2022 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

The contact owns a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that the vehicle experienced a loss of camera and safety feature functionality for eight hours daily. The message "Adaptive Headlights Feature Unavailable" was displayed. The manufacturer was notified of the failure, and a complaint was filed. The contact was referred to a service center that was over an hour away. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired due to the cost. The failure mileage was approximately 100,000.

NHTSA ID

11755531

Incident

Apr 7, 2026

Mileage

100,000 mi

The horn on the steering wheel rarely works UNLESS it is pressed directly in the middle. I have tried to honk the horn when there is a safety event but it rarely works. This is definitely a safety issue. This has been going on since I bought the car June 2022. Full self drive is also unsafe and it will make sudden turns, accelerate too quickly, or have phantom braking. This can be unsafe for other drivers. I heard that this is improved with newer models, but if it is unsafe for older models like my 2022, it should not be available.

NHTSA ID

11755527

Incident

Aug 7, 2026

The contact owned a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while the vehicle was unoccupied, the vehicle independently started while parked in the driveway and caught on fire. No warning lights were illuminated prior to the failure. The contact stated that the fire spread to the residence and the residence burned down. The contact's daughter and her significant other were able to exit the residence safely. The local Fire Department arrived on the scene to extinguish the fire. The contact stated that the fire had started near the charging port. A Police Report was not filed. In addition, the contact stated that his daughter and her significant other suffered severe mental distress. Medical attention was not sought. A Fire Report was filed. The local dealer was not contacted. The vehicle was deemed a total loss by the insurance company. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 33,000.

NHTSA ID

11755495

Incident

Aug 4, 2026

Mileage

33,000 mi

My car randomly gave me alerts that my steering alignment fault then came the following two days later Automatic Emergency Braking is unavailable Feature may be restored on next drive 20:55 | DI_a246 Automatic vehicle hold disabled Use brake pedal when stopping 20:55 | DI_a223 Traction control disabled Drive with caution 20:55 | APP_W264 Lane Departure Avoidance features unavailable Features may be restored on next drive 20:55 | DI_a222 Stability control disabled. I take my car to a mechanic and they show me that my lower control arms are damaged. Tesla is more than 2 weeks out for something that has caused my car to act completely unsafe and not normal.

NHTSA ID

11755384

Incident

Aug 1, 2026

I own a 2022 Tesla Model 3 that is just past the 5-year/60,000-mile warranty. I bought it used from Tesla inventory and picked up my vehicle on June 1st, 2026 with ~32,000 miles on the odometer. The front passenger safety restraint system alert (RCM2_a636) first appeared on June 5, 2026. On June 15 at 64,008 miles, Tesla Service confirmed the airbag alert and front passenger OCS issue. They found the occupant classification system module damaged and exposed, replaced it, and noted the passenger-side module shorting was also causing a driver-side error. Both cleared after the repair and test drive. Cost: $363.23. The same alert came back. On July 30 at 66,475 miles they found an open in the passenger seat cushion self-capacitance trace wire and the driver occupancy sensor voltage out of range. They replaced the front passenger seat cushion trim and the driver seat occupancy sensor. Alerts cleared and the self-driving button now worked from park again which never did prior showing the issue was never fixed the first time. Cost: $930.36. No crash or injury, but this is a real safety risk. The restraint system may not work as designed and airbags could fail to deploy properly. This exact RCM2_a636/OCS fault keeps happening to other Model 3 owners both before and after warranty on forums, and Tesla has service bulletins on the same parts, yet people still end up paying for the repairs who are out of warranty and also have their safety and life at risk. Please investigate this as this is a severe safety defect.

NHTSA ID

11754191

Incident

Jun 5, 2026

U.S. registered Tesla operating in [XXX]. Full Self-Driving engaged. Dark, nighttime conditions. Vehicle was traveling toward low traffic zones near the edge of [XXX] when the system made a severe mistake. The car went off the main road. Driver was forced to take control off-road after the system lost control. Damage to the rims occurred. At the time of this incident, manual speed control was still available. The driver could cap the speed. That capability has since been removed by a software update. The current version is more dangerous. If the same incident happened today, the driver would have no way to limit speed or prevent the system from repeating the error. The defect is the progressive removal of driver control from the Full Self-Driving system. Earlier versions allowed manual speed caps. Current software does not. This vehicle is U.S. registered and runs U.S. software on American roads. The same defect that caused this off-road incident in Mexico now exists without the safety net of manual speed control. The software is dangerous. The removal of driver overrides makes it worse. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11754099

Incident

Jan 29, 2026

Tesla software update 2026.20.6.11 v14 Lite NA-2025.44 removed manual speed control for Full Self-Driving. The driver can no longer set a maximum speed. The vehicle chooses its own speed and it is frequently wrong and dangerous. Curves are the worst failure. The car enters curves too fast. It accelerates through curves. It does not slow to a safe speed before the curve begins. The driver has no way to cap the speed. The scroll wheel is dead. There is no override. Posted speed limits are ignored. The vehicle uses bad map data instead of reading visible signs. It will do 65 in a 55. It will not slow down when the sign says 55. The driver cannot force it to obey the posted limit. Speed control is gone. The driver is a passenger watching the car make bad decisions. This is not safe. This is not driver assistance. This is loss of control. NHTSA must require Tesla to return manual speed control immediately. A human driver must be able to cap the speed at all times. The current software removes that ability and creates a clear safety hazard.

NHTSA ID

11754093

Incident

Jul 31, 2026

On XXX, while Full Self-Driving (Supervised) was engaged, my 2022 Tesla Model 3 RWD abruptly decelerated without any visible vehicle, pedestrian, debris, or other obstacle requiring braking. Based on my best recollection, this occurred on approximately five separate occasions in clear daylight with clean cameras. On XXX, the first event occurred near XXX while traveling from [XXX] toward the [XXX]/[XXX] area. I took manual control for about 30 minutes. After I re-engaged FSD, a second event occurred and included approximately three rapid braking pulses. The occupants lunged forward during both episodes. On XXX, the drive from [XXX] to the Ukiah Costco was normal. On the return toward [XXX], FSD suddenly braked hard at approximately 63 mph and reduced the vehicle's speed by about 25 mph, to approximately 38 mph. Family members and friends in the vehicle were startled and moved forward. Later that day, there were two additional unexpected braking episodes while traveling from XXX toward XXX. I used accelerator input to override the unwanted braking. The unexpected highway-speed deceleration created a risk of being struck from behind and made the system unpredictable to supervise. No crash, fire, injury, or property damage occurred. I do not recall a warning message before the braking. The vehicle has not been inspected or diagnosed for this issue and is available for inspection upon request. As of XXX, the vehicle reports Tesla software 2026.20.3 and FSD (Supervised) v12.6.4; it has Hardware 3. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11751194

Incident

Jul 12, 2026

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.