2021 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

my 2021 tesla model 3 required replacement of both front upper control arms due to premature wear. the vehicle developed suspension noise, and an inspection determined both upper control arm assemblies with ball joints needed replacement. the repair cost was $1,845, including a wheel alignment. i am aware of numerous similar owner reports involving premature front suspension component failures in tesla model 3 vehicles and am submitting this complaint because i believe this may represent a broader safety-related issue.

NHTSA ID

11754861

Incident

Apr 17, 2026

I was driving down Interstate 635 Lane Departure Assist on my 2021 Model 3 pulls me into the lane it senses im departing into when system is set to "assist" (if vehicle sense im straying into the left lane as an example, it will pull me further towards the left lane markings and requires an abnormal amount of effort into recentering the vehicle within the lane I am in). Vehicle has since been driven in "warning" setting since this event with no further issues.

NHTSA ID

11754632

Incident

Aug 3, 2026

The adaptive cruise control on Tesla vehicles is dangerous. The model in question is a 2021 Model 3 but its an issue with many model years. The cruise control tends to get confused and applies the brakes during normal driving leading to very unsafe conditions for the Tesla and anybody behind it. The issue can happen in any environment and from 1-2 times per drive. There are no warnings or indications that the car is about to apply the brakes. The car has not been inspected by a service center but is in good working condition.

NHTSA ID

11754569

Incident

Jul 23, 2026

Passenger side view mirror intermittently gets stuck in the "reverse" position while in drive gear. I have the side view mirrors settings to where they are in a certain position when in reverse gear, and then a different position when in drive gear. I will reverse out of a parking spot and then proceed on my drive. Every now and then, the passenger side mirror will still be in the "reverse" position while driving and I only notice it when making a lane change and looking at the mirror and its pointed down at the ground in its reverse position. This has distracted me a few times as I expect the mirror to be in the normal drive position and I'm unable to see any cars in my blind spot. The issue has never occured on the driver side mirror, and has happened for the past few months. I have to correct this each time it does this by going into the mirror settings and hitting the reset position button.

NHTSA ID

11753472

Incident

Jul 29, 2026

I am reporting a safety concern regarding the glovebox fascia on my Tesla Model 3. The material on the glovebox trim is peeling and separating, which appears to be caused by prolonged exposure to heat inside the vehicle. The peeling fascia creates concerns about the durability and integrity of the interior component, as the material may continue to deteriorate over time. Loose or damaged trim could potentially interfere with the proper use of the glovebox, create sharp edges, or become a distraction while driving. I am requesting that Tesla inspect the affected area and determine the appropriate repair or replacement to ensure the vehicle remains safe and maintains proper interior component quality.

NHTSA ID

11751588

Incident

Jul 10, 2026

Front Seatbelt On March 13, 2026, at approximately 7:51 PM EST (23:51 UTC), the driver of a 2021 Tesla Model 3 was killed in a head-on collision on SR 741 in Warren County, Ohio. Two people died in this crash — the Tesla driver and the driver of the oncoming vehicle. Tesla's own telematics data (provided to the family post-crash) reveals that the driver's seatbelt unlatched at Row 5115 / 23:51:03.269 UTC — exactly 14.15 seconds before the collision. The driver was actively driving at the time, as confirmed by 66 separate steering torque readings between the seatbelt unlatch and the crash, ranging from −1.59 Nm to +2.15 Nm in constantly alternating directions — the signature of active lane-holding. The seatbelt released on its own while the driver was actively steering based on tesla data at approximately 66 mph. No rational driver unbuckles their seatbelt while driving 66 mph on a busy two-lane road. The telematics data proves continuous active driving before, during, and after the seatbelt event. The seatbelt failure is a separate and independent defect from the Emergency Lane Keeping (ELK) system failure that caused the collision (which is the subject of a separate NHTSA complaint). Even if the collision was unavoidable, a functioning seatbelt may have saved the driver's life. The seatbelt failure independently contributed to the fatality. The following data is from Tesla's own telematics file provided to the family: Timestamp (UTC)RowEvent 23:51:03.269 5115 Driver seatbelt status changes from LATCHED to UNLATCHED 23:51:03.269 – 23:51:17.420(row 5115–5311)66 steering torque readings confirm active driving (−1.59 to +2.15 Nm) 23:51:17.4205311ELK system activates (separate defect) ~23:51:19.0—Head-on collision — driver unrestrained — two fatalities Pattern of identical complaints from other 2021 Model 3 owners (ODI 11713076, 11738583, 11684327)

NHTSA ID

11750698

Incident

Mar 13, 2026

Component: Lane Support System — Emergency Lane Keeping (ELK) Part of standard Autopilot safety suite (not FSD) activated without valid lane detection data and pushed the vehicle into the oncoming lane of traffic on Ohio State Route [XXX]. The system then aborted mid-intervention (LSS_STATE_ABORT), leaving the driver in the oncoming lane. The resulting head-on collision killed both drivers — the [XXX] Tesla driver and the driver of the oncoming vehicle. Two people died because of this ELK malfunction. Tesla's own telematics data confirms the following sequence: 5At 23:51:17.420 UTC, the Lane Support System activated Emergency Lane Keeping (LSS_STATE_ELK). 6At 23:51:17.652 UTC (232 milliseconds after activation), the system logged ALC_UNAVAILABLE_NO_LANES — confirming it had no valid lane detection data during the intervention. 7At 23:51:17.755 UTC (335 milliseconds after activation), the system logged LSS_STATE_ABORT — the system cancelled itself mid-intervention. 8During the 335-millisecond intervention, the vehicle's steering angle reached -16.79 degrees leftward and lateral acceleration measured +1.200 m/s² leftward — both confirming the vehicle was pushed into the oncoming lane. 9The driver responded with the largest steering torque (-5.08 Nm rightward) and largest rightward steering angle (+19.50 degrees) recorded in the entire telematics file — confirming he was actively attempting to recover. 10 The head-on collision killed both him and the driver of the oncoming vehicle. We requested additional telematics data from Tesla through the Tesla app. A forensic expert has examined the vehicle's ECU motherboard— missing critical fields including continuous yaw rate, high-resolution steering data, ELK steering commands, and lane detection confidence scores. A subsequent request for additional data produced an error message and Tesla has not provided further data. This crash is the exact behavior under PE25012. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11750627

Incident

Mar 13, 2026

The high voltage battery on my 2021 Tesla Model 3 Standard Range suddenly failed without any prior warning or gradual degradation. The vehicle was consistently achieving approximately 180 miles of range per full charge. Overnight, the battery charge was restricted to approximately 30% capacity, reducing usable range to roughly 30 miles. No warning signs or symptoms appeared prior to this failure. The failure was sudden and immediate. The vehicle displayed the alert "Maximum Battery Charge Level Reduced / OK to Drive, Schedule Service." The battery has been confirmed by a Tesla Service Center as having an internal fault. The only remedy offered by Tesla is full battery replacement at a cost of approximately $9,000 to $14,000 depending on the option selected. This failure poses a safety risk as the severely limited range can result in the vehicle becoming stranded unexpectedly, particularly during highway driving or in areas without nearby charging infrastructure. The failure occurred approximately 6 months after the battery warranty expired with no prior indication of degradation, suggesting a potential defect in the battery unit. The vehicle has been inspected by a Tesla Service Center and the fault has been confirmed. The component is available for inspection upon request.

NHTSA ID

11750373

Incident

May 1, 2026

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.