2025 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.

While driving straight ahead in my lane on a wet freeway in an active construction zone, the vehicle abruptly and without warning lost traction and spun out of control. I was traveling in a normal, controlled manner with the flow of traffic and was not turning, braking hard, or making any abrupt maneuver when the loss of control occurred. It was so sudden that I initially believed another vehicle had struck me. I was unable to recover control, and the vehicle left its lane and was involved in a collision that resulted in the vehicle being declared a total loss. This is a nearly new all-wheel-drive vehicle, approximately 17 months old, equipped with electronic stability and traction control. I am an experienced driver with a clean record and had driven this same vehicle through mountain roads the week prior without any issue. A vehicle of this type is not expected to suddenly lose control while traveling straight. The specific component or system that failed is UNKNOWN. No warning lamps or messages appeared before the loss of control. The vehicle data available to me as an owner is limited and does not reflect the full diagnostic logs the manufacturer retains. The vehicle is a total loss but is preserved and available for inspection upon request. The manufacturer has not inspected or responded. A police report was filed.

NHTSA ID

11756095

Incident

Jul 17, 2026

Vehicle has complete Full Self-Driving (Supervised) capabilities. Vehicle was reverse parking on its own but the right side crashed into a wall. Vehicle did not stop reverse upon collision. Driver took over immediately to avoid further crash fatality.

NHTSA ID

11755576

Incident

Aug 7, 2026

Driver selected auto-park in parking area and car tried to self-park in a chosen spot adjacent to a pole and made several attempts to park and in the process hit a pole adjacent to the chosen parking spot. Immediately the incident was reported via Tesla app and photos were uploaded and an appointment was given for 8/6/2026 at 2:15pm at Tesla service Aliso Viejo. In reference to the pictures, car tried to park in spot 89 entering from spot 90, and made several attempts and driver expected the auto-park to be aborted giving up control to teh driver, but the car hit the pole and then driver took control to park.

NHTSA ID

11754240

Incident

Jul 28, 2026

The Full Self Driving software does not allow the user to limit the maximum speed of the vehicle while in use. The car frequently drives 15-20 MPH over the actual limits in typical driving modes with no ability for the user to safely and precisely restrict its speed to a more safe and appropriate level. The car may begin a journey at an appropriate speed, and continue at that speed for miles, but for no reason that is apparent to the user, the system may begin to accelerate beyond a safe limit. This makes the driving experience while using this software less predictable and compromises the safety of the user and others on the road. The user controlled speed limiting feature was previously available, and worked well, but was removed as part of an update to version 14.x of the software. An alternative that is being used, which is much less safe, is that users can restrict the speed of the entire vehicle such that its speed may never pass a certain level, under any circumstance, even if the accelerator is fully depressed (by the user). Once enabled, this feature cannot be adjusted or disabled while driving. Users are using this vehicle speed restriction feature to more precisely restrict the excessive and unpredictable speeding of the automated system because they are not given the ability to do so safely and precisely via other means.

NHTSA ID

11753209

Incident

Jul 28, 2026

My 2025 Model Y with stalks creates an unsafe driving condition. Under current software, enabling FSD forces a single-pull lockout that completely disables standard Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC). (Advanced Driver Assistance Sytems) FSD routinely follows vehicles at less than a 1 second gap at 70-80 MPH and attempts unsafe merges with tractor-trailers. Drivers must be allowed to drop to TACC to maintain safe following distances without being forced to entirely disable FSD while parked. Because the software removes the single-pull/double-pull distinction, the driver cannot downgrade the system to standard cruise control on the fly to establish a safe following distance. To stop the dangerous FSD behavior, the driver must completely disengage the system to manual control, as switching the underlying autopilot modes requires pulling over and shifting into Park. Tesla customer support has refused to address this software-enforced safety hazard. Following too closely routinely happens on the interstate at Highway speeds while using FSD. This safety issue occurs consistently during highway driving on major interstates at speeds between 70-80. The inability to seamlessly select a safe cruise control mode increases the risk of a high speed rear end collision.

