2024 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

It has been towed to Tesla 5 times in the last 6 months. The car will all of a sudden do ALL of the following. Hood pops open Tailgate starts to go up and down The car lights start to flash - all of them The heater goes on 100 percent The seat and steering wheel warmers are activated The horn blows constantly The windows go up and down The stereo goes on full blast I cannot stop any of these things from happening. Tesla has had the car 5 times and said it is all repaired but it comes back every time. I cant trust driving the car anymore

NHTSA ID

11766808

Incident

Sep 24, 2026

The Full Self-Driving (FSD) system on my 2024 Tesla Model Y repeatedly causes the vehicle to weave or oscillate from side to side within its lane, particularly at highway speeds. The vehicle is available for inspection upon request. The most serious incidents have occurred at highway speeds while traveling in the left lane next to a concrete median. The vehicle has weaved so severely that it has nearly caused me to hit the concrete median. I attempted to steady the steering wheel with my hands, but this was not sufficient to stop the oscillation. I had to immediately disengage FSD to stop the behavior and regain stable control. This has happened more than once. The problem is independent of rain, wet pavement, poor weather, or unusual road conditions. I have experienced it in dry, clear weather and normal road conditions. There are no warning lamps or messages before the weaving begins. Tesla inspected the vehicle for this problem on July 22, 2026. Tesla Service found no physical defect and told me the behavior was a known software/firmware problem that could not be repaired at the service-center level. Tesla personnel indicated that similar behavior was known to be occurring in Europe. I was told that a future software update would correct the problem. Since then, Tesla has released multiple software/FSD updates and my vehicle has received subsequent updates. The weaving may have improved slightly on city streets and at lower speeds, but I have not observed meaningful improvement at highway speeds, where the greatest safety risk occurs. The weaving also creates a risk to surrounding traffic because the vehicle may appear to other motorists to be driven by an impaired or otherwise unsafe driver, potentially causing them to react to its unpredictable movement. Tesla has inspected and acknowledged the problem, but the high-speed safety issue remains unresolved and they do not expect any additional remedy from the dealer for my vehicle.

NHTSA ID

11766453

Incident

Jun 26, 2026

The contact owns a 2024 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that while driving 35-40 MPH, the brake lights failed to illuminate during regenerative braking. The contact stated that the vehicle display screen failed to show the brake lights illuminating while stopping, which nearly caused other vehicles to crash into the rear of the vehicle. The contact attempted to contact the manufacturer by phone, but could not get through the automated answering system. The failure mileage was unknown.

NHTSA ID

11764361

Incident

Aug 15, 2026

My 2024 Tesla Model Y (VIN [XXX]) has lost all forward camera-based safety and driver assistance functions. The vehicle displays alerts that Automatic Emergency Braking is unavailable, Park Assist is unavailable, adaptive headlight features are unavailable, and that self-driving is degrading and the vehicle may stop. Autopilot and Full Self-Driving will not engage. The side repeater cameras and the rearview camera still display images normally on the touchscreen, so the failure is not a loss of video display. The loss of Automatic Emergency Braking and forward collision warning means the vehicle has no automated protection against a frontal collision, and the loss of adaptive headlights and auto high beam means the high beams no longer dim for oncoming traffic. I performed a touchscreen reboot and a full power-off reset, and the condition returned. The vehicle is equipped with HW4 hardware and falls within the model years covered by NHTSA campaign 25V002000 (Tesla SB-25-00-001) concerning a computer circuit board short, though my VIN was not included in that recall population. I am reporting this because a vehicle sold with these active safety systems is now operating without them, and I believe other owners of vehicles in this build range may be experiencing the same failure. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11763974

Incident

Sep 13, 2026

Component that failed & available for inspection? The power window on the passenger-side rear door failed to auto-reverse when it hit an obstruction while closing. It closed with enough force to pinch and injure my child's finger and did not reverse. The 2024 Tesla Model Y is available for inspection on request. How was safety put at risk? The window was closing automatically (auto-lock), with no one touching the switch, when it pinched and injured my child's finger. FMVSS 118 requires power windows to detect an obstruction and reverse during hands-free closing. It did not reverse at all. This puts children and passengers at continued risk of finger and hand injury. Reproduced/confirmed by a dealer or service center? Yes I reproduced it myself. With a child-sized finger-width carrot placed in the window path during an automatic close, the window failed to reverse and crushed the carrot instead of retracting. I have video of this. Not yet confirmed by a service center; I am scheduling a Tesla Service inspection. Video can be viewed in the attachments that's in GIF format. Inspected by manufacturer, police, insurance or others? Not yet. I am reporting this to Tesla Service and filing this complaint at the same time. Warning lamps/messages/symptoms before failure, and when? None. No warning lamps, alerts, or messages appeared before or during the incident, and there were no prior symptoms that the automatic window reversal system was malfunctioning. Our best guess is that its always been malfunctional.

