2014 Tesla Model S

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.

From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.

On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.

Dashboard is leaking glue out the bottom center causing the computer screen and dash control panels to move. I'm not feeling safe driving as I'm not sure if they will drop down or stop functioning at any point. Tesla wants $1500 to fix, and I don't have that money being retired. How can Tesla glue their cars together, and it only last for about 10 yrs?? I feel like this is a safety issue that they should be fixing.

NHTSA ID

11750141

Incident

Jul 1, 2026

This issue appears to be related to a known MCU failure affecting early Tesla Model S vehicles. The touchscreen exhibits screen melting/discoloration and eventually goes blank or becomes inoperative. When this occurs, critical functions including occupant detection indicators, seatbelt warnings, and windshield defrost controls may become unavailable. The loss of these functions creates potential safety risks involving visibility, occupant protection, and driver awareness while operating the vehicle."

NHTSA ID

11744089

Incident

Jun 2, 2026

I have been driving my Model S Tesla for 13 years. On 30 April as I was pulling into a parking space at my local grocery store, I applied the brakes to ease into the space and my car surged forward with unintended acceleration. I smashed into the concrete base of a light pole, the airbags deployed and my car ricocheted back about 8 feet. There were no warning messages. I was taken to the emergency room and had whiplash and a burn on my leg from the airbag. No one else was hurt. I know it was the car that malfunctioned because my foot was still on the brake after the collision and the airbags bruised the right side of my right leg. It could not have bruised it in that way if my foot had been on the accelerator. The insurance company inspected and declared a total loss. I obtained the black box data from Tesla and am uploading the documents below. The car is currently at the Tesla collision center. They do not seem interested in evaluating the problem.

NHTSA ID

11741164

Incident

Apr 30, 2026

Motor suddenly failed after a required update while driving, nearly causing a crash with multiple commercial vehicles and pedestrians, leaving brake lights dangerously always on and alarm sounding, killed 12v as well.

NHTSA ID

11735218

Incident

Apr 30, 2026

**Incident / Defect Description for NHTSA Safety Complaint** **Vehicle Information** - Make: Tesla - Model: Model S - Year: 2014 - VIN: [XXX] - Approximate Mileage: 148,129 miles - Date of Discovery / Failure: 04/23/2026 **Description of the Defect** This vehicle is equipped with Tesla’s Large Drive Unit (LDU / rear drive unit), which was used in the majority of 2012–early 2020 Model S vehicles (RWD and Performance models). The LDU design routes coolant through the hollow rotor shaft. Over time, the rotor seal fails and allows ethylene glycol coolant to leak internally into the motor and inverter. Evidence of this failure is easily visible by removing the rear speed sensor, where blue coolant, corrosion, and debris are present. This is a well-documented design flaw affecting thousands of vehicles. **Consequences of the Defect** Coolant intrusion causes: • Corrosion and rust in the stator windings • Washing out of bearing grease • High-voltage isolation faults • Inverter damage • Complete drive unit failure **Safety Risks** This defect presents an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety because: • Drive unit failure can occur suddenly and without warning while driving, resulting in total loss of propulsion. This is especially dangerous on highways, in traffic, or at high speeds. • Coolant inside high-voltage electrical components increases the risk of electrical shorts, arcing, or fire. • Reduced power or complete shutdown can lead to loss of vehicle control and potential crashes. I have experienced complete drive unit failure. Many other owners report identical issues, often between 50,000–120,000 miles. Tesla has not issued a recall despite this being a widespread, predictable design defect. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11734270

Incident

Apr 23, 2026

Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration I am submitting a complaint regarding repeated denial of access to charging infrastructure for my electric vehicle due to fraudulent billing activity within Tesla’s Supercharger network. I own a 2014 Tesla Model S located in Alabama. My Tesla account has repeatedly recorded Supercharging sessions in California that were not performed by my vehicle. Tesla customer support representatives have acknowledged that this issue appears to involve VIN cloning or a flaw in their charging identification system. Because I blocked my credit card to prevent fraudulent charges, Tesla’s system repeatedly flags my account as having unpaid balances and automatically disables my vehicle’s access to the Supercharger network until those balances are resolved. This creates a situation where my vehicle can be denied access to charging infrastructure even though the charges are fraudulent and unrelated to my vehicle’s actual activity. The issue has occurred multiple times over several months and requires repeated calls to Tesla customer support to restore charging functionality. Loss of access to charging infrastructure can significantly impact the usability and operational reliability of an electric vehicle. I am requesting that this issue be investigated as a potential defect in the Supercharger billing or authentication system that could affect multiple vehicle owners.

NHTSA ID

11723948

Incident

Jan 28, 2026

Rear Door handles are inoperable again after repairs made by dealer. The fault is due to design fault with the wiring harness on the door handles. Manufacturer refuses to make repairs under warranty

NHTSA ID

11721790

Incident

Dec 31, 1969

The rear door handle has failed and now the door pops open when parked.

NHTSA ID

11720129

Incident

Feb 24, 2026

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the battery powered Pyrotechnic High Voltage (HV) Battery Disconnect will reach the end of its battery lifespan in the near future, which will trigger alerts and may limit the vehicle’s performance.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.