2022 Tesla Model S

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

This vehicle has a recurring suspension defect causing a chassis or suspension component to make physical contact with the inner shoulder of the rear tires during normal operation, producing a sharp linear cut progressing to full cord exposure and fraying of internal steel and aramid belts. This has occurred on at least three sets of rear tires between July 2025 and June 2026. Tesla's own service records document the damage pattern on multiple occasions. No root cause has ever been identified or corrected by Tesla's service department. A tire with exposed and fraying cords on a vehicle producing over 1,000 horsepower presents a serious risk of catastrophic blowout at speed.

NHTSA ID

11750106

Incident

Jul 12, 2026

Turn signal inaccessible.

NHTSA ID

11748845

Incident

Jul 5, 2026

See attached document for complaint.

NHTSA ID

11747689

Incident

May 5, 2026

The vehicle was being driven northbound in the regular (non-HOV) lanes of Route I-95 under the control of Version 12 of FSD software. I believe that the vehicle would have crashed into the lowered gates preventing vehicles from entering the HOV lanes, which operate in only one direction at a time. Beyond the gates, the HOV lanes contained high-speed oncoming traffic. The problems occurred south of the Dale City exit from northbound I-95. The car’s navigation system gave an audio instruction to keep left to bear onto northbound I-95 and the car did exactly that. Twice. I believe that both crashing into the lowered gates or crashing head-on into oncoming vehicles would likely have resulted in multiple deaths, including my own. I saw the developing problem and took control of the vehicle before it could bear left onto the closed ramp to the HOV lanes.

NHTSA ID

11747523

Incident

Jun 30, 2026

This car does not have reliable horn system. I have the steering wheel version (not the “yoke” version) but I believe it’s a similar problem on both. The steering wheel center (airbag) does NOT operate as a horn. Instead there is only a extremely small horn sensor on one side of the wheel that cannot be reliably accessed in an emergency situation b/c of its tiny size and b/c its position depends on where the steering wheel has been turned. This is EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. On a recent drive a car pulled into our lane from a side street and I was unable to locate the horn in a timely manner. Fortunately the car braked and I was able to pull around but it was very close and could have resulted in a head on crash. I contacted Tesla about this issue. The service rep acknowledged the problem and said it was an “issue” that had gotten numerous complaints but that all he could offer was a Tesla aftermarket replacement that would cost nearly $1,000 to install. I presume NTSB has gotten many complaints about this incredibly dangerous and egregious latent safety defect in the car’s design. Tesla (at least for the 2024 and on Model 3 - which I also own) has corrected this design defect such that the center area does operate as a horn (as I am sure 99% of cars do). The NTSB should investigate and require Tesla to retrofit any of its cars which have this safety defect. I have no doubt that people will (or likely have been) seriously injured (or even killed) in car crashes that could have been avoided had Tesla retrofitted its vehicles built with this dangerous safety design defect. Please, please open an investigation and require Tesla to correct this inherent safety design defect. Tesla already has the fix (and have implicitly recognized the defect by correcting it on its current models). NTSB’s failure to require Tesla to act will result in many avoidable accidents/injuries. Owners should not have to pay nearly $1k to correct Tesla’s latent/non-obvious safety defect.

