SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC:FOUNDATION COMPONENTS:DISC:ROTOR; WHEELS:LUGS/NUTS/BOLTS/STUDS
2026 Tesla Cybertruck
Recalls, owner-reported complaints, investigations and safety data
Data refreshed
Overview
Our database contains 11 NHTSA owner-reported complaints for the 2026 Tesla Cybertruck, most frequently naming the steering, driver assistance and electrical categories. 2 safety recalls have been issued covering this model year; 2 NHTSA investigations name it; and 2 manufacturer communications are on file.
Complaints are reports submitted by owners and drivers to NHTSA. They are not verified and do not establish that a defect exists.
Complaint activity over time
When owners filed reports about this model year
View as table
| Month | Complaints filed | Cumulative |
|---|---|---|
| Oct 2025 | 1 | 1 |
| Mar 2026 | 1 | 2 |
| Apr 2026 | 1 | 3 |
| May 2026 | 1 | 4 |
| Jun 2026 | 1 | 5 |
| Aug 2026 | 1 | 6 |
| Sep 2026 | 2 | 8 |
| Oct 2026 | 1 | 9 |
| Nov 2026 | 2 | 11 |
What owners report
Complaints grouped by the component NHTSA recorded
- Steering317.6%
- Driver assistance317.6%
- Electrical317.6%
- Powertrain (other)211.8%
- Brakes211.8%
- Tires & wheels15.9%
- Engine15.9%
- Suspension15.9%
Percentages are of component mentions. A single complaint can name more than one component, so these do not sum to the total complaint count.
Safety recalls
2 campaigns cover this model year
Recalls apply to specific vehicles, not to every vehicle of a model year. Check your VIN with NHTSA or your manufacturer's dealer to confirm whether a recall affects your vehicle.
Check a VIN on NHTSA.govELECTRICAL SYSTEM:SOFTWARE; EXTERIOR LIGHTING
Safety investigations
NHTSA inquiries naming this vehicle. An investigation is not a finding of a defect.
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
Recent owner complaints
Reports submitted to NHTSA, shown in the owner's own words
VEHICLE SAFETY DEFECT COMPLAINT Manufacturer: Tesla, Inc. Vehicle: Tesla Cybertruck Premium All-Wheel Drive Incident date: XXX Location: [XXX] VIN: [Insert VIN] Nature of complaint: Unexpected vehicle movements during Full Self-Driving operation and an extremely loud metallic grinding noise while driving. Description of incident On XXX, at approximately 8 PM Central Time, I experienced a potentially serious safety malfunction while driving my recently purchased Tesla Cybertruck. While Full Self-Driving (Supervised) was engaged, the vehicle began making unexpected and erratic driving movements. During the same drive, I heard an extremely loud noise resembling thunder or heavy metal components grinding against one another. I became concerned that a critical mechanical component could be failing while the vehicle was in motion. I was able to return home safely and have stopped operating the vehicle pending a professional inspection. This incident follows an earlier major malfunction in which the windshield-wiper system failed. Tesla service personnel subsequently informed me that the wiper motor had come apart and that associated damage required brake-system repairs. I believe the combination of unpredictable driving behavior, the severe mechanical noise, and the vehicle’s recent repair history warrants investigation for possible safety-related defects. I recorded a short video during the incident and preserved available Dashcam footage. I request that NHTSA review this incident and determine whether further investigation is warranted, including whether similar complaints have been reported involving Cybertruck Full Self-Driving behavior, braking, steering, or drivetrain components. I am willing to provide the recordings, prior repair documentation, and any additional information necessary for an investigation. Reported by: [XXX] Location: [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- NHTSA ID
- 11776511
- Incident
- Nov 7, 2026
My 2026 Tesla Cybertruck (base AWD, 18-inch wheels) developed warped front brake rotors at about 6,000 to 6,831 miles, roughly one month after purchase. Tesla Service Center [XXX] (invoice XXX, XXX) measured rotor lateral runout of 0.007 in against a 0.002 in spec and denied warranty coverage, saying 'Brake wear is not covered by Tesla warranty.' Tesla attributed the warping to 'spirited driving' and deceleration events of 5 m/s^2. That is about 0.5 g, which is normal braking. Tesla also stated the brake pads are like new and the brakes are not glazed, which contradicts its claim that driving style overheated and warped the rotors. Rotor runout this early on a nearly new truck points to a component or manufacturing defect, not abuse. Warped rotors cause vibration and reduce braking performance, which is a safety concern on a heavy vehicle. NHTSA recall 26V255 already covers brake rotor/hub problems on Cybertrucks with 18-inch steel wheels. NHTSA's VIN lookup shows no open recall on my VIN. I have filed an official complaint and dispute with Tesla. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- NHTSA ID
- 11776361
- Incident
- Nov 6, 2026
when this vehicle Lane avoidance assistance is on it is dangerous it does not allow you to keep the setting off it resets every time you get in the car and if you don't shut it off and you think it's off if you try to avoid something like a pothole or an animal running out in the road it automatically pulls you back and it's very dangerous
- NHTSA ID
- 11768645
- Incident
- Oct 1, 2026
See attached document for complaint.