NHTSA ID

11763849

Incident

Sep 12, 2026

I am submitting this complaint regarding a safety concern involving the panoramic glass roof of my 2024 Tesla Model Y. My toddler lightly bumped their head against the inside of the roof glass, after which the glass developed a significant starburst crack. The contact was very minor, and the resulting damage raised serious concerns about the safety and durability of the roof glass, particularly because I regularly transport my children in this vehicle. On XXX, I brought the vehicle to a Tesla Service Center in Orland Park, Illinois. Tesla documented my report as a child/passenger safety concern. The technician verified an impact zone, documented that the top/exterior portion of the roof glass was cracked, that the interior section did not crack, and that a portion of the roof glass was pushed inward at the impact zone. Tesla recommended replacement of the roof glass. I requested written confirmation that the vehicle was safe to continue driving with the damaged roof. After escalation, Tesla’s Regional Manager responded that whether it was “safe” was a decision I would need to make at my own discretion and suggested replacement if I did not feel safe. He also stated that Tesla’s glass is deemed safe for its intended use based on testing and government regulations. My concern is not simply repair cost or coverage. I am concerned that very minor interior contact resulted in significant damage to a large glass panel directly above occupants, including children. I am requesting that NHTSA document and review this incident as a potential vehicle safety issue.

NHTSA ID

11762105

Incident

Aug 31, 2026

SEVERE DEFECT: Unprompted autonomous steering overrides manual driving. When Autopilot is OFF, Emergency Lane Departure Avoidance (ELDA) violently yanks the steering wheel, steering TOWARD hazards like oncoming traffic on the left or a mountain/rock wall past the curb on the right. This creates a severe collision risk, overriding safe manual input.DOCUMENTED PROOF: Provided Tesla Service (Palo Alto) over 12 timestamps and several dashcam footage. Technicians physically verified NO internal/external camera obstructions across TWO separate visits. Moving a transponder failed to resolve it.TESLA REFUSAL: Service Center has canceled TWO other service requests without fixing the defect, claiming it the 'system is working as intended.' Crucially, the Manager Jay explicitly admitted this dangerous steering override is a 'known issue for vehicles without FSD' operating on an older, separate software stack prone to these errors. To resolve this critical safety hazard, he explicitly suggested I purchase Tesla's premium Full Self-Driving (FSD) upgrade, claiming the FSD stack fixes it. Tesla is fully aware their base active safety software stack is defective and steers into hazards, yet demands a paid consumer upgrade to resolve it rather than issuing a safety patch or recall.

NHTSA ID

11759885

Incident

Aug 26, 2026

While exiting a drive-thru, I pressed the accelerator and the vehicle unexpectedly accelerated at a high rate of speed on its own. I attempted to brake, but the brakes did not respond. The vehicle struck a concrete median. Police report on file: East Hanover Township PD, Case #2026-12503.

NHTSA ID

11758962

Incident

Aug 18, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

On some Model Y vehicles, the rear view mirror upper camera cover is not sufficiently transparent, which may prevent infrared light from traveling through the cover, resulting in increased vehicle occupancy warnings in low-light conditions. This has no effect on vehicle operation or Autopilot features. Inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the rear view mirror upper camera cover.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Certain Model 3 and Model Y vehicles were manufactured with High Voltage (HV) batteries containing cell modules that do not meet Tesla’s internal quality standards, potentially resulting in a reduction of range.

On some Model Y vehicles, the center high mounted stop light may cause interference with the power supply line for the High Voltage Controller (HVC), which can falsely trigger High Voltage Interlock Loop (HVIL) alerts HVP_w026_HvilFault or BMS_a036_SW_HvpHvilFault.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.