2020 Tesla Model X

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

While driving my Tesla Model X on the interstate at highway speed, the vehicle began intermittently displaying false warnings that the trunk was open. This occurred multiple times during the drive and appears to have been caused by a malfunctioning trunk latch sensor. At the time, I was using Autosteer, part of Tesla’s Autopilot driver-assistance system. Each time the false trunk-open condition occurred, Autosteer immediately and unexpectedly disengaged. Under normal circumstances, when Autosteer disengages while I am driving, the vehicle provides an audible alert and a visual warning instructing the driver to take control immediately. During these incidents, neither warning occurred. There was no audible alert and no visual notification informing me that Autosteer had disengaged or that I needed to immediately resume steering. The system simply stopped providing automatic steering assistance. Because there was no warning that Autosteer had disengaged, I did not immediately realize that the vehicle was no longer maintaining its lane. The vehicle drifted into the adjacent lane before I recognized what had happened and regained control. Fortunately, there was no vehicle in the adjacent lane. Had another vehicle been present, this could have resulted in a collision. This occurred multiple times during the drive. The false trunk-open warning repeatedly caused Autosteer to disengage without the normal audible or visual disengagement warnings. My primary safety concern is not simply the malfunctioning trunk latch sensor. The safety concern is that a failure of an unrelated trunk latch sensor can cause Autosteer to suddenly disengage at highway speed without providing the driver with an audible or visual warning that automatic steering assistance has been lost. In my case, this failure mode resulted in an unintended lane departure. A relatively minor sensor malfunction should not be capable of causing an unannounced loss of automatic steering assistance.

NHTSA ID

11756594

Incident

Aug 7, 2026

To Whom It May Concern, I am writing to you once again to emphasize and provide additional details regarding the critical safety issue I previously addressed concerning the Tesla Model X vehicles, which is similarly affecting Tesla Model S models. My personal experience underscores the severity of this problem: I have had to replace six tires due to accelerated inner wall wear in the last 5 months. This specific wear pattern is a direct result of improper camber alignment, an issue that Tesla has continuously refused to rectify. This problem is not isolated to my vehicle alone. A growing number of Tesla Model X and Model S owners have reported similar experiences, indicating a widespread and systemic issue. The accelerated inner wall tire wear poses significant safety risks, as it can lead to unexpected and dangerous tire failures on the road. Despite the clear evidence and numerous complaints from Tesla owners, Tesla has consistently declined to address this issue adequately. It appears that the company’s reluctance is rooted in the fact that proper repair or recall to fix the camber alignment is not cost-effective from their perspective. However, this cost-cutting measure is putting drivers and passengers at risk. Given the scale and gravity of this issue, I urge the National Highway Safety Institute to take immediate action. It is essential to investigate these recurring problems with both the Tesla Model X and Model S models. The safety of Tesla drivers, passengers, and the general public is at stake, and a thorough investigation could compel Tesla to take the necessary corrective actions. Thank you for your attention to this urgent safety matter. I trust that the National Highway Safety Institute will act promptly to ensure automotive safety and hold manufacturers accountable for their vehicles’ reliability and safety.

NHTSA ID

11741048

Incident

May 30, 2026

While driving the vehicle on the freeway, the driver noticed the car was handling unusually at highway speeds. After exiting the freeway at approximately 45 mph, the accelerator pedal failed to decelerate properly when the foot was lifted from the pedal. A warning message appeared on the display screen indicating the vehicle was shutting down while the vehicle was still in motion. The vehicle subsequently became completely inoperable and had to be towed to a Tesla service center. Tesla's own technician confirmed multiple Battery Management System faults and an internal fault within the high voltage battery pack. A full HV battery replacement was required. The vehicle had been purchased 14 days prior and had only been driven approximately 723 miles at the time of the incident. Safety of driver and passengers was at risk due to unexpected loss of power and loss of accelerator response while driving at speed.

