2025 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.

I was on the freeway in the fast lane approaching a tunnel and vehicle came with warning vehicle shutting down. Code DL_a063. Vehicle stopped in fast lane would not move to shoulder. No prior warning there was any issue. State police came and had vehicle towed. Lucky the car behind me was able to stop in time.

NHTSA ID

11755831

Incident

Aug 8, 2026

While operating the vehicle at low speed (~35 MPH reducing to a stop) on August 1, 2026, at approximately 10:38 AM under normal road and weather conditions, the vehicle experienced a catastrophic and simultaneous loss of primary braking capability and steering responsiveness. > Detailed Description of Failure: > * Brake Failure: Upon pressing the brake pedal, the vehicle failed to decelerate or stop adequately despite continuous application, nearly causing a collision. > * Steering Loss / Disconnection: Concurrently, while the steering wheel could physically be turned, it offered no directional control—turning the wheel had no effect on the vehicle's path, feeling as if the steering linkage or assist was entirely disconnected or disengaged. > Vehicle Warnings / Diagnostic Codes: > The vehicle's onboard display immediately registered critical active safety and chassis failures, specifically displaying: > * "ABS (anti-lock braking system) disabled - Drive with caution" > * "Automatic Emergency Braking is unavailable - Feature may be restored on next drive" > Dashcam video and system screen captures documenting the exact speed, timestamp, and error messages have been saved and are available upon request. No crash occurred, but the sudden, simultaneous failure of core braking and electronic steering systems presents an extreme safety hazard. >

NHTSA ID

11754149

Incident

Aug 1, 2026

A front wheel of this vehicle and/or its suspension is undergoing extremely dangerous vibrations at highway speeds (65-70+ mph). It is enough to shake the entire vehicle multiple times per second. The local service center, without looking at the vehicle, stated it "would be fine to drive on until your appointment" and scheduled an appointment nearly a month out into the future after I brought up concerns that the vehicle is unsafe to drive. They also would not recommend any third party service centers to look at the vehicle in order to address the concern more urgently, nor offered any alternatives such as rentals or loaner vehicles to use in the meantime. I understand that car issues will come up; my complaint is due to how it is being handled (long wait time for an appointment, dismissal over safety concerns, no alternatives to drive safely in the near month-long wait for the appointment).

NHTSA ID

11753275

Incident

Jul 27, 2026

I am filing a formal safety complaint regarding a severe braking and stability control failure that resulted in unpredictable, highly dangerous vehicle behavior. While driving, the vehicle displayed a cascade of critical system failures, throwing error codes APP_w009 (AEB disabled), DI_a222 (Stability control disabled), DI_a223 (Traction control disabled), ESP_a080, and ESP_a067 (ESP/ABS sensor faults). This concurrent breakdown caused a total loss of critical safety features: Anti-lock Braking (ABS), Automatic Emergency Braking, Traction Control, "Vehicle Hold," and "Hill Start Assist." Because the vehicle completely lost its ability to hold its position, it unexpectedly free-rolled backward on an incline when I anticipated it to remain stationary or move forward. This uncommanded movement created an immediate collision hazard. Of serious concern is that despite a total breakdown of vital braking and stability assists, the vehicle remained fully drivable and only advised me to "drive with caution." Allowing a car to remain operational under these severe fault conditions is an unacceptable risk. A driver expecting normal EV behavior (like vehicle hold and regenerative braking) is placed in immediate danger when the vehicle suddenly free-rolls without warning. The software should classify a multi-system ABS/ESP failure as a critical emergency requiring an immediate safe shutdown, rather than suggesting it is safe to continue driving.

NHTSA ID

11751612

Incident

Jul 20, 2026

While out on vacation in [XXX] on XXX at around 11 am I had just finished charging the Tesla at a supercharging station. I was headed to go eat breakfast at the intersection of [XXX] and XXX on the right lane. I stopped briefly prior to making a right onto [XXX]. Upon making the right turn the vehicle kept turning all the way right and making a sharp right turn instead of a soft right. When I noticed the sharp right turn I tried to turn the steering wheel towards the left but the steering wheel was locked and it wouldn't respond. The car drove me into a concrete barricade and caused a collision. My children were in the car and thankfully no one in my vehicle was seriously injured nor were there any pedestrians on the sidewalk near the barricade. I contacted Tesla for the repair and investigation into why the steering wheel locked. Tesla has not provided a loaner vehicle in the meantime despite my frequent requests. This incident is a serious and critical safety issue that may have caused deaths had I been traveling at a higher rate of speed or been on the highway heading back to [XXX]. The strange thing is that this vehicle is still under warranty with Tesla and had been working just fine without any issues since I got the vehicle in XXX. No warning messages, or symptoms to indicate any malfunction. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11751359

Incident

Jul 16, 2026

My Tesla's FSD turned off midway through a curve at highway speeds. I hit the guard rail and scratched the right side of the car. I could have run straight through the guardrail from the inertia or made the back car hit me due to the slowing down, though thankfully I took control of the vehicle to limit the damage. I visited a Tesla repair center, but they said they didn't address these types of issues and referred me to the Tesla.com/legal page and a body shop they work with. Obviously, every time FSD turns off there is a chime, but that sudden alert for an event that spanned 5 seconds, 2 for me to take control, failed to be enough.

NHTSA ID

11749219

Incident

May 14, 2026

After disengaging Full Self-Driving (FSD), a mandatory questionnaire pop-up now stays on screen until manually answered, instead of auto-dismissing after a few seconds as it previously did. This forces the driver to interact with the touchscreen immediately after taking back manual control — a moment when full attention should be on the road, not a pop-up. The prompt blocks part of the instrument/display screen until it is tapped, and in some cases requires a minimum 5-second voice response to dismiss (a previous workaround allowing a near-instant voice note to clear it was removed). The pop-up has also been observed persisting even after the vehicle is shifted into Park. This creates a distraction risk during an already safety-critical moment (immediately following a system disengagement, which by definition means FSD failed to handle the driving task). This behavior has persisted across at least 3 software updates. Multiple attempts to raise this with Tesla directly have not resulted in a fix or response. Other FSD users have reported the same complaint. No collision has occurred as a result of this specific issue, to my knowledge, but the design creates a foreseeable distraction hazard during takeover events, which are often already high-risk moments.

NHTSA ID

11748459

Incident

May 1, 2026

Tesla Full Self-Driving (Supervised) repeatedly ignored the “Avoid Toll Roads” navigation setting and attempted last-second lane changes into Express Toll Lanes at freeway speeds. This has occurred approximately 10 times. I was repeatedly forced to take over steering immediately to avoid entering the toll lane, creating a serious safety risk due to sudden maneuvers in heavy traffic. On several occasions, I could not safely intervene before the lane change was completed. Tesla Service Center inspected the vehicle, found no hardware or camera faults, and stated the behavior appears to be software-related.

NHTSA ID

11747730

Incident

Mar 18, 2026

On some vehicles, degraded or excessive glue under the front seat cushion(s) may cause creaking noises during cornering or when pressing on the seat cushion(s). Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework the front seat cushion(s).

On some vehicles, insufficient lubricant at the front seat recliner tube ends may cause creaking noises during weight shifting when the seat is occupied. Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, lubricate the front seat recliner tube ends.

On certain Model 3 and Model Y vehicles, the tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) sensor battery may drain at an accelerated rate. Identify and replace the affected TPMS sensor.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.