2015 Toyota Avalon Hybrid

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received a petition dated September 19, 2023 from the owner of a 2012 Toyota Prius V requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP19-004. In the letter, the petitioner reported experiencing an unexpected and complete loss of brake power while driving, accompanied by multiple dashboard warning lights. This petition is based on the petitioner's direct experience and assessment that ODI closed DP19-004 because its prompting petition was withdrawn by that petitioner. ODI will review the work conducted during DP19-004 and a review of any additional related complaints and crashes via a new defect petition The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number:11553736.

NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.

On September 19, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a defect petition from Mr. Roger Hogan requesting that the Agency investigate and recall certain Toyota Prius, Prius PHV, Camry Hybrid and Avalon Hybrid vehicles for a brake actuator valve wear condition covered under Toyota Customer Support Programs ZJB and ZKK (subject CSP?s). In support of his request, the petitioner identified 117 NHTSA complaints allegedly related to the subject CSP condition, including 60 reporting crashes. On September 30, 2019, ODI opened Defect Petition DP19-004 to evaluate the petitioner?s request for an investigation. In August 2020, the petitioner notified the Agency that he was withdrawing his petition. Because the petitioner has withdrawn the petition, we are denying the petition as moot and no further analysis of this petition is necessary.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Because the petitioner has with withdrawn the petition, the petition is denied as moot. This action does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency notes that it is not required to receive a defect petition prior to opening a defect investigation and will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect.  During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment.  FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW.  These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes.  An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.   In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU.  This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation.  The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage.  There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation.  The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU.  If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC.  Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC.  All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled.  In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024.  With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

TL* THE CONTACT OWN A 2015 TOYOTA AVALON. THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING 30 MPH, THE HYBRID ENGINE ON THE VEHICLE SWITCHED FROM ELECTRIC TO GASOLINE OPERATION WHICH CAUSE A FASTER ACCELERATION AND JERKING MOTION. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. THE CONTACT HAD THE VEHICLE TOWED TO FITZGERALD TOYOTA GAITHERSBURG (907 N FREDERICK AVE, GAITHERSBURG, MD 20879) WHO INSPECTED THE VEHICLE AND FOUND NO FAILURE WITH VEHICLE. THE DEALER STATED THAT THE VEHICLE OPERATED AS DESIGNED. THE CONTACT NOTIFIED THE MANUFACTURER OF THE FAILURE. THE MANUFACTURER HAD A THIRD-PARTY INVESTIGATOR INSPECT THE VEHICLE AND IDENTIFIED THE ACCELERATION AND JERKING IN THE VEHICLE WHEN SWITCHING TO ENGINE FROM ELECTRIC TO GASOLINE HOWEVER, THE INVESTIGATOR STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS SAFE TO DRIVE. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 89,696.

NHTSA ID

11390023

Incident

Dec 1, 2019

Mileage

89,696 mi

THE AVALON HYBRIDS COVERED ONLY BY WARRANTY ENHANCEMENT ZKK ARE SUFFERING THE SAME DANGERS AND FVMSS NONCOMPLIANCE DUE TO BRAKE BOOSTER PUMP ASSEMBLY FAILURES AS THOSE TOYOTA COVERED BY SAFETY RECALLS (D0H & K0L). BY EXCLUDING AVALON HYBRIDS WITH DEFECTIVE BRAKES FROM THE D0H AND K0L SAFETY RECALLS, TOYOTA IS LEAVING THE OWNERS TO HELPLESSLY EXPERIENCE LIFE-THREATENING BRAKE FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION BEFORE TOYOTA WILL PROVIDE THE REPLACEMENT BRAKE COMPONENTS NEEDED TO MAKE THE VEHICLE SAFE. THE LAW REQUIRES TOYOTA TO PREVENT THE LIFE-THREATENING DANGERS OF THIS BRAKE DEFECT BEFORE THE FAILURE OCCURS. TOYOTA'S COST-CUTTING STRATEGIES ARE CAUSING CRASHES AND INJURIES. INJURIES AND CRASHES CAUSED BY THE BRAKE DEFECT EXPLAINED IN THIS LETTER HAVE OCCURRED AND BEEN REPORTED TO THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION. TOYOTA'S DECISION TO PROVIDE A REACTIONARY, POST-FAILURE REPAIR - INSTEAD OF A PREVENTATIVE SAFETY RECALL REMEDY - EXPLAINS MANY OF THE CRASHES AND INJURIES ON NHTSA'S SAFERCAR.GOV WEBSITE. RELEVANT COMPLAINTS FROM SAFERCAR.GOV INCLUDE 10515182 AND 11093611. DIAGNOSTIC TROUBLE CODES C1256, C1253, C1252, AND C1391 - INDICATING DANGERS AND NONCOMPLIANCE - ARE BEING STORED IN VEHICLES EXCLUDED FROM THE PAST SAFETY RECALLS. TOYOTA HAS LONG HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNREASONABLE RISKS TO SAFETY AND FMVSS NONCOMPLIANCE OCCURRING IN HYBRIDS EXCLUDED FROM THEIR SAFETY RECALLS. TOYOTA GETS REAL-TIME TRANSMISSIONS OF DTCS AND FREEZE FRAME DATA FROM HYBRIDS WITH FAILED BRAKES THROUGH THE TECHSTREAM TOOL AT ITS FRANCHISE DEALERSHIPS.

