2014 Toyota Avalon Hybrid

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received a petition dated September 19, 2023 from the owner of a 2012 Toyota Prius V requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP19-004. In the letter, the petitioner reported experiencing an unexpected and complete loss of brake power while driving, accompanied by multiple dashboard warning lights. This petition is based on the petitioner's direct experience and assessment that ODI closed DP19-004 because its prompting petition was withdrawn by that petitioner. ODI will review the work conducted during DP19-004 and a review of any additional related complaints and crashes via a new defect petition The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number:11553736.

NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.

On September 19, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a defect petition from Mr. Roger Hogan requesting that the Agency investigate and recall certain Toyota Prius, Prius PHV, Camry Hybrid and Avalon Hybrid vehicles for a brake actuator valve wear condition covered under Toyota Customer Support Programs ZJB and ZKK (subject CSP?s). In support of his request, the petitioner identified 117 NHTSA complaints allegedly related to the subject CSP condition, including 60 reporting crashes. On September 30, 2019, ODI opened Defect Petition DP19-004 to evaluate the petitioner?s request for an investigation. In August 2020, the petitioner notified the Agency that he was withdrawing his petition. Because the petitioner has withdrawn the petition, we are denying the petition as moot and no further analysis of this petition is necessary.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Because the petitioner has with withdrawn the petition, the petition is denied as moot. This action does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency notes that it is not required to receive a defect petition prior to opening a defect investigation and will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect.  During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment.  FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW.  These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes.  An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.   In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU.  This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation.  The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage.  There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation.  The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU.  If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC.  Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC.  All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled.  In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024.  With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

DRIVING ON I-10 IN THE METARIE, LA AREA AT SPEED LIMIT, WE HEARD A LOUD BANG, THEN WIND COMING INTO THE CAR. NO OTHER VEHICLES AROUND US, WE PULLED TO THE SIDE OF THE ROAD AND NOTICED THAT THE SUNROOF HAD EXPLODED. SOUNDED LIKE A BOMB WENT OFF WHEN IT HAPPENED. WE RETURNED TO OUR HOTEL AND TAPED THE GLASS TO PREVENT FURTHER GLASS FRACTURE AND SPRAY TO OTHER VEHICLES ON THE ROAD.

NHTSA ID

11105271

Incident

Jul 2, 2018

Mileage

26,000 mi

AUTO SUDDENLY BRAKED TO A STOP FOR NO APPARENT REASON. AUTO HAD BEEN REPAIRED FOR THE RECALL, 15V728000, FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: CRASH IMMINENT BRAKING. HAS OCCURRED TWICE IN THE LAST MONTH. HAVE SINCE DEACTIVITED THE PRE-COLLISION SYSTEM. BOTH OCCURRENCES HAPPENED WHILE ON CRUISE CONTROL, TRAVELING AT 55 MPH IN ONE CASE AND 60 MPH IN THE OTHER. BOTH WERE ON STRAIGHT, LEVEL HIGHWAYS WITH NO OBVIOUS CAUSE. THE 55 MPH CASE WAS WHILE CRUISE WAS SET AT 60 MPH BUT CRUISE CONTROL WAS CONTROLLING AT THE LOWER SPEED TO CONTROL THE DISTANCE FROM THE CAR AHEAD OF ME. THE CAR AHEAD DID NOT BRAKE OR SLOW DOWN. THERE WAS NO COLLISION IN EITHER CASE. MY DIAGNOSIS IS THAT THE REPAIR FOR THE ABOVE RECALL DID NOT CORRECT THE PROBLEM.

NHTSA ID

10954981

Incident

Feb 10, 2017

Mileage

36,000 mi

WHILE THE VEHICLE IS COASTING AT A STEADY SPEED ON A STRAIGHT ROAD (~30-40 MPH), A SLIGHT ROARING NOISE CAN BE HEARD FROM THE ENGINE BAY WHILE SITTING IN THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT. THE DEALER, NORTHSIDE TOYOTA OF CHICAGO, INSPECTED THIS VEHICLE ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2016, AND DETERMINED THAT THE TRANSMISSION IS FAILING AND WILL NEED TO BE COMPLETELY REPLACED. HOWEVER, THEY CLAIM THAT, DUE TO A "COLLISION IMPACT" (A VEHICLE WHICH SCRAPED THE PASSENGER SIDE OF THE FRONT BUMPER AND WHICH MIRACULOUSLY DID NOT IMPACT EITHER THE ENGINE OR THE BODY FRAME), A LEAK HAS BEEN CAUSED FROM A "CLIP" THAT IS "MISSING," AND BASED ON THESE GROUNDS, THE DEALER IS REFUSING TO REPAIR THE TRANSMISSION. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE TOLD US WE NEED TO EITHER REPLACE THE TRANSMISSION OUT OF POCKET ($6000.00 - $7000.00) OR GO THROUGH OUR INSURANCE. THIS KIND OF PROBLEM MIGHT BE NORMAL FOR AN OLDER VEHICLE, BUT WHAT IS UNUSUAL ABOUT THIS CASE IS THAT THIS HYBRID AVALON IS ONLY 2 YEARS OLD AND BARELY CLOCKED 16,000 MILES. IT IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE FOR SUCH A MAJOR COMPONENT OF A NEARLY-NEW VEHICLE TO FAIL SO SOON AND THE DEALER IS WAVING IT OFF AS NOT A DEFECT.

NHTSA ID

10925189

Incident

Nov 4, 2016

Mileage

16,000 mi

TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA AVALON HYBRID. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE CENTER CONSOLE, WHERE THE CUP HOLDERS WERE LOCATED, WOULD BECOME HOT WHEN THE HEAT WAS ACTIVATED AND COLD WHEN THE AIR CONDITIONER WAS ACTIVATED. THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS DRIVEN FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO SEVERAL DEALERS FOR DIAGNOSTIC TESTING, BUT NO FAILURE COULD BE DETERMINED. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN.