- NHTSA ID
- 11765268
- Incident
- Jul 31, 2026
Tesla FSD failed to measure an entrance correctly and scratched the left side of the truck. Affected left rear passenger door, left rear flares, left rocker panel.
- NHTSA ID
- 11762551
- Incident
- Sep 5, 2026
Lane Departure Avoidance is jerking the vehicle aggressively back into the lane and is creating a serious safety concern. I have already scheduled maintenance with Tesla regarding this issue, but I was told that there was nothing they could do about it. The issue occurs when driving in a lane and needing to move over quickly or make an immediate lane adjustment. If the turn signal is not activated, the vehicle will aggressively steer/jerk itself back toward the original lane. This can be dangerous because the system is essentially fighting the driver’s steering input at a moment when the driver may need to move out of the lane to avoid a hazard, merge, or reposition the vehicle. Lane Departure Avoidance should assist and warn the driver, not override the driver’s steering input to the point that the vehicle aggressively forces itself back into the lane. At minimum, the system should be adjustable to provide a vibration, warning, or chime rather than making such a strong steering correction. The current behavior makes it feel like the vehicle cannot safely exit a lane without activating the turn signal, even when the driver is intentionally and safely controlling the vehicle. This needs to be investigated and corrected because the steering intervention itself can create a hazardous situation rather than prevent one.
- NHTSA ID
- 11756441
- Incident
- Aug 12, 2026
2026 Tesla Cybertruck was in Full Self Driving mode when backing out of a parking space. The Cybertruck backed into a parked car causing damage to both vehicles and whiplash of Cybertruck occupants. The Cybertruck accelerated backwards from 1 mph to 4 mph instantly. There is vehicle video footage of the car in FSD leading up to the accident.
- NHTSA ID
- 11744372
- Incident
- Jun 15, 2026
Purchased truck on May 5th. May 7th scuba valve went bed causing air suspension failure. Low voltage system had critical safety failure causing loss of steering and throttle control. Received vehicle back from Tesla shop said they could not repay the issue. Next day while driving system had total low voltage crash resulting in vehicle loosing all power. Loss of steering no throttle response all systems died. Shop kept vehicle for two weeks returned it on May 15 upon getting home parked vehicle three hours later truck had total loss of all power with 27 system voltage errors.
- NHTSA ID
- 11738273
- Incident
- May 7, 2026
Manufacturer communications
A bulletin sent by a manufacturer to its dealers. Not a recall, and repairs are not necessarily free.
STRUCTURE:BODY
On some Cybertruck vehicles, customers may experience low frequency shaking, rattling, and/or vibrations at the door assemblies and/or LH side mirror when the vehicle is driven at high speeds. Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, apply new adhesive to the reinforcement brackets and, if necessary, install additional butyl pads on the affected door assemblies.
STRUCTURE:BODY
On some Cybertruck vehicles, the adhesive in top edge and/or center reinforcement bracket of the tailgate might delaminate, which may cause noise, vibration, and harshness (NVH). Inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework or replace the tailgate assembly.
Manufacturers file copies of the bulletins they send to dealers with NHTSA. These often describe diagnostic or repair procedures for a known condition. They are not recalls: repairs described in a bulletin are usually only free if the vehicle is still under warranty or the manufacturer has extended coverage.
Compare model years
Complaint and recall counts across every year of this model
Higher-selling and older vehicles accumulate more reports. Counts are not failure rates and are not directly comparable between vehicles that sold in very different numbers. Older model years have had longer for reports to accumulate.