2021 Ford Mustang Mach E

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Engineering Analysis (EA) is being opened to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25001) to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

On August 17, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened RQ23-004 to investigate instances of loss of motor power due to overheating high voltage battery contactors in model year (MY) 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (subject vehicles). This Recall Query (RQ) was opened after receiving 12 consumer complaints alleging a high voltage battery main contactor failure in subject vehicles that were included in Recall 22V-412 and remedied prior to the reported incidents. The remedy in 22V-412 was a Secondary On-Board Diagnostic Control Module (SOBDMC) software update to monitor contactor temperature and reduce battery power to prevent damage to the contactor, and a Battery Energy Control Module (BECM) software update to monitor contactor resistance to identify an overheated contactor and reduce vehicle power to prevent further damage. On October 13, 2023, Ford filed Recall 23V-687 of 34,762 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles produced from May 27, 2020 to May 24, 2022 with recalled Bussed Electrical Center parts NK48-10C666-AA, NK48-10C666-BA, or LK98-10C666-AB. Affected vehicles are equipped with the extended range battery. Ford stated that preexisting damage to the contactors caused by heat and accumulated wear may reduce the effectiveness of the software update remedy in 22V-412. The remedy of 23V-687 is to complete a replacement of the Bussed Electrical Center, or High Voltage Battery Junction Box. In addition, Ford stated that subject vehicles equipped with standard range batteries, in comparison to vehicles equipped with extended range batteries, are less at risk of experiencing this failure due to their smaller battery capacity and lower output electric drive motors. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI will continue to monitor reports of this failure in both extended range and standard range models. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.

While driving my front passenger door opened. It has now done it several times while driving the vehicle. Also, I will lock my car and walk into the house and work and my door will open setting my alarm off.

NHTSA ID

11765348

Incident

Sep 16, 2026

My 2021 Ford Mustang Mach-E (142,009 miles) intermittently fails to accept a charge at public DC fast-charging stations. My husband relies on these stations because our home electrical panel cannot support a home EV charger, and he uses this vehicle daily for his work in commercial real estate, often needing to charge it twice a day while traveling throughout Southern California. We first brought the vehicle to Tuttle-Click’s Capistrano Ford (San Juan Capistrano, CA) for this issue, and were charged $250 for a diagnosis and software-related repair (Invoice XXX, dated XXX). The technician’s notes state the vehicle would stop charging after about a minute at DC fast chargers, that the code P0EEE:27 was stored in the SOBDM module, and that the battery was manually charged to 99% and the code cleared. Ford refunded the $250 after the same problem recurred shortly after this repair. When we brought the vehicle back in a second time for the identical issue, the dealership informed us that Ford currently has no fix for this defect, and that only a Level 1 or Level 2 AC home charger can reliably charge the vehicle — which is not an option for us since we have no home charger installed. The dealership subsequently provided us with a copy of Ford’s own internal Special Service Message, SSM 55080, titled ‘Stop Charging When Using DC Fast Charger Level 3 With DTC P0EEE:27 And/Or P2E53:27 Stored In the SOBDM Module.’ This bulletin confirms Ford is aware this defect affects 2021–2023 Mustang Mach-E, 2022–2025 E-Transit, and 2022–2023 F-150 Lightning vehicles, that replacing the charge port hardware will not resolve it, and that a software fix was targeted for Q3 2026 — a deadline that has passed without a working fix reaching our vehicle. This defect leaves us with no reliable way to charge the vehicle away from home, directly impacting my husband’s ability to conduct his work.

NHTSA ID

11761335

Incident

Jun 15, 2026

This is the information from the Ford dealership that was looking at my vehicle, but did not complete the repair: "Verified customer concern. During diagnosis, the following on-demand DCs were retrieved from the BECM: POAA1:00, POAA4:00, and P0563:00. Following TSB 25- 2247, a High Current Fuse Box is required for replacement to start. During the FDRS High Voltage System De-energizing procedure, FDRS detected a stuck contactor. After opening the LVSD as instructed, FDRS displayed Voltage Still Present. Multiple repair attempts failed. Customer was contacted and notified to bring to selling dealer, Further technical support required with engineering. No repairs made at this time." While Ford has reported that my vehicle is not subject to any related recall at this time, the safety concerns raised during this diagnosis are very similar to those safety concerns raised in NHTSA Recall No:23V-687 (Manufacturer Recall No: 23S56). My vehicle is also part of the described class of vehicle in that Safety Recall Report. I am of the belief that my vehicle should have been included in that safety recall or a related safety recall. To date, every Ford dealership I have reached out to refuses to make repairs to my vehicle related to this issue.

