2025 Tesla Model X

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.

While operating a 2025 Tesla Model X on Full Self-Driving (FSD Supervised), the vehicle engaged in leader-car following behavior and trailed a slow-moving vehicle onto an active railroad crossing. FSD failed to ensure the exit path was clear, causing the vehicle to suddenly decelerate from 12 mph to 0 mph, stranding the car directly on the tracks just as the crossing's active warning lights and gates triggered. When attempting to take immediate manual control to clear the tracks, the vehicle suffered a severe drivetrain control lockout. The vehicle remained unresponsive and stuck at 0 mph for approximately 3 seconds despite driver intervention to shift into reverse and accelerate. After the 3-second software lag, manual control was recovered, and the vehicle reversed. A dropping railroad gate arm struck the vehicle's panoramic roof and hood during the escape. Telemetry stats and multi-camera dashcam video of this autonomous software failure and control lockout have been retained.

NHTSA ID

11748104

Incident

Jul 2, 2026

Sept 20, 2025. 2025 Model X door alarmed for being open when it was actually closed. Door would only open intermittently. Your in car and cannot escape through drivers door. It was locked shut and thought it was open. Parked car requested Tesla service. Mobile unit came out replaced electric opener. Door continued to lock driver in and out of car randomly for the month of October 2025. We parked car and scheduled appointments with Tesla multiple times. They were not concerned this was a safety issue. They reschedule our appointments multiple times. At the end of October after several service appointments and multiple parts replaced the door started working. Their final comments we "THEY WERENT ABLE TO VERIFY THERE WAS AN ISSUE."

NHTSA ID

11717818

Incident

Sep 20, 2025

The contact owns a 2025 Tesla Model X. The contact stated that after the latest update was pushed out, the speed regulation on the vehicle failed to function as intended. The contact stated that the speed regulation was set to "Standard Mode" and the vehicle accelerated to 70 MPH in a 55 MPH Zone. The contact stated that was not the mode selected. In addition, when the contact set the speed regulator to "Crawl Mode," the vehicle drove 10-15 MPH below the speed limit. No warning light was illuminated. The contact was unable to control the speed of the vehicle. The vehicle was not taken to the dealer. The vehicle was not repaired. The manufacturer was not notified of the failure. The failure mileage was unknown.

NHTSA ID

11713772

Incident

Jan 1, 2026

I am writing to report and formally document a very serious and distressing safety incident involving my Tesla Model X that occurred for a second time, on [XXX]. While driving routinely into the parking garage at my workplace, my vehicle suddenly and violently stopped without warning. There were no obstacles, vehicles, or pedestrians in front of me. The abrupt stop caused my body and head to jolt forward with force, resulting in whiplash. I am still feeling dizzy, dazed, and disoriented, and I believe I may need to consult a neurologist as I have a headache from the whiplash. This is not the first time this has occurred. A similar but less severe incident happened previously while I was driving on [XXX] . At that time, I dismissed it as a possible glitch, but after this most recent and violent episode, I am deeply alarmed. I am extremely concerned about the safety of this vehicle. What if this sudden stop had occurred on the freeway, or while my two children were in the car? The potential consequences could have been catastrophic. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11698050

Incident

Oct 29, 2025

My Tesla Model X was in Autopilot mode (v13.2.9) at the time of the incident. The vehicle’s advanced driver-assistance system was actively controlling steering and speed, while I remained attentive with my hands on the wheel I was closely monitoring the car’s operation but was not manually steering, braking, or accelerating during Autopilot engagement The vehicle collided with stationary flexible delineator posts. The impact occurred at 55MPH. The flexible delineator posts were the only object struck. No other vehicles were involved in the accident, and no persons were injured.No passengers or bystanders affected. The collision with the flexible delineator posts caused damage to my vehicle’s front bumper area and cracked right headlight. There was no damage to any property besides my own vehicle. The incident was captured on the Tesla’s built-in camera system (dashcam). I have saved the video footage, which clearly shows the car’s approach and the impact with the flexible delineator posts. This video is available and can be provided for review.