NHTSA ID

10907221

Incident

May 8, 2015

TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA AVALON HYBRID. THE CONTACT RECEIVED NOTIFICATION FOR NHTSA CAMPAIGN NUMBER: 15V728000 (FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE). THE DEALER WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE REMEDY AND PARTS. THE SYSTEM WAS DISCONNECTED AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION MONTHS AGO. THE CONTACT WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHEN THE VEHICLE WOULD BE REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED AND WAS UNABLE TO INDICATE A REASONABLE TIME FRAME FOR THE REMEDY AND PARTS. THE CONTACT EXPERIENCED THE SYSTEM RANDOMLY ENGAGING WHILE MAKING A TURN AND HAD TO ADJUST TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO FAILURE. THE APPROXIMATE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 29,000. PARTS DISTRIBUTION DISCONNECT.

NHTSA ID

10889036

Incident

Jan 20, 2016

Mileage

29,000 mi

BRIDGESTONE TURANZA EL400 P215/55R17 TIRES SHOWING EXCESSIVE WEAR. MILEAGE ON CAR 30,579. THESE ARE ORIGINAL MANUFACTURERS EQUIPMENT. BECAUSE OF TREAD WIRE EXPOSURE, CAR DEEMED TO DANGEROUS TO DRIVE.

NHTSA ID

10881971

Incident

Jun 30, 2016

Mileage

30,579 mi

TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2014 TOYOTA AVALON HYBRID. THE CONTACT RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF NHTSA CAMPAIGN NUMBER: 15V728000 (FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE); HOWEVER, THE PART TO DO THE REPAIR WAS UNAVAILABLE. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE MANUFACTURER EXCEEDED A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR THE RECALL REPAIR. THE MANUFACTURER WAS MADE AWARE OF THE ISSUE. THE CONTACT HAD NOT EXPERIENCED A FAILURE. PARTS DISTRIBUTION DISCONNECT.

NHTSA ID

10875184

Incident

Nov 3, 2015

NHTSA RECALL 15V728 INVOLVING PRE-COLLISION SYSTEM. OVER 6 MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE I RECEIVED NOTICE OF THIS RECALL. TO DATE NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM OTHER THAN TELLING ME TO TURN OFF THE PRE-COLLISION SYSTEM. BOTH LEAVING IT ON OR TURNING IT OFF LESSEN THE SAFETY OF THE VEHICLE.

NHTSA ID

10860334

Incident

Oct 1, 2015

OBSOLETE NOTICE February 13, 2026: This bulletin is now obsolete. Please see T-SB-0009-26.

This bulletin includes basic procedures for performing a rescue charge on Ni-MH high voltage (HV) batteries. This bulletin should be used in conjunction with the applicable model and model year Repair Manual while performing a rescue charge. The GRX-5100 should be used wherever the Repair Manual references the Toyota Hybrid System (THS) charger.

Some 2005 – 2026 Toyota vehicles that have undergone water intrusion may exhibit a condition in which a musty odor is present. Follow the procedures in this bulletin to remediate the odor and address this condition. The purpose of this Service Bulletin is to provide general guidelines and procedures for odor remediation. This Service Bulletin provides a guide on how to prepare and treat the interior of the vehicle for odor remediation. Refer to the applicable model and model year Repair Manual and the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) website for the most up-to-date safety and precautionary guidelines.

The air conditioning dye injection tool kit has been developed to aid in identifying the location of air conditioning refrigerant leaks. The procedures outlined in this Service Bulletin aid in locating, inspecting, and repairing refrigerant leaks.

Acid rain results from rainwater or other airborne moisture that become acidic due to industrial chemical impurities in the atmosphere. If these acidic compounds settle on an exposed vehicle, especially the horizontal areas such as the hood, roof, and decklid, significant damage to the painted surfaces can occur. Acid rain damage can typically be identified on vehicles by the presence of stains on the paint surface that resemble hard water spots. Unlike water spots however, acid rain damage cannot be removed by regular washing procedures. Also, because acid rain can etch and soften the paint, normal buffing or polishing repair procedures should not be attempted. This can cause further damage and result in visible depressions in the paint surface. The following are the three major categories of acid rain damage: •Minor damage: requires only buffing to repair. •Moderate damage: usually requires neutralizing, color sanding, and buffing. •Severe damage: extending beyond 1/2 mil of clearcoat on a pearl, metallic, or solid color, requires neutralization, sanding, and repainting. In cases where acid rain damage is minor, neutralization and buffing with a liquid-type paint finessing product may provide an adequate repair. Only specially formulated products outlined in this bulletin should be used for that purpose. Unfortunately, other than minor damage, there is no simple method of determining the actual extent (depth) of acid penetration other than color sanding a representative affected area until there is no visible etching or depressions, followed by measuring the amount of paint removed with either a magnetic or digital-type film thickness gauge. The procedures in this bulletin are intended for use by qualified body/paint technicians and should not be attempted by inexperienced personnel. It is the dealer’s responsibility to protect and maintain the quality of the vehicle’s paint finish after receipt at the dealership prior to the first sale. Perform frequent vehicle washing, as often as daily, during high heat and humidity periods to minimize the potential for paint damage due to acid rain exposure. This is especially important in geographical areas known for high frequency and concentration of acid rain and industrial fallout.

To prevent brake rotor rust from forming during transportation and storage, wheel film will be used instead of a cardboard type of anti-rust cover. The purpose of the wheel film is to shield the disc brake rotor from weather elements and initial rust before the vehicle is delivered to the customer. Consequently, the film should remain on the wheel for as long as possible.