. Upon arrival to my house yesterday my car would not charge. upon further investigation once the Hvbj connector is replaced a charge of the car to put a full load on this connector is not performed. Instead ford goes the easy route and uses a test drive and other diagnostic test such as there computer to see if the connector is bad. This software does not detect even close to 100 percent of the time a faulty high voltage battery connector there diagnosis software it is flawed. The only true way to ensure proper replacement of this connector has been done is to charge the car with the charging cable that has come with the car and do thermal imaging on the connector. Because this is not being done you are putting peoples lives at risk by not knowing if the work has been done correctly without this thermal imaging test. Eventually if the high voltage battery junction box is replaced and even the slightest mis crimp of the connector is not done properly without putting a charging load on the connector and testing it with thermal imaging testing they are doing the quick and easy thing which does not detect the problem 100 recent of the time by using the on board diagnosis system as well as driving it. Two recalls and NHSTA investigation on the high speed battery voltage box and it still fails. Because of this test not being done I am positive this is why my car has failed again because it is the only way to be 100 percent sure of a bad high voltage box connector. This will unfortunately due to not being tested by putting a real world load on the vehicle and testing it with thermal imaging thermal runaway of an improper crimping or loose connection on someones car. Recommendation if you are going to replace a connector that has to deal with the battery charging and the only way to be 100 percent sure is to put a load and do thermal imaging to ensure its done properly do it no shortcuts.

NHTSA ID

11759936

Incident

Aug 26, 2026

See attached document for complaint

NHTSA ID

11758437

Incident

Jun 26, 2026

The high voltage battery junction box connector has failed. There have been two recalls one software and one to replace this part the high voltage battery junction box with a more robust part to handle thermal loads. As of now there are zero recalls on my car open so they are all done. The first time this component failed was around 24k miles ish it's now 56k miles ish and it has failed again even after two recalls and an investigation around the same exact time. This means one of two things has happened either somehow the recalls by Tim Moran ford where not done properly and somehow the older failed part number was installed in my car or the more likely senario is that fords supposed robust part was just a simple part number change without a robust enough design to handle the thermal load. I would like to think that Tim Moran ford who is independent from for has done there due diligence the first time it was replaced and but the correct part number which leads me to conclude the investigation by the NHSTA that resulted in a part change did not fix the issue at hand and the car is now unsafe to drive as this is the second time it has happened to me on this vehicle. Thank god this time I was not going through a curve and headed off road. Same issue almost exact same failure part gone wrong and same issue to date. I demand not only for myself but the safety of others as a former Quality Assurance Representative of electronics on Hueys and Cobras that this be re investigated immediately. It is to late in the game to have zero recalls on my car open two that have been done and the same part fails a second time this should never happen to anyone if it has already been investigated and supposedly fixed. I do not believe it is fixed and the car is not safe to drive I'm hesitant to even go get it when it's ready next week with this serious safety flaw in the design of this vehicle with it still incurring.

NHTSA ID

11758349

Incident

Aug 10, 2026

I was pulling into a parking lot at low speed when the car suddenly began accelerating rapidly on its own. Fortunately, when I hit the brakes it stopped without incident. However, if someone had been right in front of me at the time - a pedestrian or car - it could have resulted in a crash. I am certain that I didn't hit the accelerator, nor was it pushed by floor mats or anything like that. It is conceivable that when I was turning, my left palm activated the cruise control in some manner, but that scenario wouldn't explain the acceleration part. And frankly, I don't think that is what happened. I love the vehicle and am not trying to get anything out of it. I am a capable driver with good reflexes and experience. I was able to stop it, but if this were to happen to a new driver or senior driver it could result in a crash. I looked on reddit and many others report exact same issues.

NHTSA ID

11757918

Incident

Aug 18, 2026

I am unsure, but I think it's the High Voltage Battery Junction Box. A week after buying the car used from Aaron Ford of Poway, I received a Safely Stop now warning, then the car broke down on the middle of the turning lane into my job a medical clinic putting myself, patients, other drivers, and my coworkers all on danger as it is a busy street. The hazard lights would not work, and the car would not go into neutral. The next day, all the dealership did was replace the 12v battery, then I only got 1 mile from the dealership before it broke down again in an even more busier and dangerous highway in the slow lane and crosswalk. The hazard lights would not work, and the car would not go into neutral.

NHTSA ID

11757487

Incident

Aug 12, 2026

Some 2021-2023 Mustang Mach-E vehicles built on or before 25-Jun-2023, 2022-2025 E-Transit and 2022-2023 F-150 Lightning vehicles may experience a high voltage battery stop charging condition when using a direct current (DC) fast charger level 3 with diagnostic trouble codes (DTCs) P0EEE:27 and P2E53:27 stored in the on-board diagnostic control module A (SOBDM). This may be due to the SOBDM software. Replacement of the charge port will not resolve this concern. Inform customers that their vehicles can still be charged using a level 1 or level 2 alternating current (AC) charger. Engineering is currently working on a software solution expected in Q3 2026. Schedule an appointment with the customer when the repair becomes available. Monitor Professional Technician System (PTS) for additional information.

Some 2021-2026 Ford/Lincoln vehicles may exhibit various symptoms including but not limited to the auto start/stop system not operating as intended with a "Check Charging System" message in the instrument panel cluster (IPC) while the charging system is operating properly with no charging related diagnostic trouble codes (DTC) stored. This may be due to someone using an aftermarket programmer to change the body control module (BCM) configuration to disable the auto start/stop system or perform other unsupported programming modifications. To correct this condition on F-150 and Bronco vehicles, download and run the Ford Diagnosis and Repair System (FDRS) application titled "BCM-Charging System Configuration Correction". Running this application will determine if the BCM configuration was modified by the customer and if so, provide the option to return the configuration back to factory settings. For other vehicle models exhibiting concerns related to unsupported aftermarket BCM programming, submit a Technical Support Request (TSR) requesting support to revert the BCM configuration

Some 2021-2024 Ford and Lincoln vehicles may exhibit an "Updating SYNC" message on the vehicle center display screen after an over the air (OTA) update. The message can be cleared from the center display screen and SYNC can be used normally, but it will re-appear at every subsequent ignition cycle. Inform customers that engineering is currently working on a software update solution for this condition to be delivered OTA expected in late Q3 2026. Software will update automatically if vehicle connectivity is enabled in the vehicles settings. Monitor Professional Technician System (PTS) for additional information.

Some of the vehicles listed in the Model statement above may exhibit a distorted or muffled sound originating from the center speaker. This may be due to a deformed speaker cone.

Some 2021-2026 Ford vehicles may exhibit inoperative heated/cooled seats, heated steering wheel and/or front/rear defrost features after a remote start is performed through the Ford mobile application or with the key fob. Customers may also experience heated/cooled seats, heated steering wheel and/or front/rear defrost features turning on in unexpected conditions such as during warmer weather. These features will operate normally when commanded in the center display screen. This may be due to the customer not setting up their "Climate Settings" through the Ford mobile application. To correct this condition, inform the customer they should perform a remote start from the Ford mobile application and then adjust the "Climate Settings" in the Ford mobile application as desired. These settings only need to be set once and will persist through subsequent remote starts. Heated and cooled seats will be set to Level 2 when turned ON via "Climate Settings" in the Ford mobile application during a remote start event. This is normal operating characteristic. This condition does not affect vehicle durability and no a

Quality improvements include: - Updates the motor short failure detection logic to prevent Diagnostic Trouble Codes