2021 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received nine Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting an inability to open doors on Model Year (MY) 2021 Tesla Model Y vehicles. The most commonly reported scenarios involved parents exiting the vehicle after a drive cycle in order to remove a child from the back seat or placing a child in the back seat before starting a drive cycle. In those events, the parents were unable to reopen a door to regain access to the vehicle. Four of these VOQs reported resorting to breaking a window to regain entry into the vehicle. Although Tesla vehicles have manual door releases inside of the cabin, in these situations, a child may not be able to access or operate the releases even if the vehicle’s driver is aware of them. As a result, in these instances, an occupant who remains inside a vehicle in this condition may be unable to be rapidly retrieved by persons outside of the vehicle. Entrapment in a vehicle is particularly concerning in emergency situations, such as when children are entrapped in a hot vehicle. For awareness, NHTSA has a Child Heatstroke Campaign that highlights the dangers to children entrapped in hot vehicles. Based on ODI’s preliminary review, this condition appears to occur when the electronic door locks receive insufficient voltage from the vehicle. Available repair invoices report replacement of the vehicle’s low voltage battery after the incident. However, no VOQs reported seeing a low voltage battery warning prior to the exterior door handles becoming inoperative. The Tesla Owner’s Manual “Jump Starting” and “Opening the Hood with No Power” sections describe a multi-step process for restoring power to the electronic door locks in order to enable their operation from outside of the vehicle. This process requires applying 12 volts DC from a separate power source to two different points accessible from the vehicle’s exterior.The subject incidents suggest that this process may not be readily available to owners or well known. For instances where an occupant is able to access and operate interior door handles, the Tesla Owner’s Manual “Opening Doors with No Power” section identifies the manual door releases inside of the vehicle’s cabin. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and severity of this condition, including the risks that arise from the conditions reported in the VOQs. This investigation will also assess the approach used by Tesla to supply power to the door locks and the reliability of the applicable power supplies. At this time, NHTSA’s investigation is focused on the operability of the electronic door locks from outside of the vehicle as that circumstance is the only one in which there is no manual way to open the door. The agency will continue to monitor any reports of entrapment involving opening doors from inside of the vehicle, and ODI will take further action as needed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume and the ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

On September 23, 2026, the vehicle was being driven at low speed when the driver experienced sudden and unexpected acceleration. The vehicle rapidly accelerated and a collision occurred. The driver reports that she did not intentionally accelerate the vehicle to this degree. Vehicle data and the Event Data Recorder (EDR) were subsequently obtained. The data records the vehicle accelerating from approximately 0 mph to approximately 35 mph in about four seconds, with the recorded accelerator-pedal-position signal reaching 100%. The EDR does not record brake application before the first crash trigger. Vehicle data records driver brake application shortly after the initial crash trigger, including ABS activity. The cause of the accelerator-pedal-position signal is UNKNOWN. It has not been determined whether the recorded signal resulted from driver pedal application, the accelerator pedal/sensor system, or another vehicle system. I am reporting this because of the sudden acceleration and severity of the resulting collision and would like the incident reviewed as a potential vehicle safety issue. The EDR also indicates that airbag and seat-belt pretensioner deployment was not commanded during either of the two recorded crash events. Given the severity of the collision, I am also reporting the lack of airbag deployment as a safety concern. I do not know whether the collision met the applicable deployment thresholds. The vehicle is available for inspection. The EDR report and complete raw vehicle-data CSV have been preserved. There were no known warning messages indicating an accelerator problem before the incident.

NHTSA ID

11766674

Incident

Sep 23, 2026

My vehicle falls within the 2021–2023 Model Y population identified in NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation PE26-006. The vehicle is a 2021 Model Y and current mileage is 73,350 miles. I am experiencing progressively worsening front suspension squeaking/creaking when turning the steering wheel in either direction, which can now be heard both inside and outside the vehicle. The vehicle also feels noticeably bouncier than normal. I first noticed a faint creaking sound in July and it has gotten worse over time. So I have concerns regarding the lower lateral-link/control-arm suspension failure. Additionally, I have experienced unusual wear on my tires and alignment issues in the last couple of years. There was also a previous recall from 2021 , 21V-835 / SB-21-31-003, that involved certain 2020–2021 Model Ys where the front lower lateral-link fasteners could loosen and allow the lateral link to separate from the subframe. NHTSA specifically described the potential consequence as changed wheel alignment, instability, and increased crash risk. I have reached out to Tesla about my concerns and they stated there were no open recalls and quoted me for repairs. I have screenshots of the Tesla correspondence if needed. I have an upcoming appointment with Tesla on 9/24/26 for diagnostic testing.