NHTSA ID

11746306

Incident

Jun 17, 2026

2022 Tesla Model S Plaid purchased CPO from Tesla Florida Inc. Jacksonville on 8/29/2025 for $75,533.19. Multiple unresolved safety defects. (1) Trunk closure obstacle-detection failure 10/15/2025: key fob fell in gap between liftgate and roof; powered liftgate continued upward opening cycle and compressed fob against fixed roof glass until rear glass shattered. $4,100 repair. Same cycle on a child hand or finger would cause crush injury or amputation. Tesla Model X tailgate and falcon doors have obstacle detection; Plaid liftgate lacks it. (2) Passenger-side rear door handle requires extreme pressure to operate, raised 10/25/2025; iced over 1/19/2026 compounding egress hazard. (3) Center console haptic backup gear selector non-functional plus observed main touchscreen reset/blackout events: no manual gear control during foreseeable touchscreen failure event. (4) HV battery umbrella valves and flood port plunger required replacement 10/25/2025. (5) Rear spoiler bilaterally detached as of 5/13/2026 on 200mph-capable vehicle. (6) Front trunk latch unreliable; requires 2-3 commands to open; risk of hood opening at speed. (7) USB charging circuit melted a portable battery bank 11/2/2025; fire-risk overcurrent indicator. (8) Tire sidewall damage Tesla circled "OK" at CPO delivery; refused replacement 5 times; Tesla SMS 1/13/2026: "sidewall damage would need to be replaced." (9) Multiple unauthorized digital-access events: Track Mode created post-service; Charge Current set to 5A; Dog Mode disabled; pre-delivery key card 8/28/2025; phone key 3/14/2026; both front door reflectors found loosened 11/8/2025. Warranty defect notice sent certified 4/20/2026; Tesla declined 5/7/2026 without addressing any item. Full documentation, SMS thread, photographs attached.

NHTSA ID

11737697

Incident

Aug 29, 2025

My 2022 Tesla Model S is equipped with 21" Arachnid cast alloy wheels. The wheel on the front driver side developed a structural crack under normal driving conditions with no road hazard impact or unusual driving events. The crack has caused a significant air leak, with tire pressure dropping from 44 PSI to 34 PSI over approximately 10 miles of normal driving. At 34 PSI on a 265/35ZR21 low-profile tire, there is meaningful risk of rim-to-road contact. The vehicle shakes noticeably during normal driving as a direct result of the pressure loss. The tires have approximately 13,000 miles on them. We are aware of multiple other Tesla Model S Arachnid wheel owners reporting identical cracking under normal use on [XXX] , suggesting a pattern consistent with a manufacturing defect in the cast alloy wheel design. This is a safety concern as the leak rate is significant and the condition could deteriorate without warning. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11737473

Incident

May 5, 2026

The center high-mounted stop lamp (CHMSL / third brake light) fails on 2021 and newer Tesla Model S vehicles (including Plaid). This is a common issue reported by many owners, particularly as vehicles exit the warranty period. No redesigned or corrected replacement part has been made available by Tesla. Pre-2021 CHMSL units are incompatible and will not fit. Repair requires removal and replacement of the entire rear liftgate glass assembly, which is extremely expensive and labor-intensive for owners. Prior model years did not experience this problem. A non-functional CHMSL reduces the vehicle's visibility to following traffic and increases the risk of rear-end collisions, especially at night or in poor weather. This appears to be a design or manufacturing defect affecting safety. Discussions [XXX] Repair process [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11736496

Incident

May 5, 2026

On some Model S and Model X vehicles, the compression gap of the HVAC drain funnel seal is wider than intended, which may cause water ingress. Inspect the sponge area of the HVAC drain funnel for water ingress. If water ingress is present, rework the HVAC drain funnel seal.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the HV battery umbrella valves, over time, may become damaged due to road debris. Replace all 5 umbrella valves with updated parts. This new revision, R1, updates the affected Countries/Regions.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles built between approximately January 2021 and September 22, 2022, the High Voltage (HV) battery ports’ plungers intended for internal water leak egress (also known as flood ports) can be replaced with plungers that are more robust against external ingress due to submersion during flooding or other similar high-severity abuse instances. Replace all 5 flood port plungers with updated parts. This new revision, R2, updates the affected Countries/Regions.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the HV battery umbrella valves, over time, may become damaged due to road debris.

Messaging sent directly to customers who have queued with Tesla Service to perform Service Bulletin SB-25-16-002 "Replace Flood Port Plungers". The customer is informed that their vehicle is in queue to receive parts and repairs, Tesla Service will reach out to them when the Service Center is ready to schedule vehicle service, and what to do if the vehicle is exposed/will be exposed to flooding.

Proactive messaging sent directly to customers affected by Service Bulletin SB-25-16-002 "Replace Flood Port Plungers". The customer is informed that their vehicle is impacted by Service Bulletin SB-25-16-002, the benefits of performing the bulletin repair, and what to do if the vehicle is exposed/will be exposed to flooding.