NHTSA ID

11758351

Incident

Jul 15, 2026

My 2021 Ford Mustang Mach-E suffered a total loss of motive power on the road, throwing code P0D10:00:AF for a stuck-open high-voltage contactor. This is the exact failure mode of Safety Recall 23S56. Ford is refusing to cover the repair because my VIN was omitted from the database and the vehicle is at 108,017 miles, treating a hazardous powertrain defect as an out-of-warranty consumer expense. I have an active case number with Ford.

NHTSA ID

11757768

Incident

Aug 7, 2026

The panoramic roof glass panel is not properly bonded/sealed to the vehicle body structure, allowing water to leak into the cabin on the driver’s side. The vehicle and the failed component (roof glass/moulding) remain available for inspection upon request. This creates a safety risk consistent with the one described in NHTSA Campaign 21V712000 / Ford Safety Recall 21S42, which covers 2021 Mustang Mach-E vehicles with inadequate panoramic roof glass panel adhesion to the vehicle body structure — a defect that, per Ford’s own recall filing, creates risk of the roof panel separating from the vehicle while driving, increasing the risk of a road hazard, injury, or crash. My vehicle exhibits the water leak symptom associated with this defect, but my VIN was not included in the recall population. The first visible symptom — staining on the driver’s side rear headliner — was documented in a photograph dated XXX, with continued staining documented in a follow-up photograph dated XXX. The vehicle was presented to an authorized Ford dealer (All American Ford of [XXX]) for inspection on XXX. The dealer confirmed the water leak and documented the driver-side top moulding as faulty, with the roof panel requiring replacement. The vehicle was also examined through a BBB AUTO LINE arbitration proceeding (Case #XXX), which acknowledged the existence of Safety Recall 21V712 in connection with this vehicle’s file. There were no warning lamps or dashboard messages associated with this failure; the only symptom has been visible water intrusion and headliner staining. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11755711

Incident

Apr 21, 2026

While merging onto the freeway and accelerating, the center touchscreen detached from its mount. The screen has two components: a rear housing fixed to the dash and a glass front panel that sits on top of it — the glass panel came loose on its own; I have never attempted to remove or pry it. The panel remained connected only by internal wiring and hung loose from the dash while the vehicle was in motion. This created three distinct safety hazards: (1) the screen was dangling and at risk of fully detaching, (2) the failure occurred during a high-attention driving maneuver (accelerating while merging), and (3) I was forced to catch the glass panel with one hand to prevent it from falling or shattering, then reattach it while still navigating traffic — as the sole occupant of the vehicle. Heavier-than-usual traffic that day gave me a lower-speed window to manage this; at highway speed under normal conditions, this could have been considerably more dangerous. No warning lights or dashboard messages preceded the failure — this is a hardware/mechanical defect, likely related to the internal mounting clips. Since the initial failure, the screen has detached repeatedly during acceleration, occurring frequently over the following days. In subsequent incidents, my boyfriend was a passenger and able to assist in stabilizing the screen. The screen has since stopped functioning entirely, which independently constitutes a safety issue, as it disables the backup camera display and other driver-assist systems that rely on it. The dealer has not yet been able to reproduce the issue. A service appointment has been scheduled and is pending.

NHTSA ID

11755696

Incident

Aug 5, 2026

The HVBJB ($3500 + Tax) went on my car. It is out of battery system warranty by 25,000 miles (ended at 100,000 miles, I have 125,000 miles). I called Ford Corporate and they said they "have no current programs" to give me any good will discount on the repair. This is a big, known issue with Mustang Mach-e's There was a recall for this HVBJB part / system on many of the 2021 models, but somehow mine wasn't included in the recall. I cannot afford this repair, and I was hoping the NHTSA can get involved to get me some financial relief from Ford. There was also a safety issue as this morning when this all happened, the car forced me to stop at an intersection and would not move or restart. The police had to push me through the intersection. It's currently at Chapman Ford in Egg Harbour Townshop, NJ.