NHTSA ID

11766449

Incident

Jul 1, 2026

I was using my cars FSD program and it nearly turned me in front of an oncoming Semi truck. This was after it hesitated to turn the car when it had a safer opportunity. I thought it would wait but then it started to turn and I had to stop it, which left me slightly out of my lane which was scary too, with a giant truck coming head on.

NHTSA ID

11764834

Incident

Sep 16, 2026

The Tesla will randomly when the Adaptive Cruise Control is engaged brake from highway speeds down to 30mph. This happens when you go by off ramps and at some intersections on the highway. 1) At the intersection of [XXX] and [XXX] in [XXX] it happens sometimes especially if there is a vehicle next to you 2) At the intersection of [XXX] and [XXX] 3) Off ramp on [XXX] and [XXX]. these are the places that it happens the most. It does very randomly do it at other locations. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11764813

Incident

Sep 16, 2026

On or about XXX my Tesla Model Y downloaded FSD version 14 Lite. One day after downloading the software, I used FSD and the new software caused the computer to overheat. This killed the car computer and made FSD, adaptive, cruise control, lane keep assist, reverse camera, and many other functions, including GPS and navigation inoperable. My car’s warranty expired in January of this year and Tesla will not cover the replacement car computer. There are hundreds of other complaints of this issue reported online on [XXX], Reddit, Facebook, etc. In the 2nd quarter Tesla Earnings Call, [XXX] declared that hardware 3 equipped Tesla vehicles would not be able to support autonomous driving with full self driving. He stated every hardware 3 vehicle will need to be updated with a hardware 4 computer and cameras. Since my hardware 3 computer failed, I requested the hardware 4 computer and cameras to be installed, but Tesla denied this service even though [XXX] said it was a requirement. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11764580

Incident

Jul 23, 2026

In the 5 years we have had this vehicle there have been multiple issues with the Self Driving feature including: 1)Phantom braking on busy freeways in [XXX] 2)Swerving randomly into the other late on a curve on 4 lane hwy at 65 mph ([XXX] near [XXX]) 3)Attempting to switch lanes into fast traffic when we were at a standstill in rush hour traffic ([XXX]) 4)Slamming brakes on on a 2 lane road on a curve because there was a semi in the other lane (that had not crossed the line) [XXX] 5)Being a short way from exiting the freeway and having the car jump back into traffic ([XXX] at [XXX]) 6) Slammed on brakes when the car in front of us was exiting [XXX] normally on an offramp going northbourd around the city of [XXX]. These are some of the most egregious errors the car has made, but there are more not listed. I try it on occasion when there is a software update. It is not safe though- almost without fail I need to take over each time I try it. As [XXX] said on XXX "Hardware 3 simply does not have the capability to achieve unsupervised FSD due to physical computing and memory limitations." The full self driving is dangerous, yet each time I get in the car the computer encourages its use. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11764224

Incident

May 11, 2026

I brought the vehicle to a Tesla Service Center for a front suspension noise. During the alignment portion of that repair, the technician found a crack in the left side of the rear subframe casting, the structural member that locates the rear suspension links and supports the rear drive unit. The subframe required full replacement. There was no impact event. The vehicle has never struck a curb, pothole, or object, and Tesla's own written finding confirmed there was no evidence of any side impact. Tesla attributed the crack to stress transmitted from failed front lower control arm bushings, which were replaced at the same visit. The front lower lateral links and their subframe fasteners were also replaced during this repair. The Tesla technician stated he had not seen this subframe crack so severely at this mileage, and that he normally sees this failure only on vehicles over 100,000 miles, or vehicles that have hit severe potholes or fallen off steep curbs, none of which applies here. A rear subframe cracking under normal driving loads at 68,000 miles is a structural failure with safety implications. The subframe controls rear wheel alignment and retains the drive unit. Progressive or sudden failure could cause loss of alignment, instability, or loss of vehicle control. I am reporting this so NHTSA can determine whether premature rear subframe cracking, potentially linked to front suspension link failure, represents a defect trend on these vehicles.

NHTSA ID

11763484

Incident

Sep 4, 2026

My garage-kept 2021 Tesla Model Y experienced a premature failure/tearing of the front lower lateral link and compliance bushings at only 31,930 miles under normal driving conditions. The service center identified severe degradation requiring immediate replacement. This component failed prematurely without any severe impact or road hazards, posing a potential safety hazard regarding vehicle control and alignment. This issue appears to be part of the ongoing suspension defect under NHTSA investigation (PE26006). Funny thing is that my dad's model Y also has the similar issues on the rear suspension. sigh...

NHTSA ID

11763387

Incident

Sep 10, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.