2021 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

I am reporting a repeatable safety problem with FSD Lite's end-to-end parking behavior. On July 22, 2026, FSD Lite reversed the vehicle into a solid concrete garage wall while backing into a parking space. The vehicle did not stop before hitting the wall and sustained a scrape. On September 20, 21, and 22, 2026, FSD Lite selected parking spaces and began reversing toward parked cars. I had to intervene each time to prevent a collision. When I select the parking space myself, the maneuver works correctly. A previous software update briefly fixed the problem, but it returned after the vehicle updated to FSD Lite v14.1 Lite, software build 2026.26.6.5. This is a repeatable reverse-parking safety defect that can cause property damage and could injure someone. No one was injured, and no other property was damaged. The vehicle and its logs are available for inspection. Please review the FSD parking-space selection, reverse path planning, obstacle detection, and braking behavior for these events.

NHTSA ID

11765998

Incident

Jul 22, 2026

The front suspension became loose and produced a clunk while driving. The vehicle was taken in the same day. Two independent shops examined it and neither could perform the repair. One reported that a nut for the lower suspension link fasteners was still loose inside the vehicle structure and could be heard moving, and that the cause was unknown. The vehicle was then taken to a manufacturer service center. Its printed factory invoice diagnosed that the captive nuts for the lower subframe links had failed. The front subframe, both front lower lateral links, the front lower compliance link assemblies and the front aero shield were replaced, followed by a four-wheel alignment and a post-repair test drive. There was no collision, no impact damage and no tampering. The failure occurred at approximately 41,766 miles. SAFETY RISK: the lower lateral and compliance links locate the front wheels. Fasteners securing them backing out or failing can allow a link to separate from the subframe, shifting alignment and affecting steering control. This vehicle is driven regularly at highway speed, often with driver assistance engaged, and by more than one driver in the household. A separation at speed could have caused a loss of control. WARNING SYMPTOMS: an audible clunk from the front suspension and a loose-feeling front end, first noticed shortly before the vehicle was taken in. No warning lamp or message appeared. CONFIRMATION: the failure was diagnosed and repaired by the manufacturer's own service center, and the diagnosis appears as printed text on the factory repair invoice, which is available. The replaced parts may no longer be available for inspection. This vehicle has no open or completed suspension recall. Existing recall campaigns covering front suspension lateral link fasteners on this model did not include it. The repair was paid out of pocket.

NHTSA ID

11765089

Incident

Jul 27, 2026

After a Tesla-delivered over-the-air software update, my 2021 Tesla Model 3 equipped with Hardware 3 experienced loss of the rear-view camera along with other camera and Autopilot-related functions. The exact date the condition first appeared is unknown, but it occurred after the software update. Camera calibration later became stuck and resets/recalibration did not restore functionality. Tesla Service inspected and reproduced the problem. Tesla documented camera alerts, inability to activate Autopilot, alerts for both pillar cameras and the front-main camera, proper voltage to the cameras, no short to body, and no change after testing a known-good camera. Tesla concluded that the affected cameras share a deserializer path internal to the HW3 car computer and diagnosed an internal car-computer failure requiring complete computer replacement and camera calibration. The safety concern is loss of the rear-view camera and multiple camera-based driver-assistance functions, reducing rear visibility and eliminating features that rely on those cameras. Tesla did not identify the root cause of the internal HW3 failure or establish that the preceding software event could be excluded as a cause, trigger, or contributing factor. Tesla has separately acknowledged in NHTSA Recall 26V283 that software on certain HW3-equipped Model 3 vehicles can prevent camera streams from reaching the MCU and result in loss of the rear-view camera image. I am not claiming that recall necessarily applies to this specific failure; I am reporting the similar sequence so NHTSA can determine whether there may be a broader defect pattern. The vehicle remains unrepaired and is available for inspection upon request.

