2022 Tesla Model X

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

I was in the car. I had put on my seat belt and reached back to plug in my phone to charge. Before I turned back the phone accelerated forward and crashed into two cars in the parking lot.

NHTSA ID

11755585

Incident

Aug 7, 2026

I am reporting several safety concerns based on approximately one year of experience using Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD). Primary Event: Between February 23 and February 28, 2026, while traveling northbound on the NJ Turnpike with FSD engaged, the vehicle accelerated to approximately 95 mph in a 65 mph. The acceleration appeared unexpected and excessive for the traffic conditions. I disengaged FSD and immediately took control of the vehicle to reduce speed and continued driving manually.No collision occurred, but I considered the event a safety risk because the vehicle exceeded the posted speed limit by a substantial margin. Additional Observations: 1. On multiple occasions, FSD appeared not to recognize or comply with “NO TURN ON RED” traffic signs.2. Situations where overhead or elevated traffic signs appeared not to be recognized by the system.3. On one occasion, the vehicle navigated toward railroad tracks where the roadway and tracks intersected at an approximate 45-degree angle. The vehicle behavior caused concern.4. When driving directly into bright sunlight, particularly when the sun is low and shining directly into the windshield, FSD performance appears degraded or confused. Human drivers typically use sun visors and other visual cues in these conditions. The vehicle’s driving behavior appeared less predictable during such events. 5. Lane changes are attempted across areas marked by continuous lane where lane change would not normally be expected. Additional Concern: A significant regulatory issue may involve situations where drivers intervene immediately before a collision. In real-world driving, drivers often instinctively take control when they perceive an imminent hazard. Therefore, when evaluating crashes involving FSD, I believe investigators should review vehicle data for period immediately preceding a collision, including several seconds before any disengagement, rather than focusing solely on whether FSD was engaged at the exact moment of impact.

NHTSA ID

11746082

Incident

Feb 24, 2026

As I was driving the Tesla Model X, I received a steering assist reduced error on the dash. There was no immediate noticeability, but after about 5 minutes, it felt like there was ZERO power steering, with no additional warnings in the car. With zero power steering, car required extreme forces required to get to the shoulder. If attempting any kind of turn, car would require forces in excess of 80lbs of pressure to execute. Once safely in a parking lot, I put the car into SERVICE mode to check the errors. There was an EPAS error, where it said Torque Sensor 1 not receiving, along with a Torque Sensor 2 not receiving. This has occurred to me 3 times, in the 3 years I've owned the car. Other than "Steering assist reduced", there is no other warning that the car's EPAS steering system reverts to just manual forces required to steer a car. I do not trust my wife to drive this car, as she would not have the strength necessary to get the car to a safe location. If this happened while turning, there's a strong possibility the car would not turn at all, a huge safety factor.

NHTSA ID

11741443

Incident

Jun 1, 2026

The steering wheel locks periodically and I have to get out and re enter my car. On long drives it works pretty fine and does not do this much on highways only once but in hotter weathers it seems to be much much worse. This happened once before the warranty but I did not think much of it. In one instance the steering wheel was so tight that it hurt my wrist while getting off the road

NHTSA ID

11740539

Incident

Feb 2, 2026

The primary front trunk (frunk) latch mechanism fails to unlatch on the first attempt, requiring multiple actuations to open. When I brought the vehicle to the manufacturer's official service center to have the defective safety latch inspected and repaired, they confirmed the behavior but refused to fix the underlying hardware. Instead, the service center officially documented on my repair invoice that this latch failure is "frequently present and deemed a characteristic of the vehicle." A malfunctioning, binding, or misaligned front trunk latch poses a severe safety risk. If the primary latch is failing to release properly, it indicates a defect in the retention mechanism that could lead to the hood unexpectedly opening, flying up, and obstructing the driver's vision at highway speeds (a known issue that has caused recalls in the past). The manufacturer's refusal to repair a failing primary safety latch, and instead documenting it as a normal "characteristic," leaves a critical safety component in a compromised and dangerous state. There were no warning lights prior to this failure; it is a physical, mechanical defect that the manufacturer has acknowledged in writing but refuses to remedy.