NHTSA ID

11696997

Incident

Nov 1, 2025

I own a Tesla Model X 6-seater. The second-row seatbelt repeatedly becomes twisted and fails to retract or lay flat after only a few days of normal use. I have brought the vehicle to the Tesla Service Center in Austin, TX (2323 Ridgepoint Dr) multiple times — five separate repair visits so far — for the same issue. Each time, the technicians temporarily correct the twist or adjust the belt path, but the issue returns within days. I have attached screenshots of all five repair records, including Tesla’s technician notes describing the repeated attempts to resolve the problem. The problem appears to be caused by misalignment of the seatbelt retractor or seat design, not by user misuse. When the belt twists, it cannot retract properly or lay flat across the passenger, which may reduce its effectiveness during a collision. Tesla Service has not offered a permanent fix or design correction, and the defect continues to recur. This appears to be a systemic issue in the second-row seatbelt system of the Model X six-seat configuration. Because the defect involves a federally required safety restraint that may not function as intended, I am reporting this as a potential safety defect for further investigation.

NHTSA ID

11695157

Incident

Mar 4, 2025

The contact owned a 2025 Tesla Model X. The contact stated that while driving at approximately 65 MPH with Self-driving Assist activated, while the vehicle in front deaccelerated, the vehicle had aggressively deaccelerated. The contact stated that the self-driving assist had deactivated, causing him to aggressively depress the brake pedal, stopping before it struck the vehicle in front. Several unknown warning lights illuminated. In addition, the contact stated that the vehicle was struck in the rear by another vehicle, causing the vehicle to rear-end another vehicle. The contact sought medical attention for head and back injuries. A police report was filed. The vehicle was towed to a local dealer, where it was deemed a loss. The manufacturer was made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 6,150.

NHTSA ID

11682920

Incident

Jul 26, 2025

Mileage

6,150 mi

Hazard flasher button in my 2-weeks old new Tesla Model X is not working. On August 23, 2025, I was in a parking lot and needed to turn on the hazard flashers to signal to the car behind me that I was waiting for another vehicle to leave a parking space. I discovered that the hazard flasher button on my 2025 Tesla Model X did not work at all. Since I could not activate the hazard lights, I had to continue driving to find another parking spot. This was the first time I tried to use the hazard flashers since purchasing the vehicle two weeks earlier, and they have never worked. I attempted both a power cycle and vehicle reset, but the hazard button remains completely unresponsive. On this model, the hazard flasher is integrated into a touch-sensitive bar in the center console, and there is no alternative physical or touchscreen backup control. The absence of functioning hazard lights poses a significant safety risk. If I only discovered this defect during a true emergency situation (e.g., breakdown or accident), I would not have been able to warn surrounding traffic. In my opinion, relying on a touch bar for such a critical safety function is unreliable; a physical pressable button should be required. Tesla has scheduled a service appointment, but it is two weeks away, and in the meantime, I am driving a vehicle without working hazard lights. This is a safety-critical defect that should be investigated.

NHTSA ID

11682752

Incident

Aug 23, 2025

On some Model S and Model X vehicles, the compression gap of the HVAC drain funnel seal is wider than intended, which may cause water ingress. Inspect the sponge area of the HVAC drain funnel for water ingress. If water ingress is present, rework the HVAC drain funnel seal.

Some Model S and Model X vehicles with 1st Generation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antennas might suffer from lower-than-expected navigation signal strength under certain circumstances.

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles with a round steering wheel, built between November 6, 2024 and November 27, 2024, the supplier assembly process might have damaged the driver airbag. Coupled with a deep fold or crease in the airbag material or positioning of the heat diffuser, the damage could result in a tear during deployment, increasing the risk of injury in a collision.