2018 Tesla Model X

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

While driving on FSD (Full Self Driving) the vehicle was turning off the road into a parking lot and sped up and hit a vehicle while I was pressing the brake to the floor! I had to brace for impact when I hit the vehicle. I have requested the data and telemetry logs from Tesla. Everything was fine before the crash. Husband had a similar incident a few weeks ago where he was turning with FSD engaged and the vehicle stopped in the middle of the turn with a vehicle coming right at him, he had the gas floored to get out of the way but was completely stopped, could not move for 15 seconds or so.

NHTSA ID

11754460

Incident

Aug 2, 2026

The falcon doors on the model X, when it is a hot day, and the sun is hitting the door, these doors will not open under any circumstance, resulting in a major safety issue. should there be an accident, a fire or other issue where someone needs to exit the vehicle, they are simply not able to do so under any circumstance! This is a known problem with these vehicles, if the sun hits these doors or it’s a hot day. There are hundreds, if not thousands of posts about these doors, not opening when the sun is hitting the door for a prolonged period of time or the door gets hot. There needs to be a recall for this issue. From my research, seems that there’s some sort of sensor adhesive that comes loose or something similar to that. And either case this is a major safety issue, as it does not allow the passenger to exit the vehicle under any circumstance. Even holding the override button on the screen does not open the door. My kids have been stuck in this car on a repeated basis due to this issue of the door, not opening due to this failed sensor. Tesla is aware of this issue, and has never issued a recall, even though they know it affects all of the model X models

NHTSA ID

11744075

Incident

Jun 12, 2026

The Automated Emergency Brakes did not activate. This car hit the next car on the street. I was driving when I noticed the brake lights on the car in front of me, so I applied the brakes. Though it did not work, as this car is equipped with the Automated Emergency Brakes feature, it was expected that the car would activate the feature to stop to avoid impact and an accident. Which did not happen, and this car has a tremendous loss; the car in front also suffered a loss. The car manufacturer has given data in Excel files showing the events; it has no data at the time of the impact, but it has data well before and well after. Due to the failure of this important feature, the car has suffered a loss (potentially a total loss), the insurance process has been affected, and there has been a mental impact on my family members and me. Hence, requesting help in this regard.

NHTSA ID

11739759

Incident

May 17, 2026

The falcon doors will not open under any circumstance if the car is sitting in the sun. This is a known issue by Tesla with thousands of online complaints by owners. It seems the glue that holds the sensor comes loose in the heat. This is a major safety issue by NHTSA’s own standards. Not being able to exit the vehicle is directly listed as a reason for a recall by NHTSA. You need to force Tesla to issue a recall for this known issue by Tesla

NHTSA ID

11736902

Incident

May 9, 2026

For the past year, the battery will not hold it charge. I am getting about 30% of predicted mile range in colder weather and about 50% of predicted range in warmer weather. This makes the car unusable except for short trips and even then requires frequent charging. In addition, intermittantly, it will not charge quickly at a Supercharger. When others cars present are charging 180 range mph, I am charging at 20-50 range mph. I have had Tesla evaluate the issue and they claim there is nothing wrong but refused to share their evaluation with me. The rep would not give me any specific reason for my problem other than they found nothing wrong. I started the process before the end of the battery warranty (8 years) which has now expired. I feel Tesla service is committing systemic fraud in their approach to warrantied battery failure.