NHTSA ID

11736598

Incident

May 7, 2026

The failure involves the rear suspension system, specifically suspected rear control arm / suspension linkage play, which caused severe misalignment (rear toe out of specification). The vehicle is available for inspection upon request. This defect created a significant safety risk. The abnormal toe condition caused rapid and uneven tire wear, with both rear tires becoming nearly completely bald within less than 7,000 miles. This condition increases the risk of tire blowout, loss of traction, and potential loss of control at highway speeds. The issue has been confirmed by an independent service center (Les Schwab), which documented suspension play in the rear control arm area and alignment out of specification (rear toe approximately +1.20° total). The alignment could not be maintained, indicating an underlying mechanical issue. Tesla inspected the vehicle but stated that no suspension components required replacement and attributed the issue only to alignment. However, alignment does not go out of specification without a mechanical cause. Despite multiple requests, Tesla refused to provide detailed documentation regarding the inspection or repair of the suspension system. They replaced only one rear tire and did not address the root cause. The other rear tire had already worn completely bald. After approximately 5,386 miles, the replacement tire has again worn down close to the minimum safety limit, demonstrating that the underlying issue was not corrected and continues to affect vehicle safety. There were no warning lights or system messages prior to the failure. The first symptoms were abnormal tire wear, increased energy consumption, and unstable driving behavior at highway speeds, which began shortly after vehicle purchase. This appears to be a repeat safety-related defect that has not been properly diagnosed or repaired.

NHTSA ID

11730973

Incident

Nov 6, 2025

Lost power steering while I was driving multiple time and I couldn't turn. Later the alert also come on and off but sometime the steering is fine. Found out on Tesla Model X facebook group people are having the same issues.

NHTSA ID

11729091

Incident

Oct 1, 2025

The electric power assist steering system on my 2022 Tesla Model X began displaying a "Steering Assist Reduced / Steering May Require Increased Effort" warning intermittently beginning in approximately May 2024, shortly after I purchased the vehicle. This warning appeared more times than I can count over the following months. In most instances the warning appeared but the steering continued to function normally. On approximately March 2, 2026, the warning appeared and for the first time the steering became extremely difficult to turn, requiring significantly increased physical effort to control the vehicle. The first physical failure occurred while parking at low speed in reverse. The steering failure also occurred subsequently while driving at highway speeds. In both instances I stopped the vehicle, exited, waited briefly, and upon re-entering the vehicle the warning cleared and steering returned to normal. This same sequence repeated the following day. The vehicle was brought to a Tesla authorized service center on March 13, 2026. Tesla's technician confirmed the steering assist reduction as reported and determined the steering gear required full replacement. The failed part, steering gear left hand drive part number 1070801-00-F, was replaced. Only full hardware replacement resolved the issue permanently. Prior power cycling provided only temporary relief. My safety was directly at risk. I am a full-time rideshare driver operating at highway speeds. The failed component has been replaced and is in Tesla's possession. Tesla is charging the full repair cost out of pocket despite this matching a documented pattern of identical failures reported to NHTSA by multiple Tesla owners.

NHTSA ID

11724683

Incident

Mar 2, 2026

On some Model S and Model X vehicles, the compression gap of the HVAC drain funnel seal is wider than intended, which may cause water ingress. Inspect the sponge area of the HVAC drain funnel for water ingress. If water ingress is present, rework the HVAC drain funnel seal.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the HV battery umbrella valves, over time, may become damaged due to road debris. Replace all 5 umbrella valves with updated parts. This new revision, R1, updates the affected Countries/Regions.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles built between approximately January 2021 and September 22, 2022, the High Voltage (HV) battery ports’ plungers intended for internal water leak egress (also known as flood ports) can be replaced with plungers that are more robust against external ingress due to submersion during flooding or other similar high-severity abuse instances. Replace all 5 flood port plungers with updated parts. This new revision, R2, updates the affected Countries/Regions.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the HV battery umbrella valves, over time, may become damaged due to road debris.

Messaging sent directly to customers who have queued with Tesla Service to perform Service Bulletin SB-25-16-002 "Replace Flood Port Plungers". The customer is informed that their vehicle is in queue to receive parts and repairs, Tesla Service will reach out to them when the Service Center is ready to schedule vehicle service, and what to do if the vehicle is exposed/will be exposed to flooding.

Proactive messaging sent directly to customers affected by Service Bulletin SB-25-16-002 "Replace Flood Port Plungers". The customer is informed that their vehicle is impacted by Service Bulletin SB-25-16-002, the benefits of performing the bulletin repair, and what to do if the vehicle is exposed/will be exposed to flooding.