NHTSA ID

11256523

Incident

Sep 18, 2019

TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA AVALON HYBRID. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 65 MPH, THE CONTACT HEARD AN EXPLOSION AND NOTICED THAT THE SUN ROOF EXPLODED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE CONTACT CALLED NEWARK TOYOTA WORLD (230 E CLEVELAND AVE, NEWARK, DE 19711) AND SCHEDULED A DIAGNOSTIC AND REPAIR APPOINTMENT FOR JUNE 24, 2019. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE APPROXIMATE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 40,000.

NHTSA ID

11222139

Incident

Jun 22, 2019

Mileage

40,000 mi

TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA AVALON HYBRID. WHILE DRIVING 30 MPH, THE CONTACT DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL AND IT TRAVELED TO THE FLOORBOARD BEFORE STOPPING THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO DAYTONA TOYOTA 1700 (451 N NOVA RD, DAYTONA BEACH, FL 32114, (386) 255-7475), BUT THE FAILURE COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED AND NO FAILURES WERE FOUND. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED AND STATED THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE UNLESS THE BRAKE FAILURE COULD BE DUPLICATED. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 16,251. *JS *LN *TT

NHTSA ID

11093611

Incident

Apr 13, 2018

Mileage

16,251 mi

TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 TOYOTA AVALON HYBRID. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THERE WAS AN ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTION IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH SHORTED OUT THE DISPLAY PANEL WITHOUT WARNING. THE DEALER (DON MCGILL TOYOTA, 11800 KATY FWY HOUSTON, TX 77079, (281) 496-2000) WAS NOTIFIED AND AN APPOINTMENT WAS SCHEDULED TO DIAGNOSE THE FAILURE. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE AND HAD NOT ISSUED A RECALL CAMPAIGN. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS NOT AVAILABLE.

NHTSA ID

11089004

Incident

Apr 14, 2018

TIME TO TIME EVERYTHING ON THE DASHBOARD OF MY CAR SHUTDOWN (LIGHTS, NAVIGATION, STEREO SYSTEM E.T.C. ALL ELECTRONIC DEVICES, IT MOSTLY HAPPENS WHEN I DRIVE, ALSO THE DASHBOARD MAKES A NOISE WHICH SOUNDS LIKE A CLICK. ABOUT AN YEAR AGO I GOT A RECALL FOR BUT WHEN I BROUGHT MY CAR TO THE TOYOTA OF NOHO THEY TOLD ME THAT THEY DIDN'T FIND ANY PROBLEM, SO NOTHING HAS BEEN REPLACED AND I STILL HAVE BOTH PROBLEMS WHICH HARD TO FIND OUT BY DRIVING COUPLES OF MILES, HOW A TECHNICIAN EXPLAINED TO ME. SO PLEASE REQUEST A REPLACEMENT OR FIX THEM, BECAUSE IT'S DANGEROUS WHEN POWER GOES OFF WHILE YOU ARE ON FREEWAY. I HAVEN'T MENTIONED THAT I GOT LOST MANY TIMES BECAUSE THE NAVIGATION STOPPED WORKING, OR LIGHTS GOT OFF AT NIGHTTIME. SINCERELY [XXX] . TEL: [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6). *TR

NHTSA ID

11062563

Incident

Nov 29, 2017

Mileage

28,000 mi

NOTHING HAPPENED. CAR WORKS FINE. GOT THIS RECALL LAST NOVEMBER 2015 FROM TOYOTA AND HAVE NOT HEARD FROM THEM SINCE. NHTSA RECALL NUMBER: 15V728. ALMOST A YEAR LATER AND I'M STILL WAITING.