NHTSA ID

11752724

Incident

Jul 23, 2026

The left back seat actuator engaged twice in the same day and the seat back dropped down unexpectedly on the passenger. It’s done it to my grandchild twice and hurt him. No injuries but the surprise and shock of the seat coming down on him was painful. I've had this with other passengers in the same seat. Tesla inspected it for this problem, but found nothing at the time. The problem is intermittent.

NHTSA ID

11749176

Incident

Jul 6, 2026

Component/Issue Description: Following a recent over-the-air (OTA) software update to the vehicle's Full Self-Driving system, a dangerous user interface defect was introduced. Immediately upon an FSD disengagement—the critical transition window where the operator must resume manual driving control—the center touchscreen populates a mandatory, invasive feedback popup menu. This menu causes a severe driver distraction and creates an immediate safety hazard. The popup blocks vital driving visualizations and navigation data on the screen at a high-stress moment. Furthermore, the UI creates a functional touchscreen lockout, demanding manual and visual interaction from the driver to clear the box while the vehicle is actively in motion. Forcing a driver to divert their eyes from the roadway to navigate a touchscreen menu immediately following a system intervention creates an unreasonable and systemic risk of collision. The manufacturer has provided no setting to disable this dangerous distraction.

NHTSA ID

11743977

Incident

Jun 1, 2026

am reporting a serious safety concern involving a 2025 Tesla Model Y, VIN [XXX] . On [XXX], the vehicle was being driven on [XXX] in Columbus, Ohio while the driver was traveling to Columbus Preparatory Academy. During the trip, the steering reportedly stopped responding properly, and the driver struggled to control the vehicle. Witnesses at the scene reported that the driver appeared to be fighting with the steering and trying to stop the vehicle or prevent it from drifting. The vehicle then lost control, accelerated or continued moving uncontrollably, flipped/rolled over, and sustained major damage. A police report was created by the Columbus Police Department under report number [XXX]. The vehicle involved is a 2025 Tesla Model Y. This was a serious crash involving a possible steering malfunction, loss of control, and rollover. The vehicle is currently located at Pro-Cars, 400 Stimmel Rd, Columbus, OH 43223. Tesla was contacted after the incident, and the representative advised that the vehicle should be taken to a collision center. I am filing this complaint because the incident appears to involve a potential safety defect affecting steering control and vehicle control. I request that NHTSA review this matter as a possible vehicle safety defect. The vehicle has not yet been repaired, and I am attempting to preserve it for inspection. I have supporting materials including the police report, photos/videos, witness information if needed, towing/storage documentation, and communications regarding the vehicle. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11741715

Incident

May 19, 2026

On certain Model Y vehicles, a gap between the liftgate and the spoiler outer panel may produce a whistling sound if the vehicle is driven at high speed. Upon customer complaint of noise coming from the liftgate area, rework the spoiler outer panel.

On some vehicles, degraded or excessive glue under the front seat cushion(s) may cause creaking noises during cornering or when pressing on the seat cushion(s). Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework the front seat cushion(s).

On some vehicles, insufficient lubricant at the front seat recliner tube ends may cause creaking noises during weight shifting when the seat is occupied. Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, lubricate the front seat recliner tube ends.

Some Model Y vehicles may emit rattling or knocking noises when driving over bumps or rough road. The condition can be improved by replacing the front upper control arm mounts, replacing the front damper assemblies (Model Y Premium and Performance only), and removing the wiper bracket pencil braces. Inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the front upper control arm mounts with updated parts, replace the front damper assemblies with updated parts (Model Y Premium and Performance only), and remove the wiper bracket pencil braces.

Certain Model Y vehicles may emit rattling or knocking noises when driving over bumps or rough road. The condition can be improved by replacing the front upper control arm mounts, replacing the front damper assemblies, and removing the wiper bracket pencil braces. This document is for vehicles that have already had the front upper control mounts replaced and the wiper bracket pencil braces removed. Replace the front damper assemblies with updated parts.

On some Model Y vehicles, water may ingress into the front fascia camera via the channels on the front fascia harness. This may corrode the camera connector or submerge the camera lens, which results in camera alerts and possible loss of the front fascia camera feed. Inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the front fascia harness and the front fascia camera.