2022 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The suspected malfunction involved Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (Supervised) and related automated steering, lane guidance, lane-departure avoidance and disengagement/warning systems. FSD was active before the event but changed to “Unavailable” approximately 1.35 seconds before impact as the vehicle began moving left toward a barrier. The exact cause has not been independently determined. The vehicle remains in my possession and is available for inspection, along with the EDR report and Tesla data files. My safety and the safety of others were placed at risk because the vehicle departed its travel path at approximately 65–67 mph. The warning and disengagement sequence provided only about one to one-and-a-half seconds before impact. The vehicle struck the barrier at highway speed, deploying the left side and curtain airbags. This created a risk of serious injury, rollover or collision with nearby motorists. The problem has not been reproduced or confirmed by a dealer because the vehicle was rendered inoperable. However, Tesla’s data confirms that FSD was active, became unavailable approximately 1.35 seconds before the crash, and that the steering angle moved sharply left immediately before impact. The data confirms the sequence but does not conclusively establish who or what initiated the steering movement. The vehicle has not received a technical inspection by Tesla or an independent defect specialist. Towing have handled it, but no one has technically evaluated the FSD or steering system. Crash data was retrieved from EDR. Earlier in the drive, the vehicle recorded “Autopilot features limited” and “camera blocked or blinded” warnings approximately 15 minutes before the crash. The vehicle later permitted FSD to engage. Approximately 1.46 seconds before impact, a hands-on warning was detected; FSD then changed to “Unavailable,” cruise control changed to standby and a lane-departure warning appeared less than one second before impact.

NHTSA ID

11766819

Incident

Sep 17, 2026

After only 34,306 miles, the front lower forward suspension control arms (left and right) and front lower rearward csuspension control arms and ball joints need to be replaced. I discovered this when having the tires replaced. This seems to be a common issue with this model, but failure of these parts is very premature. There was no accident or incident, but the replacement of these parts is critical to the safety of the vehicle.

NHTSA ID

11766523

Incident

Sep 23, 2026

When engaging fsd, you can’t see the safety distance between you and the car in front of you for defensive driving. Even if you are supervising fsd at high speed on the freeway, the high speed and sudden possibility of fsd disengaging is dangerous. The fsd mode should allow for safe distance between you and vehicle in front to be set manually and if it can’t be set manually, it shouldn’t be allowed to following too closely to the front vehicle. It’s unfair and absolutely dangerous to all should the fsd disengage and the driver doesn’t have time to react even though we are responsibly supervising. This feature needs mitigation

NHTSA ID

11765163

Incident

Sep 16, 2026

The contact owns a 2022 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that while stopped at a red light and attempting to accelerate, the vehicle failed to accelerate as intended and jerked. The contact stated that after shifting into reverse(R), the vehicle failed to reverse as intended. The vehicle was shifted to park(P) and then into drive(D) several times, and the vehicle accelerated. The contact stated that approximately 20 minutes later, while exiting the highway and approaching a red light, the brake pedal was depressed and the vehicle was stopped and the hold feature was engaged and the icon showed up on the dashboard, but the vehicle rolled backward and struck another vehicle. The vehicle was then shifted to park(P), and after speaking with the other driver, the vehicle was moved to the closest parking lot. The Police were called, but a report was not filed. The vehicle was then taken to the residence. The vehicle was taken to a dealer; however, the failure could not be duplicated. The vehicle was then taken to the same dealer, but the failure could not be duplicated. The manufacturer was notified of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 63,500.

NHTSA ID

11765080

Incident

Sep 3, 2026

Mileage

63,500 mi

While driving on the highway with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged, the vehicle approached an exit that had been closed with traffic cones and road-closure signage. The vehicle failed to properly respond to the closure, continued through and struck multiple traffic cones, and ultimately collided with the road-closure equipment, causing significant front-end damage. My primary safety concern is that multiple safety systems appeared to provide no effective intervention. I observed no Forward Collision Warning, no Automatic Emergency Braking, and no effective automatic braking or avoidance maneuver, even after the vehicle had already begun striking traffic cones. There were no warning messages or indications of a system malfunction before the collision. This was a serious safety incident involving FSD, Forward Collision Warning, Automatic Emergency Braking, and the vehicle's obstacle-detection/collision-avoidance systems. I am requesting that Tesla immediately preserve and review all available vehicle data, including FSD status, camera/perception data, detected objects, vehicle speed, steering, braking commands, Forward Collision Warning events, Automatic Emergency Braking activity, and driver inputs before and during the collision. The vehicle is available for inspection. I also have evidence of the damage and incident available upon request. I am requesting a formal investigation to determine why the vehicle continued through multiple physical traffic-control obstacles without an observed collision warning or effective automatic braking intervention.

NHTSA ID

11764626

Incident

Sep 15, 2026

At only 27k miles in with no accident history and perfect maintenance my camera system began to fail. It started with a delay of the backup camera and then turned into the cameras no longer working and no longer talking to the satellites. This then became a gps issue. Tesla despite me being 1 month outside warranty and well below the mileage charged me for a $4k new computer without diagnosing the failure as to whether it was heat related or what. It said the FSD computer was failing to make connection with the other computer. I had never even used FSD. This Premature failure of the computer system should’ve never been charged to me.

NHTSA ID

11763776

Incident

Mar 1, 2026

Tesla identified that the Front Lower Lateral Link was worn with 33,971 miles and was not covered under warranty. Two were replaced.

NHTSA ID

11763363

Incident

Jul 7, 2025

My 2022 Tesla Model Y does not reliably activate the rear air-conditioning vents when a baby is properly restrained in a rear car seat. When the climate system is set to Auto, the rear vents remain off because the vehicle does not detect the baby/car seat as an occupant. When an adult occupies the same rear seat, the vehicle detects the passenger and the rear vents activate automatically. This creates a significant safety concern because the driver can have the climate system running normally and the front of the cabin can be cool, while very little conditioned air is being directed to the rear where the baby is seated. On multiple occasions, my baby has been visibly hot and sweating in the rear car seat even though the front of the cabin felt cool and the front climate system was actively running. The problem is particularly concerning because a baby cannot communicate that they are overheating, and there is no obvious warning to the driver that the rear vents have remained off. A driver could reasonably assume that setting the vehicle’s climate control to Auto is appropriately cooling the occupied cabin. I have been able to reproduce and isolate the issue. Applying approximately 20 pounds of pressure to a particular area of the rear seat cushion causes the vehicle to recognize the seat as occupied and the rear climate vents to activate. Removing that pressure causes the normal behavior to return. This indicates that the automatic rear climate behavior is dependent on an occupancy-detection threshold or location that a properly installed child car seat with a baby may not satisfy. A child occupying a rear seat in an appropriate child restraint is a normal and foreseeable use of the vehicle. The automatic climate-control system should not depend on an occupancy-detection method that can fail to recognize this situation and consequently leave the rear vents off. I believe this presents a huge safety defect and request that NHTSA investigate this.

NHTSA ID

11762887

Incident

Sep 8, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.