NHTSA ID

11732201

Incident

Feb 10, 2026

I own a 2018 Tesla Model X that has multiple breakdowns ( 3 times to date: Feb.28, 2026, Mar.7, 2026, Mar.14, 2026) resulting in the vehicle becoming undriveable and could not be shifted out of Neutral. During driving on separate occasions, the vehicle displayed multiple safety warnings and critical systems became disabled. Alerts shown on vehicle included: 1. Automatic Emergency Braking unavailable 2. Power braking Assist reduced 3. Parking brake not applied 4. Safety restraint system issue 5. ABS disabled 6. Park Assist unavailable 7. Service required Following these alerts, the vehicle became undriveable and could not be shifted properly, remaining stuck in Neutral. The vehicle therefore could not be driven safely. The vehicle was previously taken to a Tesla service center after an earlier breakdown. Tesla reported cleaning corrosion during service, but shortly after the vehicle was returned, the problem occurred again with the same or similar safety warnings. This issue is concerning because multiple braking and safety appear to fail simultaneously, including ABS, braking assist, and restraint system alerts. The vehicle becomes undriveable and may create a dangerous situation. Given the repeated breakdowns and the disabling of critical safety systems, I am reporting this issue for investigation.

NHTSA ID

11724612

Incident

Mar 14, 2026

The 2018 Model X experienced a sudden and complete loss of power and became totally inaccessible. All doors and access points were inoperable and the vehicle could not be unlocked, disconnected, powered on, or placed into any service or tow mode. Emergency front-trunk release cables had to be used and external 12-volt power applied at the jump terminals to wake the vehicle. The inability to access the vehicle was unexpected and alarming. Children, pets, elderly, and others could have been inside of the vehicle. Thankfully, they were not. Tesla inspected the vehicle and stated the failure was related to the battery coolant heater. The failure resulted in a complete vehicle immobilization and access failure. I had previously experienced restart warnings on the dashboard, but I did not expect a total lockout and loss of access. The inability to access the vehicle was unexpected and alarming. It may be a known safety issue. It should be recalled. This condition presents a serious safety risk because occupants could be trapped inside the vehicle and the vehicle cannot be accessed or moved without external power. In extreme heat or cold, or in a medical or emergency situation involving a child or pet, this failure mode could create a life-threatening situation. Importantly, even after multiple requests, I have not received a copy of the diagnostic report, or anything other than informal emails or calls. Tesla has not provided information regarding this failure other than broad statements, and visuals of the location of the battery pack, in an attempt to deny warranty coverage. The Tesla reports a High Voltage System alert currently. The vehicle is subject to Tesla’s Battery and Drive Unit Limited Warranty. Tesla has stated that the failed component was the battery coolant heater, but has refused to cover the repair under warranty. Tesla confirmed the failure but has not provided the diagnostic report, fault codes, or vehicle logs supporting its determination.

NHTSA ID

11715891

Incident

Feb 3, 2026

During a recent incident where a tire issue caused damage to the wiring harness for the parking brake, resulting in a Parking Brake Failure notification on the screen, the vehicle would not stop or turn off. The vehicle displayed N for neutral on the dash, but the vehicle would drive forward unless the brake was depressed. In addition, we were unable to place the vehicle in Park, which meant that we were unable to shut it off. The only way to stop the vehicle from driving on its own and crashing into something was to place concrete blocks under the tires! Unplugging the 12v battery also had no effect! The vehicle kept driving as if it was in drive, and there as no way to stop it without placing the foot on the brake pedal the entire time or placing the blocks I referenced. The only way I was able to shut it off, was to pull what's known as the Fireman's Loop, which I'm guessing firemen pull in the case of an accident. I wasn't aware of this mechanism, and only learned of it after posting on numerous social media apps regarding this issue. This is a Major issue, as we are talking about a moving and unstoppable car! Tesla needs to build some mechanism that allows the car to be shut off by the driver or to override the screen and place the car in park. Pulling this firemans loop and unplugging the 12v battery, required me being in front of the vehicle, risking my life, as the vehicle could've easily moved if the concrete barriers didn't stop it, and also required me taking 30+ minutes to remove components from the Frunk, just to access these components!!

NHTSA ID

11715473

Incident

Feb 4, 2026

On certain Model S and Model X vehicles, the battery powered Pyrotechnic High Voltage (HV) Battery Disconnect will reach the end of its battery lifespan in the near future, which will trigger alerts and may limit the vehicle’s performance.

For some Model X vehicles built before May 2018, should water seep into the printed circuit board of the rear door cladding sensor, an alert might be displayed on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.