2017 Jeep Patriot

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE19014 on September 9, 2019, to investigate 128 consumer complaints alleging that the Active Head Rest (AHR) inadvertently deployed without the occurrence of a crash or other rear impact event in model year (MY) 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles.When ODI opened the investigation, ODI was aware of thirteen alleged injuries.A small number of Early Warning Reports identified driver and/or passenger front seat AHR inadvertent deployments without a rear impact event.Reported safety consequences resulting from the AHR deployments include concussions, headaches, soft tissue injuries, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and/or loss of vehicle control as a result of being surprised and distracted by being struck in the head by the inadvertent AHR deployment. On September 24, 2019, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA).ODI requested certain detailed information from FCA related to the following subject vehicles: MY 2010-2014 Dodge Avenger 200, MY 2010-2014 Dodge Calber, MY 2010-2014 Chrysler Sebring, MY 2013-2015 Ram Tradesman, MY 2012 Ram Van, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Grand Caravan, MY 2010-2016 Chrysler Town and Country, MY 2010-2017 Jeep Compass, MY 2011-2020 Dodge Durango, MY 2011-2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Journey, MY 2010-2012 Jeep Liberty, MY 2010-2011 Jeep Nitro, and MY 2010-2011 Jeep Patriot vehicles.On December 2, 2019, ODI received a response from FCA that included vehicle production data, consumer complaints, field reports, warranty claims, manufacturer actions, production changes, and other data related to the alleged defect from the start of production (2010) through September 24, 2019.On January 27, 2020, ODI received an update to the December 2, 2019, IR response from FCA.On September 22, 2020, ODI requested additional subject vehicle AHR information from FCA.ODI received FCA's response on October 21, 2020.ODI subsequently received an update to FCA's October 21, 2020, response on February 16, 2021.During the investigation, ODI requested updates to certain IR questions on two occasions.FCA provided updates to question #2 on March 5, 2021, and questions #2 and #5 on May 26, 2023. FCA’s IR response data identified approximately 7.5 million subject vehicles (with approximately 15 million AHR assemblies).Due to the large number of vehicles and failure reports, ODI focused its analysis on the FCA vehicle model with the highest failure rate to represent the worst-case scenario.For this purpose, ODI focused on MY 2012-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles for its analysis.This population includes 710,890 vehicles that FCA manufactured between August 19, 2011, and August 8, 2015.ODI identified 2,839 alleged AHR failures within this limited population.ODI identified 263 alleged injuries that were caused by AHR failures in MY 2012-2015 Grand Cherokees vehicles.Of these alleged injuries, ODI categorized them as eighty-two (82) soft tissue (neck/whiplash, bruise) injuries, four (4) concussions, fifty-nine (59) headaches, and one hundred eighteen (118) without a specific injury description.Although complainants have alleged injuries, ODI has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate or validate any injuries where medical treatment was required.Consumer outreach was conducted by ODI, where sixty-three (63) FCA complainants with alleged injuries were contacted.Twelve of the sixty-three FCA consumers responded and were interviewed by ODI.ODI requested medical records, however, only one response was provided. Attorneys representing the responding complainant provided a synopsis that indicated they had experienced prior neck-related injuries dating to the mid-1990s.ODI also contacted one hundred (100) consumers who submitted Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) in an attempt to validate alleged injuries. Despite the efforts of ODI, the office has been unsuccessful at obtaining substantive documentation/evidence supporting complaints that allege serious injuries (where pre-existing medical conditions did not already exist). In addition to the low severity of alleged injuries caused by AHR deployments, there have been eleven alleged crashes and two alleged lane departures within the entire subject vehicle population that has been in the field up to sixteen years (with over 8,500 AHR inadvertent deployments).ODI was not able to validate that the alleged crashes were the result of inadvertent head rest deployments, and the crashes were minor in nature. ODI has conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged safety defect and with up to sixteen years of exposure for some vehicles and over 8,500 inadvertent AHR deployments, no serious crashes or injuries could be validated in the sub-population of focus.The lack of serious injuries validated by ODI with such large period of field exposure is consistent with thework done by NHTSA’s Human Injury Research Division and the Biodynamic Research Corporation, which support that an inadvertent AHR deployment is not likely to cause serious injury.In addition to the low risk of injury, FCA released an extended warranty program that covers inadvertent AHR deployment for ten years / unlimited mileage from the vehicle's in-service date. PE19014 is closed with the FCA extended warranty program.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances. To review a complete closing summary, please the attached closing report. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect.  During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment.  FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW.  These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes.  An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.   In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU.  This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation.  The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage.  There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation.  The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU.  If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC.  Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC.  All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled.  In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024.  With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

THE SECURITY SYSTEM MODULE MALFUNCTIONED AND SHUT DOWN THE CAR. THE GARAGE RESET THE MUDULE BUT IT KEEPS SHUTTING DOWN. THE MECHANIC TOLD ME THE CAR HAS TO BE RETURNED TO THE DEALER FOR SERVICE - ONLY THEY CAN FIX IT.

NHTSA ID

11727526

Incident

Mar 25, 2026

Driver headrest AHR has deployed without any accident or incident. Car is under 100,000 miles. Dealer advises there is no recall or extended warranty on this issue, however research shows other jeep vehicles manufactured at the same time with extended warranty. Safety now at risk as no repair for factory issue and headrest now pushes head out of alignment with the seat.

NHTSA ID

11708595

Incident

Jan 1, 2026

New pads, rotor, caliper, and wheel hub installed. After driving around 200 miles, approximately 10 days later, while applying the brakes, the rear wheel locked. This caused a roll over crash.