NHTSA ID

11764750

Incident

Aug 24, 2026

Interior camera circuit failed in the main computer as diagnosed by Tesla, it disables most safety features of the car, no collision warning or avoidance, no automatic emergency breaking, no lane departure warning or correction, no reverse cam, no cruise control or self driving, and probably more. Only Tesla can replace it because it's vin matched to the car, for $2400. This part should be more durable

NHTSA ID

11763429

Incident

Aug 17, 2026

As we were normally driving, the car lost power immediately with no warning sign. After the power is lost, brake does not function, electrical door button doesn't function, hazard light doesn't function. Car was able to scroll to a complete stop to the side of the road. The steering wheel is locked. Again, BRAKE DID NOT FUNCTION after the power is lost. No button works, no screen turns on, car is not able to turn to neutral. There was no collision prior and no warning prior. Tried to file a police report. But Officer [XXX], badge # XXX, refused due to there was no collision and no accident. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11763172

Incident

Sep 9, 2026

The contact owns a 2021 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that the trunk strut failed, and the lift fractured, causing the rear glass to crack. There was a long crack from the edge to the top of the glass. The contact's husband cut the strut because the vehicle could not be driven with the truck ajar. A service appointment was scheduled on the App by text with the local dealer. A message was sent to the Tesla manufacturer. The failure mileage was approximately 82,000.

NHTSA ID

11763100

Incident

Sep 6, 2026

Mileage

82,000 mi

Tesla replaced the windshield on my 2021 Model 3 at the Tesla Service Center in Schaumburg, IL. Days after the installation, following a light rain, a film appeared on the exterior surface of the glass. In the presence of moisture the film hazes over and substantially obscures forward visibility from the driver's seat. The first occurrence was on 8/22/2026 while leaving a venue in heavy pedestrian traffic. Forward visibility was significantly degraded. During that drive the vehicle's driver-assist system issued a take-control prompt and returned control to the driver. The system did not display a reason for the prompt, so I cannot attribute it; I am reporting that it occurred while visibility through the windshield was degraded. The condition is not removable by normal means. Windshield wipers and washer fluid do not clear it. The defroster/defogger does not clear it, which rules out interior condensation. It required manual scrubbing to reduce, and it has recurred repeatedly since. It presents only in high humidity or after precipitation; in dry conditions the glass appears normal. The condition did not exist prior to the windshield replacement. I have photographs taken from the driver's seat showing the obscured view. I reported this to Tesla on 8/22/2026 through two in-app channels; both were closed without a response. I escalated by email on 8/24/2026. The service manager responded and scheduled an inspection. As of this filing the substance has not been identified, no cause has been determined, and no correction has been made. The condition remains active. I am filing because a windshield that intermittently obscures forward vision under ordinary weather conditions is a driving hazard, and because the vehicle has been operated in that condition while awaiting resolution. No crash, injury, or fire has occurred.

NHTSA ID

11761153

Incident

Aug 21, 2026

My 2021 Tesla Model 3 with approximately 70,000 miles developed front suspension problems. It began with squeaking, creaking and groaning, similar to a rusty playground swing, especially while turning or when the suspension moved. The noise was worse in hot weather and progressively became extremely loud and constant during normal driving. I also began hearing intermittent knocking/"bonking" or clunking. I could even hear the suspension when the vehicle compressed as I sat in the driver's seat. There were no warning lights or messages. Tesla inspected the vehicle and diagnosed both front lower lateral links and both front lower compliance links as needing replacement, along with an alignment. Tesla estimated approximately $1,960. CPR EV Repair replaced the diagnosed lower suspension components. After removal, the bushings showed significant visible deterioration, including cracked, torn and separated rubber around the inner sleeves. CPR EV also advised that the front upper control arms were worn and would need replacement. I was concerned for my safety because failure or separation of a deteriorated front suspension component while driving could affect steering or vehicle stability and potentially cause loss of control. Although I did not experience a complete separation or crash, the rapidly worsening and eventually constant symptoms made me concerned about continuing to drive. I have Tesla's estimate, CPR EV documentation and photographs of the deteriorated components after removal.

NHTSA ID

11757148

Incident

Jun 1, 2026

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.