2024 Tesla Cybertruck

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

On XXX at approximately 5:15 AM, I was driving my 2024 Tesla Cybertruck (VIN [XXX], ~47,300 miles) on an interstate trip to [XXX] with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged. I heard a loud pop from the front of the vehicle, immediately followed by an alert stating the left front turn signal was malfunctioning and that I needed to take over control. FSD disengaged and I was forced to manually drive in pre-dawn darkness with a failed turn signal until the next charging stop. The fault then behaved intermittently: it cleared on its own, returned, cleared again, and I resumed FSD for much of the trip. Then, with roughly 100 miles remaining, the left turn signal malfunction warning returned while the vehicle was actively driving itself, again forcing manual takeover and leaving me without a functioning left turn signal in traffic. This is a serious safety defect on multiple levels: (1) A failed turn signal prevents me from lawfully and safely signaling lane changes and turns to other drivers. (2) The failure occurred WHILE the automated driving system was operating and depends on functional signaling to execute its own lane changes — yet the system had been driving with a component that failed audibly and without warning. (3) The intermittent nature means the vehicle can re-enter a hazardous state at any time, without warning, at highway speed. (4) I cannot get a service appointment immediately, so I must continue operating a vehicle with an unrepairable intermittent signal failure, exposing me to citations and collision risk. This vehicle has an extensive repair history including body panel adhesion defects related to Tesla’s 2025 cant rail recall, and this electrical failure continues a pattern of defects across multiple systems. No warning preceded the pop. The failure is reproducible in the sense that it has recurred three times in one day. Service records and buyback correspondence with Tesla are available on request. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11754251

Incident

Aug 1, 2026

The PCS (Power Conversion System) failed on my Cybertruck as it has on thousands of other trucks. It's an issue for me because the nearest supercharger station where I can charge is 45 miles away. I have to budget my daily driving so I don't run out of charge before reaching the supercharger. If I run out of charge, the truck will be inoperable until the service center can fix the vehicle. Right now the service appointment is 24 days from now.

NHTSA ID

11753917

Incident

Jul 28, 2026

PCS2 Failure alerts on the screen left the vehicle unable to charge at any level except supercharge. The vehicle can be stranded due to unavailibility of supercharges and inability to charge at any Level 1 or level 2 chrgers.

NHTSA ID

11753802

Incident

Jun 15, 2026

My 2024 cybertruck has a PCS2 onboard error. It has failed but Tesla has told me it’s under warranty however if I was past the warranty it wouldn’t be covered. This is a widespread issue known on 2024/2025 cybertruck. Nearly all VINs are affected.

NHTSA ID

11753751

Incident

Jul 29, 2026

The vehicle has experienced an issue with its power conversion system (PCS2) that leaves AC charging unavailable. Based upon online forums and social media, this issue is clearly widespread amongst early VIN model Cybertrucks. The scope of the issue has lead to delays with repair. My vehicle has experienced this issue since early June 2026, and I am still awaiting repair. This is a safety concern because it could plausibly leave the vehicle stranded due to lack of ability to charge the vehicle. While Tesla and third party superchargers are widespread, they are not everywhere and cannot allow a vehicle to travel to most roads in the United States. There have been circumstances where, if AC charging was not an option, I would have been stranded in a desert and surely would have died of excessive heat exposure. With the PCS2 failure, this issue a plausible risk.

NHTSA ID

11753745

Incident

Jun 8, 2026

I paid Tesla to perform a safety inspection of my Tesla Cybertruck after I purchased it. During that inspection, Tesla determined that the vehicle's as built configuration was **not safe** and required me to purchase a newer revision of the Power Conversion System (PCS). The required PCS revision did not exist when my vehicle was originally manufactured, meaning the vehicle could not have been built with that revision. The original PCS installed in my vehicle has a widespread failure rate among Cybertrucks. When the PCS fails, the vehicle is unable to charge, leaving it stranded. I believe this is a safety defect that warrants investigation by the NHTSA. Tesla's own words on their invoice state that the as-built configuration was determined to be unsafe, and required me to purchase a newer revision of the PCS (1777777-T2-G) to address the safety issue.

NHTSA ID

11753655

Incident

Jun 2, 2026

The car would stop charging at home and an error showed up about two months ago. After reporting to Tesla, they did a diagnostic over the air and concluded that the battery (HVB) needs to be replaced. The car is at the shop for over a month, and they are still waiting on parts.

NHTSA ID

11751738

Incident

May 1, 2026

I am filing a safety defect complaint regarding my Tesla Cybertruck. Water entered the truck bed outlet area and caused corrosion to the mounting bolts and surrounding components, resulting in Tesla determining that the entire bed wall panel requires replacement. The bed outlet is designed for outdoor use and exposure to weather conditions. In my opinion, water intrusion into this area represents a design defect because moisture can enter the electrical outlet assembly and associated mounting hardware, leading to corrosion and component deterioration. My concern is that continued corrosion could potentially affect the integrity or functionality of the electrical outlet system and create an electrical safety hazard for owners using the bed power outlets in normal outdoor conditions, including rain or vehicle washing. Tesla inspected the vehicle and confirmed water ingress and corrosion were present and advised that replacement of the bed wall panel was necessary to correct the condition. I request that NHTSA review whether the design of the Cybertruck bed outlet and surrounding components adequately protects against water intrusion and corrosion during normal vehicle use.

NHTSA ID

11749753

Incident

Jun 4, 2026

On certain Cybertruck vehicles, the halfshaft bolts may lose torque, which may cause a loud grinding noise if the hub and axle facespline teeth become unseated and damaged. If axle grinding noise is present before starting this bulletin, replace the hub, halfshaft, and halfshaft bolt on the impacted corner. Replace the remaining halfshaft bolts on the unaffected halfshaft locations. Then, run a Double Pedal Torque Test to confirm the hub and halfshaft facespline teeth are properly seated. If no axle grinding noise is present before starting this bulletin, replace all 4 halfshaft bolts and run a Double Pedal Torque Test to confirm the hub and halfshaft facespline teeth are properly seated.

On certain Cybertruck vehicles, the halfshaft bolts may lose torque, which may cause a loud grinding noise if the hub and axle facespline teeth become unseated and damaged. Replace all 4 halfshaft bolts and run a Double Pedal Torque Test to confirm the hub and halfshaft facespline teeth are properly seated.

On certain Cybertruck vehicles, the AC junction box to fast charge contactor HV harness might have a poor crimp connection, which may cause increased resistance and localized heating in the harness. If the ancillary cover is removed for other procedures, replace the AC junction box to fast charge contactor HV harness with version -J or later.

On some Cybertruck vehicles, the adhesive in top edge and/or center reinforcement bracket of the tailgate might delaminate, which may cause noise, vibration, and harshness (NVH). Inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework or replace the tailgate assembly.

On some Cybertruck vehicles, when the tonneau cover is closed, the tonneau slat water management channel is exposed, which under certain environmental conditions, may cause excessive water to enter the cargo bed.

On certain Cybertruck vehicles, the left body controller's printed circuit board was misaligned with its heatsink, which may cause the board to crack when the enclosure is closed. This may lead to a graceful power-off event.