NHTSA ID

11703520

Incident

Oct 26, 2025

Because they have not sealed the screws on the interior side of the roof that hold the rails on top of the Jeep it now leaks since we have attached a kayak rack to those Jeep factory placed rails. Jeep is not willing to repair it and it requires tearing out the complete interior headliner to repair. After it rains the water sits in the door frame and leaks into the floor of the backseat causing molding issues (last good rain we got I ended up with an inch of water sitting in the back floorboard). It also collects in the front interior light fixture so when you drive and come to a stop there is water coming down all over the dashboard and the electrical/computer components of the dash. I called Jeep customer service and they won't repair it even though it is a VERY COMMON problem (per google search to try and see what the cause and repair entails, this is how I found out that the rail screws are the issue). Since it is a common problem and Jeep doesn't want to repair it and it is not only ruining my headliner and the carpet, but it also poses a risk when driving that it distracts as you try to sop it up as it's leaking from the light fixture as you drive and there's no other way to get it out without taking the whole inside of the Jeep apart.

NHTSA ID

11684283

Incident

May 1, 2025

Jeep cvr transmission started bucking and hesitating when driving. Having problems shifting when accelerating. Worried it would quit while driving. Had it serviced and no codes came up for transmission. Still has hesitation when driving. Mechanic said it was transmission. No warning lights came up on dash.

NHTSA ID

11676959

Incident

Jul 14, 2025

I am writing to formally express my deep concern and frustration regarding the persistent electrical issues with my 2017 Jeep Patriot, which I purchased in November 2018 with approximately 18,000 miles. Just two days after purchasing, I began experiencing electrical malfunctions. I returned to the selling dealership, who claimed they found no issue but performed a tune-up. Over the years, the problems persisted, and despite numerous visits to authorized dealerships, I was repeatedly given temporary repairs with no permanent resolution. Eventually, a recall was issued, but by that time, I was told the vehicle was no longer under warranty — despite the fact that I had reported the issue early and consistently. I have spent thousands of dollars trying to resolve these electrical faults, with no lasting fix. Most recently, I brought the vehicle to a trusted dealership who confirmed an electrical issue, but informed me the required part has been discontinued. I have also learned that many other Jeep Patriot owners have experienced similar electrical issues. Some have returned or sold their vehicles due to the same defects. This pattern suggests a systemic problem with this model, and it is unacceptable that a vehicle this recent is no longer serviceable due to lack of parts and ongoing defects. I have contacted Chrysler support multiple times, but I have received no meaningful resolution. At one point, I was told to use an aftermarket part, which carries no warranty and no guarantee of compatibility. This is not a safe or acceptable option for a manufacturer-supported vehicle. At this point, I am requesting the following: A full investigation into the recurring electrical issues on my vehicle; Chrysler’s support in covering the cost of repairs or offering an alternative solution (e.g., buyback, reimbursement, or replacement assistance); Written clarification on why this part has been discontinued and what Chrysler’s policy is on supporting vehicles in this situat

NHTSA ID

11670191

Incident

Nov 30, 2018

Active head restraint deployed when not in accident

NHTSA ID

11640050

Incident

Aug 15, 2024

This is an update to my claim report #11532893 filed on July 18th, 2023, Regarding the spontaneous deployment of the AHR injuring and startling me, believing I was being attacked from behind. I have undergone an ACDF c4-7 fusion, TBI diagnosis, and speech therapy treatments for cognitive speech impairment, Depression, PTSD and anxiety Chrysler stated to me that, in essence, there is virtually zero chance of harm from a random deployment of a defective AHR. I have learned that the FCA now admits there is oil contamination and that they began washing parts with alcohol in August of 2017 to rid the parts of potential contaminants. The dealership, upon inspection, stated they could order a new AHR, which could take months to receive and fix, but refused to replace the un deployed passenger AHR under warranty because it did not deploy. My wife nor I was instructed it would be unsafe to drive in front of the random activated AHR until it could be replaced leading us to believe it was safe fully extended and a logical question, why the needeployment?. When my wife drove me to doctor appointments pre- and post-ACDF recovery, the passenger AHR was tied down with 110# rated Paracord, and I sat with a pillow and the back down slightly, which I believe was not safe either; my neurosurgeon was shocked I had to sit in front of it. We opted not to replace the activated driver's side AHR, believing it's safer fully extended. I discovered fearful people making tutorials on how to remove the AHR's as well, not a safe alternative is tying with zip ties that could cause lacerations. That is why I opted for paracord. I noticed my wife driving, her head still about an inch from the extended AHR. I asked if it was comfortable, and she said yes; I thought of the crash test dummy head placements, far enough away the AHR doesn't even make contact when deploying so fast, I like the idea of catching, parachuting the head back. Is anyone asking common sense questions at NHTSA?

NHTSA ID

11625199

Incident

Jul 7, 2023

Verify Reman part number availability. Order the "R" part number for all orders: Warranty, Mopar, customer pay and service contract. Order "68" part number for New unsold units only.

Verify Reman part number availability. Order the "R" part number for all orders: Warranty, Mopar, customer pay and service contract. Order "68" part number for New unsold units only.

ACTUATOR - A/C AND HEATER

ACTUATOR - A/C AND HEATER

Start Stop Charging Warning Lamp Illuminated On, Intelligent Battery Sensor (IBS) State of Charge (SOC) Inaccurate, Battery Charging Message, Presence of IBS related Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs), or Battery Warning Lamp On

LIFTER, Hydraulic Roller Deactivating Please do not replace MDS lifters because the disconnecting pin is not lined up, this is normal and not a defect.