NHTSA ID

10898291

Incident

Nov 3, 2015

PRE-COLLISION RADAR SYSTEM (SAFETY RECALL)THE VEHICLES, UNDER CERTAIN SITUATIONS, THE PCS (PRE-COLLISION SYSTEM) COULD INTERPRET A STEEL JOINT OR PLATE IN THE ROADWAY AS AN OBJECT THAT TRIGGERS PCS ACTIVATION. IF THIS OCCURS, THE PCS WARNING BUZZER SOUNDS AND THE SYSTEM WILL APPLY THE SERVICE BRAKE AUTOMATICALLY. UNEXPECTED BRAKING COULD INCREASE THE RISK OF A CRASH OR VERY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS.

NHTSA ID

10864032

Incident

Sep 2, 2015

Mileage

19,000 mi

OBSOLETE NOTICE February 13, 2026: This bulletin is now obsolete. Please see T-SB-0009-26.

This bulletin includes basic procedures for performing a rescue charge on Ni-MH high voltage (HV) batteries. This bulletin should be used in conjunction with the applicable model and model year Repair Manual while performing a rescue charge. The GRX-5100 should be used wherever the Repair Manual references the Toyota Hybrid System (THS) charger.

Some 2005 – 2026 Toyota vehicles that have undergone water intrusion may exhibit a condition in which a musty odor is present. Follow the procedures in this bulletin to remediate the odor and address this condition. The purpose of this Service Bulletin is to provide general guidelines and procedures for odor remediation. This Service Bulletin provides a guide on how to prepare and treat the interior of the vehicle for odor remediation. Refer to the applicable model and model year Repair Manual and the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) website for the most up-to-date safety and precautionary guidelines.

The air conditioning dye injection tool kit has been developed to aid in identifying the location of air conditioning refrigerant leaks. The procedures outlined in this Service Bulletin aid in locating, inspecting, and repairing refrigerant leaks.

Acid rain results from rainwater or other airborne moisture that become acidic due to industrial chemical impurities in the atmosphere. If these acidic compounds settle on an exposed vehicle, especially the horizontal areas such as the hood, roof, and decklid, significant damage to the painted surfaces can occur. Acid rain damage can typically be identified on vehicles by the presence of stains on the paint surface that resemble hard water spots. Unlike water spots however, acid rain damage cannot be removed by regular washing procedures. Also, because acid rain can etch and soften the paint, normal buffing or polishing repair procedures should not be attempted. This can cause further damage and result in visible depressions in the paint surface. The following are the three major categories of acid rain damage: •Minor damage: requires only buffing to repair. •Moderate damage: usually requires neutralizing, color sanding, and buffing. •Severe damage: extending beyond 1/2 mil of clearcoat on a pearl, metallic, or solid color, requires neutralization, sanding, and repainting. In cases where acid rain damage is minor, neutralization and buffing with a liquid-type paint finessing product may provide an adequate repair. Only specially formulated products outlined in this bulletin should be used for that purpose. Unfortunately, other than minor damage, there is no simple method of determining the actual extent (depth) of acid penetration other than color sanding a representative affected area until there is no visible etching or depressions, followed by measuring the amount of paint removed with either a magnetic or digital-type film thickness gauge. The procedures in this bulletin are intended for use by qualified body/paint technicians and should not be attempted by inexperienced personnel. It is the dealer’s responsibility to protect and maintain the quality of the vehicle’s paint finish after receipt at the dealership prior to the first sale. Perform frequent vehicle washing, as often as daily, during high heat and humidity periods to minimize the potential for paint damage due to acid rain exposure. This is especially important in geographical areas known for high frequency and concentration of acid rain and industrial fallout.

To prevent brake rotor rust from forming during transportation and storage, wheel film will be used instead of a cardboard type of anti-rust cover. The purpose of the wheel film is to shield the disc brake rotor from weather elements and initial rust before the vehicle is delivered to the customer. Consequently, the film should remain on the wheel for as long as possible.