2015 Tesla Model S

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.

From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.

On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.

The center touchscreen suddenly went completely black and became unresponsive without warning. Repeated attempts to restart it using the steering-wheel scroll buttons have failed. The black screen prevents me from accessing important vehicle functions, including the rearview camera and other controls plus the sound system is affected so I do not hear any warnings. This creates a serious safety concern while driving. Additionally, the driver's instrument cluster remains black for approximately 20–30 seconds after pressing the brake pedal before the Tesla logo appears and the display becomes operational. This delays access to essential driving information. These problems have occurred during normal vehicle use. The vehicle drives normally once the instrument cluster starts, and its driving range and charging behavior appear unchanged. However, I am concerned that these electronic failures could put me, my passengers, and other road users at risk. The vehicle has been professionally inspected, and I was advised that it likely needs a replacement Media Control Unit (MCU) and 12-volt battery. These components have been identified as needing replacement to address the electronic problems. However, the repairs have not yet been completed. I respectfully ask NHTSA to investigate whether these failures represent a broader safety defect affecting other Tesla Model S vehicles, particularly involving the MCU, eMMC memory, touchscreen, and instrument cluster. If a safety defect is identified, I hope appropriate recall action will be considered.

NHTSA ID

11776595

Incident

Nov 5, 2026

This complaint concerns the failure and subsequent denial of coverage for a critical high-voltage safety component: the Pyrotechnic High Voltage Battery Disconnect (commonly known as the pyro fuse). This device is engineered to catastrophically isolate the high-voltage battery pack during a collision or thermal event to prevent vehicle fires. The device relies on a built-in, non-rechargeable internal battery. Tesla has officially acknowledged a progressive defect in this component via a retroactive warranty extension program ("Reimbursement of Pyrotechnic High Voltage Battery Disconnect Replacement"), noting that when the internal battery degrades, the fuse fails and forces an in-vehicle Battery Management System (BMS) safety alert. My vehicle experienced this exact component degradation and was repaired at an authorized Tesla Service Center. However, Tesla is denying warranty reimbursement by enforcing a rigid calendar expiration cutoff (December 2023). Because this is a progressive internal battery failure, the component degradation actively manifested prior to the warranty cutoff. Furthermore, Tesla has actively refused my requests to provide the vehicle's diagnostic log history and BMS alert timestamps, effectively withholding critical vehicle safety and defect data from the consumer to avoid financial liability for a recognized safety component failure. I request that the NHTSA investigate Tesla’s use of arbitrary calendar cutoffs to evade addressing this known high-voltage electrical defect, as well as their policy of withholding diagnostic log data related to critical safety components.

NHTSA ID

11775947

Incident

Aug 29, 2024

Car suddenly unable to drive and stranded on the street. The vehicle had to to towed to Tesla SC. Upon inspection, Tesla said: "we identified that the first-generation fuse cover has developed rust, which allowed moisture to enter the fuse assembly. This has rendered the vehicle inoperable." This is clearly a manufacture design defect that seriously compromises the safety of drivers and passengers as this can happen at any time.

NHTSA ID

11775941

Incident

Oct 11, 2026

On October 25, 2026, I was slowly pulling out of a residential parking space in my 2015 Tesla Model S, which has approximately 82,500 miles. Suddenly, I heard a very loud grinding noise, and the vehicle came to an immediate stop. Afterward, the car would not move either forward or backward. I had not hit any potholes, curbs, or other obstacles. There was no collision or external impact. When I inspected the vehicle, I noticed that the left rear wheel was severely tilted and misaligned. The vehicle became completely undrivable. Based on the visible damage, I suspect a serious failure involving the left rear suspension or wheel assembly. However, the exact component that failed and the cause of the failure have not yet been determined. The vehicle has not yet undergone a mechanical inspection. I have photographs documenting the condition of the rear wheel and suspension area. I am very concerned about the safety implications of this sudden failure. Had this occurred at highway speed, it could have resulted in a serious accident. I contacted Tesla regarding the incident. I am reporting this failure to NHTSA as a potential vehicle safety defect and requesting that it be reviewed for similar incidents involving the 2015 Tesla Model S.