NHTSA ID

11755300

Incident

Aug 6, 2026

The contact owns a 2021 Ford Mustang Mach-E. While the contact's daughter was driving at an undisclosed speed, the vehicle independently accelerated. The brake pedal was depressed; however, the vehicle failed to stop as intended. No warning lights were illuminated. The contact stated that the failure occurred while the vehicle was being parked in the residence driveway. The vehicle crashed into the right side of the residence before coming to a stop. The air bags did not deploy. The contact stated that the right side of the garage was damaged. No injuries were sustained. The contact stated that the failure was a known failure with the vehicle. The contact stated that an unknown recall with a similar failure was completed in 2022. The vehicle was towed to a local tow yard. The vehicle was deemed a total loss by the insurance company. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 65,000.

NHTSA ID

11754043

Incident

Jul 22, 2026

Mileage

65,000 mi

Some 2021-2023 Mustang Mach-E vehicles built on or before 25-Jun-2023, 2022-2025 E-Transit and 2022-2023 F-150 Lightning vehicles may experience a high voltage battery stop charging condition when using a direct current (DC) fast charger level 3 with diagnostic trouble codes (DTCs) P0EEE:27 and P2E53:27 stored in the on-board diagnostic control module A (SOBDM). This may be due to the SOBDM software. Replacement of the charge port will not resolve this concern. Inform customers that their vehicles can still be charged using a level 1 or level 2 alternating current (AC) charger. Engineering is currently working on a software solution expected in Q3 2026. Schedule an appointment with the customer when the repair becomes available. Monitor Professional Technician System (PTS) for additional information.

Some 2021-2026 Ford/Lincoln vehicles may exhibit various symptoms including but not limited to the auto start/stop system not operating as intended with a "Check Charging System" message in the instrument panel cluster (IPC) while the charging system is operating properly with no charging related diagnostic trouble codes (DTC) stored. This may be due to someone using an aftermarket programmer to change the body control module (BCM) configuration to disable the auto start/stop system or perform other unsupported programming modifications. To correct this condition on F-150 and Bronco vehicles, download and run the Ford Diagnosis and Repair System (FDRS) application titled "BCM-Charging System Configuration Correction". Running this application will determine if the BCM configuration was modified by the customer and if so, provide the option to return the configuration back to factory settings. For other vehicle models exhibiting concerns related to unsupported aftermarket BCM programming, submit a Technical Support Request (TSR) requesting support to revert the BCM configuration

Some 2021-2024 Ford and Lincoln vehicles may exhibit an "Updating SYNC" message on the vehicle center display screen after an over the air (OTA) update. The message can be cleared from the center display screen and SYNC can be used normally, but it will re-appear at every subsequent ignition cycle. Inform customers that engineering is currently working on a software update solution for this condition to be delivered OTA expected in late Q3 2026. Software will update automatically if vehicle connectivity is enabled in the vehicles settings. Monitor Professional Technician System (PTS) for additional information.

Some 2021-2026 Ford vehicles may exhibit inoperative heated/cooled seats, heated steering wheel and/or front/rear defrost features after a remote start is performed through the Ford mobile application or with the key fob. Customers may also experience heated/cooled seats, heated steering wheel and/or front/rear defrost features turning on in unexpected conditions such as during warmer weather. These features will operate normally when commanded in the center display screen. This may be due to the customer not setting up their "Climate Settings" through the Ford mobile application. To correct this condition, inform the customer they should perform a remote start from the Ford mobile application and then adjust the "Climate Settings" in the Ford mobile application as desired. These settings only need to be set once and will persist through subsequent remote starts. Heated and cooled seats will be set to Level 2 when turned ON via "Climate Settings" in the Ford mobile application during a remote start event. This is normal operating characteristic. This condition does not affect vehicle durability and no a

Some of the vehicles listed in the Model statement above may exhibit a distorted or muffled sound originating from the center speaker. This may be due to a deformed speaker cone.

Quality improvements include: - Updates the motor short failure detection logic to prevent Diagnostic Trouble Codes