2024 Tesla Model X

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

On 7/29/2026, 2:45 PM PST, I tapped the in-car myQ interface to send an "Open" command. Due to network latency/ connection drops in the Tesla infotainment system, there was a significant delay before the open command executed. After it finally opened, I proceeded to back out in Reverse. However, due to buffering/retry logic during the network reconnect, the system unexpectedly transmitted a follow-up "Close" command without any driver input. Because this automated ghost command executed while the vehicle was actively backing out, the overhead garage door unexpectedly began closing, striking the car and shattering the left Falcon Wing door glass. Safety Concern: The infotainment software suffers from a critical retry/buffering flaw where latent network API payloads execute out of sequence or trigger unintended secondary commands after initial connection drops. Transmitting an unprompted "Close" signal to an overhead garage door while a vehicle is actively moving in Reverse creates a severe collision hazard and safety risk for occupants and bystanders.

NHTSA ID

11754055

Incident

Jul 29, 2026

On XXX at approximately 465 miles, multiple critical safety systems simultaneously failed on my 2024 Tesla Model X (VIN: [XXX]). Dashboard warnings indicated that ABS, stability control, traction control, steering assist, and automatic emergency braking were all simultaneously disabled. The vehicle was taken to Tesla Service immediately. Tesla diagnosed the issue as a faulty wheel speed sensor and performed a replacement (RO# XXX). This simultaneous disabling of five critical safety systems on a vehicle with only 465 miles is a serious safety defect. Additionally, on XXX at approximately 21,180 miles, a passenger airbag warning light illuminated requiring service. This was resolved and addressed by slight moisture on son's shorts triggering the alert but unsure why this would cause such sensitivity. The vehicle has required 12 service visits since delivery in November 2024 for various recurring safety and mechanical issues. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11753633

Incident

Dec 3, 2024

Both Garnish - Fender - Front - LH Right side and Left side come loose when driving in rain. The force of wheels pushing rain water on the fender garnish causes both the left and right fender garnish 4 push clips to come loose. When this fender garnish breaks and flies off it could hit a pedestrian, another car on the road or the car it is installed on causing an accident

NHTSA ID

11741158

Incident

Feb 28, 2026

COMPONENT: Rear right falcon-wing door electronic control system. Door becomes stuck in a partially closed position and cannot be opened from inside or outside. Vehicle and component are available for inspection. SAFETY RISK: Falcon-wing doors have NO exterior mechanical release accessible to occupants when the electronic system fails. An occupant of the rear right seat can be trapped inside the vehicle. This creates a foreseeable risk of serious injury or death in any emergency requiring rapid egress: collision, fire (including thermal-runaway events documented across the lithium-ion EV fleet), submersion, or smoke inhalation. The risk is especially severe for child passengers using this seating position. CONFIRMED BY DEALER: Yes. Tesla Service Aliso Viejo and Tesla Collision Aliso Viejo (CA) inspected and attempted repair on at least 5 separate occasions between October 2025 and April 2026. Tesla represented in writing each time that the issue was resolved. The defect has recurred after every repair attempt. As of May 2026 the door remains unsafe. INSPECTED BY: Tesla service technicians only. No police, insurance, or independent inspection. WARNING SYMPTOMS / TIMING: The defect began in September 2025. No prior warning lamps or messages. The door operated normally for the preceding 12 months. Tesla initially attributed the failure to a minor cosmetic scratch sustained 12 months earlier — a theory inconsistent with the timeline, since the scratch existed during 12 months of normal door operation. Recurrence after 5+ failed repair attempts confirms the defect is electronic in nature, not cosmetic.

NHTSA ID

11736437

Incident

May 7, 2026

I would like to report a potential safety issue regarding Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD), specifically version 14.3.2. Following any driver intervention (such as braking or steering override), the system presents a prompt asking “Why did you intervene?” with selectable options (e.g., Navigation, Discomfort, Preference, Critical) or voice input. In my experience, this prompt does not automatically dismiss and requires manual interaction with the touchscreen to clear. This design creates a safety concern because: - It introduces a mandatory driver interaction immediately after a disengagement event. - It diverts driver attention away from the road during a potentially critical moment. - It may encourage rushed or inattentive responses just to clear the interface. Driver intervention moments are often associated with complex or unsafe driving situations, where full attention is essential. Requiring touchscreen interaction at that time may increase the risk of distraction-related incidents. I believe this behavior could represent a human-machine interface design issue that impacts driver safety. Vehicle: Tesla [Model] Software Version: FSD 14.3.2 Frequency: Occurs consistently after interventions

NHTSA ID

11735945

Incident

May 4, 2026

once full self-driving is disengaged a pop-up menu shows up at the main part of the screen requesting a feedback why full self-driving was disengaged you cannot dismiss the questionnaire easily without being distracted during the driving extremely dangerous The only way to dismiss the compulsory questionnaire is to make a selection of 1 option or double click on a microphone button on the steering wheel extremely distractive and requires not to look at the road just at the moment you disengage full self-driving there is no option to dismiss it Tesla is forcing you to answer it

NHTSA ID

11735665

Incident

May 1, 2026

Vehicle GPS self driving is malfunctioning. GPS shows the route driving through houses and buildings The assisted self driving is extremely unsafe to use and the same goes for the GPS guided navigation The GPS is untrustworthy giving multiple unsafe routes.

NHTSA ID

11730830

Incident

Apr 1, 2026

1) Yes, upon opening the falcon door there is water flooding down 2) Yes 3) Yes 4) No

NHTSA ID

11728896

Incident

Feb 16, 2026

On some Model S and Model X vehicles, the compression gap of the HVAC drain funnel seal is wider than intended, which may cause water ingress. Inspect the sponge area of the HVAC drain funnel for water ingress. If water ingress is present, rework the HVAC drain funnel seal.

Some Model S and Model X vehicles with 1st Generation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antennas might suffer from lower-than-expected navigation signal strength under certain circumstances.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles with a round steering wheel, built between November 6, 2024 and November 27, 2024, the supplier assembly process might have damaged the driver airbag. Coupled with a deep fold or crease in the airbag material or positioning of the heat diffuser, the damage could result in a tear during deployment, increasing the risk of injury in a collision.

Some Model S and Model X vehicles with 1st Generation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antennas might suffer from lower-than-expected navigation signal strength under certain circumstances.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.