2023 Tesla Model S

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

My Tesla Model S has a touch-sensitive horn button on the right side of the steering wheel. In urgent situations, I've often had difficulty quickly locating it to get another driver's attention. Tesla quoted me $1800 to replace the steering wheel with a model that has the horn in the center, like most other cars. This is a safety concern because owners shouldn't have to pay to move the horn for safety reasons. Tesla should be required to retrofit any model with a touch button for the horn to one with the horn in the center of the steering wheel.

NHTSA ID

11756007

Incident

Aug 8, 2026

The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while exiting a supercharging station with the Full Self-Driving (FSD) feature engaged, the message "Take Over Immediately" was displayed. The contact stated that the vehicle abruptly accelerated into an intersection and crashed head-on with another vehicle. The air bags deployed as needed. The contact stated that a Police report was filed; however, the report number was not provided. There were no injuries sustained. The vehicle was towed to an independent mechanic, where it remained undiagnosed and unrepaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure but provided no assistance. The failure mileage was 150,332.

NHTSA ID

11754941

Incident

Aug 4, 2026

Mileage

150,332 mi

​The driver's seat assembly on the vehicle suffers from a critical mechanical and software tracking defect that causes the seat to permanently jam into a mechanical lock, creating an immediate and severe safety hazard. ​The electronic calibration soft-stops for the driver's seat allow the mechanism to travel past the safe limits of the track when indexed or operated. When the seat reaches the absolute mechanical limit of the rear rail, the lead screw/worm gear mechanism binds tightly, resulting in a total mechanical lock where the motor lacks the breakaway torque to reverse direction. This causes the driver's seat to become permanently stuck in the fully rearward position. ​This defect directly compromises vehicle safety by potentially preventing a driver from safely reaching and operating the brake and accelerator pedals. ​The vehicle has been taken to the manufacturer's service center on three separate occasions for this exact issue. During these three visits, technicians physically replaced the seat motor, checked track alignment, and attempted recalibration. Despite these repeated hardware interventions, the defect persists, and the seat continues to travel past safe limits and bind into a mechanical lock. The manufacturer has now refused to correct the underlying track/assembly defect under warranty, incorrectly dismissing the recurring, hazardous mechanical failure as "customer education." The vehicle lacks a safe physical fail-safe to prevent the seat from self-destructing into a permanently jammed state.

NHTSA ID

11753375

Incident

Apr 9, 2026

Repeated warning of failure of Front left safety restraint system. Now also a seatbelt warning light. Have already bright car to service three times. Tesla acknowledges inability to resolve recurrent issue. I think this was a recall issue for previous years of this model, Model S. Most recent yesterday, Friday, June 12, 2026.

NHTSA ID

11743884

Incident

Jun 12, 2026

I feel Tesla has introduced two safety issues with a recent version of software relating to the "Full Self Driving (Supervised)" feature. Issue #1. When disengaging the Full Self Driving ("FSD") software, Tesla positions a dialog box over the main center display screen. The box takes up a fairly large portion of space. The purpose of the box is to provide feedback on the reason for disengaging FSD. This dialog box does not dismiss by itself. The only way for the user to dismiss it is to tap one of the 4 options presented or leave a voice message. This is an unnecessary distraction that in no way is required for the user to operate the vehicle. Tesla is mandating feedback and introducing distractions when users take over control of the vehicle for their sole benefit. It is also akin to a penalty for disabling FSD, as it a generally negative experience for most people. Issue #2. Tesla has introduced a mandatory "FSD Streak" counter. This number appears on the smaller instrumentation screen for the S & X models. The counter counts the number of miles consecutively traveled by FSD. When a driver disables FSD for any reason, the counter resets to 0. The gamification of keeping FSD enabled is a major safety issue. Some people are highly susceptible to increasing this number as high as possible as if it were a video game. In situations where they should likely disable FSD and make manual control, there are inevitably users that will hesitate or maybe even not take control at all because they do not want to reset the counter. Tesla does not have any options to disable or remove this counter, so even people who know they are susceptible to this cannot remove it. This is akin to placing an open beer in the car and saying people will not drink it because they have self control... only - as we know, addiction is a disease, and games are just as addicting as many substances.

NHTSA ID

11743804

Incident

May 15, 2026

The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model S. The contact stated that the horn button on the right side of the steering wheel was not easily accessible. The contact was concerned that the issue could prevent the driver from beeping the horn during emergencies, increasing the risk of a crash. The manufacturer was notified of the failure and advised the contact to purchase the improved steering wheel designed with a center horn. The vehicle was not repaired. The failure mileage was unavailable.

NHTSA ID

11742158

Incident

Sep 30, 2023

Tesla just sold me a car with defective front half shafts axles. The car makes a reproducible and very concerning accelerator pedal shudder that makes the entire vehicle front vibrate, including the steering wheel and brake pedals while the car is accelerating between 30-60mph. This interferes with safety features like, lane departure assistance and blind spot steering wheel feedback, Confusing the driver and creating a distracting scenario where an accident can happen. Upon bringing this to the attention of the service center in Fort Myers Florida, the service center manager took a drive test with me, and was able to replicate the issue, but immediately started dismissing it as "normal" and within Tesla specs. This is becoming a regular practice at that service center, where they deem warrantable issues as normal and within (their tolerance). I insisted that this issue is not to be taken likely by Tesla, because it is something that involves a safety hazard. Upon further research, I was able to find that this issue is happening to many Teslas model S and X, where the front axles bend due to the weight and high torque of the vehicles. The issue falls completely under warranty and the half shafts should be replaced, but apparently Tesla has instructed their service centers to dismiss and disregard the symptoms, and just tell the customers that no warranty replacement will occur, because it is not necessary, we just have to drive the cars like this, until the car completely fails, or an accident happens because one of the bent axle shafts breaks on a highway during normal drive. I recording this report as evidence that the issue has been reported to the highest vehicle safety authorities, and I expect a corrective action so Tesla can fix my car under the existing unexpired warranty.

NHTSA ID

11737380

Incident

May 10, 2026

I have been consistently at risk since I picked up my car in late December 2023. The Horn icon which is impossible for older people to see, especially at night, is located in a place that is very hard to find on the steering wheel and unintuitive. Just yesterday, a large truck was coming around the corner near my house in my lane in the opposite direction and I could not find the horn to honk. It was another near miss. Interestingly, Tesla changed the design and put the horn in the middle of the steering wheel where it belongs starting in January 2024 just a few days after I picked up my car. I need the Horn in an intuitive place in the middle of the steering wheel for my safety and the safety of the other people on the road I believe Tesla should pay to change out the steering wheel

NHTSA ID

11736794

Incident

May 8, 2026

On some Model S and Model X vehicles, the compression gap of the HVAC drain funnel seal is wider than intended, which may cause water ingress. Inspect the sponge area of the HVAC drain funnel for water ingress. If water ingress is present, rework the HVAC drain funnel seal.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

Some Model S and Model X vehicles with 1st Generation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antennas might suffer from lower-than-expected navigation signal strength under certain circumstances.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

Some Model S and Model X vehicles with 1st Generation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antennas might suffer from lower-than-expected navigation signal strength under certain circumstances.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.