2021 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received nine Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting an inability to open doors on Model Year (MY) 2021 Tesla Model Y vehicles. The most commonly reported scenarios involved parents exiting the vehicle after a drive cycle in order to remove a child from the back seat or placing a child in the back seat before starting a drive cycle. In those events, the parents were unable to reopen a door to regain access to the vehicle. Four of these VOQs reported resorting to breaking a window to regain entry into the vehicle. Although Tesla vehicles have manual door releases inside of the cabin, in these situations, a child may not be able to access or operate the releases even if the vehicle’s driver is aware of them. As a result, in these instances, an occupant who remains inside a vehicle in this condition may be unable to be rapidly retrieved by persons outside of the vehicle. Entrapment in a vehicle is particularly concerning in emergency situations, such as when children are entrapped in a hot vehicle. For awareness, NHTSA has a Child Heatstroke Campaign that highlights the dangers to children entrapped in hot vehicles. Based on ODI’s preliminary review, this condition appears to occur when the electronic door locks receive insufficient voltage from the vehicle. Available repair invoices report replacement of the vehicle’s low voltage battery after the incident. However, no VOQs reported seeing a low voltage battery warning prior to the exterior door handles becoming inoperative. The Tesla Owner’s Manual “Jump Starting” and “Opening the Hood with No Power” sections describe a multi-step process for restoring power to the electronic door locks in order to enable their operation from outside of the vehicle. This process requires applying 12 volts DC from a separate power source to two different points accessible from the vehicle’s exterior.The subject incidents suggest that this process may not be readily available to owners or well known. For instances where an occupant is able to access and operate interior door handles, the Tesla Owner’s Manual “Opening Doors with No Power” section identifies the manual door releases inside of the vehicle’s cabin. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and severity of this condition, including the risks that arise from the conditions reported in the VOQs. This investigation will also assess the approach used by Tesla to supply power to the door locks and the reliability of the applicable power supplies. At this time, NHTSA’s investigation is focused on the operability of the electronic door locks from outside of the vehicle as that circumstance is the only one in which there is no manual way to open the door. The agency will continue to monitor any reports of entrapment involving opening doors from inside of the vehicle, and ODI will take further action as needed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume and the ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

I am reporting a potential safety defect in my 2021 Tesla Model Y, currently showing 47,582 miles, involving electrical, software, and driver-assistance systems. Problems began around August 2026. By September 10, 2026, automatic high beams were malfunctioning. Diagnostic alerts dated October 15–16, 2026, indicated Autosteer unavailable and adaptive-headlight failures. Autopilot becomes unavailable, nighttime visibility is affected, and software updates repeatedly stall at approximately 50%. On October 16, 2026, Service Mode showed a CRITICAL Secondary Autopilot ECU fault. Tesla Sterling subsequently identified computer reboot-loop faults and recommended approximately $2,700 in computer replacement without conclusively establishing whether software or hardware caused the failure. Tesla Tysons also reviewed vehicle logs but reported that existing faults prevented further remote diagnosis. An independent former Tesla technician indicated that typical computer failures can involve overheating or camera malfunctions. Neither symptom is present, and cameras function while parked. I am concerned that these safety-related failures may be associated with an incomplete software update. Tesla has been notified, but the root cause remains unresolved. The vehicle is available for inspection. I request that NHTSA investigate potential systemic software and Autopilot computer defects, examine similar complaints, and determine whether a safety recall or manufacturer-funded corrective action is warranted.

NHTSA ID

11776462

Incident

Aug 15, 2026

After installing a Tesla software update, my blind-spot warning and lane-departure warning systems stopped working. this can cause bad accident. I took my vehicle to Tesla Service, where I was informed that the car's computer was defective and needed to be replaced at a cost of $2,518, not including labor and diagnostic fees. I have never been involved in a collision, and my vehicle has not experienced any other issues that could explain this failure. Both safety features were working properly before the software update. I strongly believe this problem was caused by Tesla's software update, yet Tesla is refusing to take responsibility and is asking me to pay for the replacement computer, labor, and diagnostic charges. I find it unfair that I am being asked to pay thousands of dollars to fix a problem that appeared immediately after a Tesla software update. I believe Tesla should take responsibility and repair the issue at no cost to me.