NHTSA ID

11773651

Incident

Oct 25, 2026

In XXX I paid $2,176.50 out of pocket for an MCU (media control unit) replacement at a Tesla service center on this 2015 Tesla Model S (VIN [XXX]). The invoice documents a black screen and internal hardware failure — the exact 8GB eMMC defect later recalled under NHTSA recall 20V710. I filed for reimbursement under Tesla's General Recall Reimbursement Plan in XXX. Tesla acknowledged receipt on XXX (reference XXX), said the request was 'under review,' and promised an update in 2-3 weeks. Tesla never responded again — no decision, no payment — for over four years despite follow-ups. A second vehicle (2013 Tesla Model S) had a similar MCU repair and was included in the same reimbursement request. Under 49 CFR 573.13(g), a manufacturer must act on a reimbursement claim within 60 days. Tesla violated its own reimbursement plan and the regulation. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11767007

Incident

Oct 10, 2019

In Nov 2019, while driving at night, the center touchscreen (MCU) of my 2015 Model S went blank and would not recover after restarts. I lost access to nearly all vehicle controls. The daytime running lights remained on, but the headlights did not illuminate despite being set to auto, and I had no way to turn them on manually because the headlight control is on the failed touchscreen. Climate control was inoperative and the windshield began fogging, reducing visibility. I could not open the charge port despite a low battery. I avoided the freeway and took local roads home. This is the failure covered by Recall 21V035 (8GB eMMC wear-out). Tesla service confirmed via diagnostic logs an internal fault within the MCU and replaced it with a remanufactured unit. I paid $2,045.47 out of pocket (invoice uploaded). The defect was not remedied. The remanufactured MCU contains the same 8GB eMMC; since the 2019 replacement the screen still goes blank 2-3 times per year, recovering only after 10-15 minutes of holding the reboot buttons. As of Aug 2026, NHTSA's VIN lookup shows Recall 21V035 as "Recall Incomplete": Tesla has never performed the free remedy (64GB eMMC daughterboard). Component available for inspection. In Feb-Mar 2021, Tesla notified me my vehicle was covered and invited a reimbursement claim per its NHTSA-filed plan (49 CFR 573.13). I submitted the claim through my Tesla account within the claim period. Tesla's portal confirms this: it displays "You have already submitted for the reimbursement" and blocks resubmission (screenshot uploaded). The plan commits to a decision within 60 days. Five years later: no decision, no payment. In Feb 2026, Tesla Support confirmed it has no mechanism to check or process reimbursement claims. I am reporting Tesla's non-compliance with its filed reimbursement plan and its failure to remedy this recall.

NHTSA ID

11756104

Incident

Nov 25, 2019

●Odometer at time of failure: approximately 204,078 miles ●Date of failure: XXX ●Location of failure: Owner's residential driveway, [XXX] Component Suspension — Front — Lower Control Arm / Front Fore Link / Front Aft Link (right side) Description of the Incident On XXX, at approximately 1:00 PM, I began backing my 2015 Tesla Model S out of my residential driveway. The vehicle was moving at less than five miles per hour. There was no impact with any curb, pothole, road debris, or other object. As the vehicle moved rearward, there was an audible pop from the right front, and the top of the right front tire visibly sank inward (negative camber) as the wheel well collapsed. The vehicle became nearly undriveable and had to be moved slowly to a repair facility approximately 7 miles away. No crash occurred. No injuries occurred. No emergency response was required. However, had this failure happened at highway speed rather than in the driveway, the safety consequences could have been significant. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11754294

Incident

Jul 31, 2026

Parking brake on my TESLA MODEL S will not release. My understanding is that this is from a defective parking brake caliper that was under a recall by TESLA. However, TESLA refuses to acknowledge or repair this issue which is a huge safety problem especially if the parking brake does not engage / release when on an uneven surface. Also, from looking at forums and speaking to other owners, this appears to be a very common issue.

NHTSA ID

11742956

Incident

Feb 9, 2026

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the battery powered Pyrotechnic High Voltage (HV) Battery Disconnect will reach the end of its battery lifespan in the near future, which will trigger alerts and may limit the vehicle’s performance.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.