2020 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

2020 Model Y developed a parking-brake/braking system failure. Vehicle displayed "Steering & Braking - Parking brake functions degraded/parking brake may not apply or release." This resulted in the vehicle being unable to drive for extended periods of time. Tesla diagnosed a rear-right brake caliper failure and quoted approximately $886. Tesla acknowledged the condition is not normal wear and tear but declined coverage because the vehicle is outside of warranty and there is no open recall. I am concerned about premature failure of a safety-critical brake/parking-brake component.

NHTSA ID

11766629

Incident

Aug 3, 2026

Loud intermittent clicking in rear and front wheel at slow speeds driver side. Likely faulty spline. It's been on going for the past three years.

NHTSA ID

11766210

Incident

Sep 1, 2024

On June 17, 2026, I experienced a severe and life-threatening entrapment inside my 2020 Tesla Model Y. The incident occurred immediately after I finished charging the vehicle for approximately two hours at a charging station under direct sunlight, which left the car extremely hot. After charging, I drove a short distance, parked, and left the vehicle for approximately 20 minutes. Upon my return, my card key failed to unlock the vehicle. After contacting my wife for assistance, I was briefly able to open the door, but I became securely locked inside the cabin as soon as the door closed. The 12V battery had completely failed without any advanced warning or vehicle alarm. All power was lost. The windows were fully rolled up, the climate control stopped, and there was no airflow. The cabin temperature was rapidly rising due to the earlier sun exposure. In a state of panic and facing a dangerously overheating cabin, I called my wife to inform her that I needed to break a window. I struck the windshield to draw the attention of passersby, which cracked the glass but did not shatter it. I then attempted to force a side window outward to establish ventilation and crawled into the back seat to try to open the trunk, but all electronic and external release mechanisms were unresponsive. After regaining composure, I used my phone to look up emergency solutions online and ultimately located the manual mechanical door release. I was able to escape.

NHTSA ID

11764144

Incident

Jun 17, 2026

We had a terrifying moment today. Low-voltage battery died instantly, leaving the driver locked inside a completely blacked-out car. No electronic door response, phone app & keycards completely frozen. Luckily, we got out safely after calling Roadside Assistance, but this is a serious hazard: No advance warning: The car gave zero indication the low-voltage battery was dying. Counter-intuitive exit: In a panic, 99% of people won't recall where the hidden manual release is. Two urgently needed safety updates: 1. Advanced, explicit warnings days before low-voltage battery failure. 2. Door safety logic that guarantees standard exit hardware works seamlessly even during complete power loss. In hot weather, this corner case can turn fatal in minutes. Please prioritize this safety redesign!

NHTSA ID

11759894

Incident

Aug 26, 2026

I am reporting multiple safety‑critical incidents involving my Tesla Model Y equipped with FSD (Supervised). The vehicle has repeatedly performed sudden braking in active traffic without any obstacles present, causing physical jolting and creating a risk of collision. These incidents occurred on [XXX] and XXX including a sudden hard brake at approximately 2:18 p.m. on XXX. Additionally, the vehicle has shown lane‑centering instability on the highway. On XXX at approximately 1:51 p.m., the vehicle drifted within the lane and failed to maintain proper centering while FSD was engaged, requiring immediate manual intervention to avoid unsafe movement. Tesla service has stated that no error codes were detected, but also acknowledged known FSD software behaviors affecting Hardware 3 vehicles. This indicates the system may be performing unsafe maneuvers without logging faults. I am reporting these incidents because they pose a direct safety risk to me, other drivers, and pedestrians. I request that NHTSA review these behaviors as potential safety defects in Tesla’s FSD (Supervised) system. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11757733

Incident

Aug 15, 2026

While my wife was driving on a flat straight road, she heard a loud bang noise from the front of the vehicle. The vehicle made a loud grinding noise. Upon inspection, it was found the bolt securing the front right damper to the suspension had snapped and come loose. The nut fastening the bolt was lost on the roadside.

NHTSA ID

11757704

Incident

Aug 17, 2026

This is about a 2020 Tesla Model Y, with HardWare3 (HW3) Full-Self-Driving (FSD) feature. The older HW3 FSD-enabled Model Y cars started getting the new "v14 Lite" FSD updates recently - I got mine a few days ago. I immediately noticed a safety concern with the v14 Lite. Previous versions of FSD allowed me to set the maximum speed that the car would drive in the FSD mode - I can adjust it using the "wheel button" on my right thumb on the steering wheel, and the car would not exceed the maximum speed I choose. However, after the update to v14 Lite, the wheel button no longer controlled the maximum speed. Instead, it controlled the "speed profile" ("Sloth", "Chill", "Standard", "Hurry" are the options in my car). Regularly in highway driving, even in the Standard mode, the car would speed up to go well past the speed limit, more than 10mph over the speed limit, seemingly to match the speed of the rest of the traffic (69mph on a 55mph highway). This felt very uncomfortable. I tried to adjust the max speed down like I was used to, but the car instead switched to a different profile, "Chill", and rapidly slowed down to 4mph below the speed limit (51mph in this case=. The speed reduction was so sudden that it also felt dangerous (car behind me would have to break quickly to not hit me), and I didn't want to be driving well below the speed limit (also dangerous). Under "Self Driving" settings menu, there is also a feature called "Speed Limit", that used to allow you to set the "default" speed limit for FSD driving (for instance, +3mph above the speed limit). You can adjust it up and down with the right thumb wheel beyond that, but it set the default basic max speed limit for FSD. After the v14 Lite update, the FSD completely ignores this speed limit, and happily accelerates well beyond that. Not it seems like the "speed limit" feature is simply for warning the driver to not exceed the pre-determined speed limit when controlling the car. FSD simply ignores it.

NHTSA ID

11752764

Incident

Jul 24, 2026

Seat occupancy sensor failed for the second time. The car will randomly shut off if I am inside because it does not detect a passenger. When I exit the vehicle, the car will stay on for an extended period of time due to failed seat occupancy sensor. This is a widespread issue affecting all makes and models of Tesla. They are aware of the high rate of failure and have not made any attempt to issue a recall. This is dangerous and inconvenient as the infotainment system will not pair with your phone because it does not detect a driver. When moving, the car will also randomly throw itself into PARK at speed if you don’t put on your seatbelt before moving. The first time this happened, I smashed my head on the steering wheel.

NHTSA ID

11741791

Incident

Jun 1, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.