NHTSA ID

11776295

Incident

Nov 5, 2026

I own a 2021 Tesla Model Y Performance with approximately 42,000 miles. On November 5, 2026, Tesla Service identified a suspension defect described in its official repair estimate as “lateral bushings torn out.” Tesla determined that both front lower lateral link assemblies require replacement. The estimated repair cost is $782.40. The vehicle has previously experienced persistent alignment problems, including pulling to the right and abnormal tire wear. A wheel alignment was performed approximately six weeks before this diagnosis. Tesla Service stated that the bushings would have been inspected during the previous alignment and suggested that the failures occurred within the intervening six weeks. However, I have not been provided documentation establishing that both bushings were undamaged during the earlier inspection. I am concerned about the potential safety implications of both front lower lateral link bushings failing at approximately 42,000 miles, particularly given the importance of these components in maintaining suspension geometry and vehicle stability. Tesla previously issued Recall 21V-835 involving front lateral link fasteners on certain 2020–2021 Model Y vehicles. Although Tesla informed me that my VIN is excluded from that recall, the affected suspension components are the same. Additionally, NHTSA opened investigation PE26-006 in July 2026 concerning front lower lateral link failures in Tesla vehicles, including 2021–2023 Model Ys. I recognize that the failure mechanism identified in my vehicle may differ from those previously investigated. Nevertheless, I request that NHTSA review this incident to determine whether premature front lower lateral link bushing failures represent an additional safety concern affecting these vehicles. I can provide Tesla’s written diagnosis and repair estimate documenting the condition of both front lower lateral link assemblies.

NHTSA ID

11775938

Incident

Nov 5, 2026

The contact owns a 2021 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that while driving 55 MPH, there was an abnormally loud popping and cracking sound, and the steering wheel became unstable. The contact pulled over to the side of the road. The contact resumed driving; however, the steering wheel was loose, causing the vehicle to fail to respond to steering input. The contact pulled over a second time and inspected the vehicle, discovering that the front driver’s side wheel was turned inward. The vehicle was towed to the residence, and later towed to Bimmer Rescue, where it was diagnosed that the axle bolts had backed out, the axle was fractured, and the lower control arm sustained damages and struck and cracked the sub frame. The contact associated the failure with NHTSA Action Number: PE26006 (Suspension). A Tesla Service Center was notified of the failure in person, but no assistance was provided. The failure mileage was 172,316.

NHTSA ID

11775597

Incident

Nov 1, 2026

Mileage

172,316 mi

On XXX (4:59 PM and 5:47 PM) and XXX (7:49 AM), while driving, my 2021 Tesla Model Y (approx. 41,500 miles) displayed "Steering assist reduced" (UI_a020), each followed within about a minute by "Lane Departure Avoidance unavailable" (APP_w264). [Add if true: The steering felt noticeably heavier when the alert appeared.] The vehicle's 12V system tested healthy in Service Mode (13.32 V, DC-DC output normal). Tesla Service ([XXX]; service SV02F94980) diagnosed an Electronic Power Assisted Steering (EPAS) rack motor control error with limited power output from overheat or overload protection. On XXX, at 41,788 miles, Tesla replaced the steering gear (part 1188832-00-B), along with the front lower compliance and lateral links, and performed an alignment. I paid $4,522.27 out of pocket; Tesla declined goodwill. Losing power steering assist while driving is a safety hazard. The failed rack belongs to the same Mando-manufactured family (XXX) named in recall 25V-092 and investigation EA24001, which covered only 2023 Model 3 and Model Y. NHTSA's complaint database shows a growing number of 2021 Model Y complaints describing the same UI_a020 alert and the same rack replacement, many filed in 2026. I ask NHTSA to evaluate whether the defect and remedy should extend to 2021 Model Y vehicles. Invoice attached. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11774496