NHTSA ID

11736694

Incident

Apr 7, 2026

My 2020 Tesla Model X (VIN: [XXX] , approx. 121,000 miles) experienced a dangerous defect with the automatic front passenger door opening with excessive and uncontrolled force. I noticed this issue within the past three months. The vehicle's front doors are fully automated — the driver and passengers have no manual control over the force at which the door opens. Because of this, a person or object standing near the vehicle could be struck without warning and without any ability to stop or slow the door. The door was opening with such excessive force that it nearly struck a bystander on at least one occasion. This posed a clear and immediate safety hazard to anyone standing near the vehicle. When I brought the vehicle to Tesla Service, their own technician documented the issue in the repair notes as a "safety concern." The technician confirmed the cause was a defective door drive unit and a corroded connector in the wiring harness. Tesla replaced the right front door drive unit and the associated wiring harness. Tesla charged me over $1,000 to repair this defect, despite the fact that their own technician's notes explicitly identify this as a safety concern — not normal wear. I believe this is a manufacturing defect that should be covered under a safety recall or goodwill reimbursement, and I am reporting it here so that NHTSA can investigate whether other Tesla Model X vehicles share this defect. I am requesting that NHTSA investigate this issue and determine whether a safety recall is warranted for this component. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11734616

Incident

Apr 29, 2026

When turning a loud cranking sound is heard and it makes it hard to turn. It as if something is stopping it from turning.

NHTSA ID

11726034

Incident

Aug 4, 2025

On 03/13/2026, while driving my 2020 Tesla Model X at approximately 65 mph on a freeway, the front hood (frunk lid) suddenly flew open without warning and slammed into the windshield. The hood rotated upward violently and struck the windshield completely blocking the driver’s forward visibility. This created an immediate safety hazard while traveling at highway speed. Prior to the incident there were no warning messages or alerts displayed on the vehicle screen indicating that the hood was open or improperly latched. Tesla vehicles normally provide a dashboard and a sound alert if the hood is not properly latched before driving. No such warning occurred. The vehicle’s front camera recorded the incident. The video does not show any hood movement or flutter prior to the failure, suggesting that the hood was fully closed before the event. After the incident, Tesla service personnel inspected the vehicle. The technician stated that the hood may not have been properly latched prior to driving. However: The vehicle gave no dashboard warning No hood movement or vibration was visible prior to the event The hood opened suddenly and violently rather than gradually If the secondary latch alone had been holding the hood, some hood movement or vibration would normally be expected prior to full release. Safety Concern A hood opening at highway speed that: occurs without warning results in complete loss of forward visibility presents a severe safety risk to the driver and surrounding traffic. This type of failure could easily cause a high-speed crash. Video evidence of the incident at: [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11724823

Incident

Mar 13, 2026

I am submitting information regarding repair access and repair estimate concerns involving a Tesla vehicle after a collision. During an insurance claim handled by Tesla Insurance Company, a repair estimate from a Tesla-preferred repair facility was used to declare the vehicle a total loss. However, a manufacturer-owned repair facility estimate would be significantly lower and could make the vehicle repairable. When I attempted to obtain an inspection and estimate from a Tesla manufacturer repair facility, the appointment was cancelled after communication between the insurance company and the repair facility. This prevented me from obtaining a competing repair estimate. Because Tesla operates the vehicle manufacturing, repair network, and insurance services within the same ecosystem, I am submitting this information for review regarding potential impacts on repair access, repairability, and consumer choice.

NHTSA ID

11722287

Incident

Dec 12, 2025

Making a loud squeaky noise and knocking while I turn. The noise is coming from the steering and front suspension arms I believe.

NHTSA ID

11713009

Incident

Jan 1, 2026

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the battery powered Pyrotechnic High Voltage (HV) Battery Disconnect will reach the end of its battery lifespan in the near future, which will trigger alerts and may limit the vehicle’s performance.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.