Incident

Oct 12, 2026

My 2021 Tesla Model Y (Autopilot Hardware 3) had a malfunction of its camera system and automatic windshield wipers after an over-the-air software update. The update was version 2026.38.5.1, which included FSD (Supervised) v14.3 Lite, and it installed on Oct 17. The vehicle had no problems with these systems before the update. After the update, the rearview camera did not display when shifting into reverse, the passenger side rear camera feeds stopped working, the automatic wipers did not activate in rain. Tesla’s automatic wipers depend on the vehicle’s cameras rather than a separate rain sensor, so both failures point to the camera or Autopilot computer system. Safety risk: Without a working rearview camera, I could not reliably see pedestrians, children, or objects behind the vehicle when reversing. Without working automatic wipers, visibility in rain depended entirely on manual control. Camera-dependent safety features such as automatic emergency braking and lane departure warning may also have been affected. The problem first appeared immediately after the 2026.38.5.1 update. I went to the Tesla service center and they are charging an exorbitant to even diagnose the issue ($265 per issue). Current status: On Oct 26, Tesla installed a newer update, 2026.38.5.11. However, the problem persists. The passenger side rear camera briefly worked before going dark again.

NHTSA ID

11773882

Incident

Oct 18, 2026

On [XXX], between approximately [XXX] and [XXX] AM, I was driving my 2021 Tesla Model Y Long Range (VIN: [XXX]) with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged, software version v14.3 Lite, on the southbound [XXX] frontage road at [XXX]. The road has five lanes in my direction, and only the leftmost lane is a left-turn lane. I was in the third lane from the left, and the navigation route required a left turn onto [XXX] at the upcoming intersection. FSD waited until the last moment to change lanes. The light turned red before it could complete the lane change, and the vehicle stopped straddling two lanes, still not in the left-turn lane. I expected FSD to continue straight and reroute. Instead, when the light turned green, the vehicle cut across the leftmost lane and drove up onto the median, apparently attempting to cross over it to complete the left turn. The other side of the median is oncoming traffic. There were two poles with city signs on the median, and the vehicle struck them. I took over immediately, but the collision had already occurred. No other vehicles or people were involved, and no one was injured. My vehicle sustained severe front-end damage, including a detached front bumper, a deformed left fender, and a shattered windshield. FSD/Autopilot features are no longer functioning. The vehicle did not automatically contact emergency services; I called the police myself. The incident was reported to the police (report #[XXX]) and to my insurance company, Progressive (claim #[XXX]). Tesla has contacted me to investigate. I have preserved the dashcam footage. Prior to this incident, I had also experienced repeated FSD issues after a software update in July 2026, including phantom braking and the vehicle suddenly stopping and freezing at intersections, requiring manual takeover. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11773313

Incident

Oct 16, 2026

On XXX, at approximately 10:21 PM, my wife was driving our 2021 Tesla Model Y at low speed (about 7 mph) through the front roundabout of a school in [XXX]. She reports that the vehicle then accelerated rapidly on its own to approximately 35 mph and struck a fence and a tree. She states she did not command this acceleration and attempted to slow the vehicle. The airbags deployed and the vehicle was totaled. She was evaluated at an emergency room and released with no serious injuries. We obtained Tesla's Incident Data Report for the crash. Tesla's data indicates the accelerator pedal was applied up to 100% in the final seconds, which the driver disputes. The data also shows the accelerator reading remained at approximately 90-100% for several minutes AFTER the impact, while the vehicle was stationary and unoccupied, and when the vehicle was inspected two days later the accelerator pedal was found sitting in a depressed position. The floor mat was flat and clear of the pedals. I am filing this complaint to document the incident for NHTSA's pattern review, including the post-crash pedal condition. The complete Tesla data package (incident report, full data export, event data recorder file, and camera recordings) is preserved and available to investigators on request. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11773127

Incident

Oct 20, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.