2020 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

I own a 2020 Tesla Model 3 purchased in 2023 with Full Self-Driving (FSD) included for the lifetime of the car. I used FSD satisfactorily for years, but Tesla recently removed the maximum-speed control I previously used while FSD was engaged. I have personally experienced this change. FSD selects speed, but I can no longer impose the maximum I previously could set. I consider this a safety issue: unwanted speed requires the driver to detect it and intervene, potentially exposing occupants and other road users to excessive speed. The human driver remains responsible for safe, lawful operation and faces possible speeding tickets. I have read reports describing maximum-speed control as an "anti-pattern." I do not consider that an adequate safety justification for removing a preventive control. Learning a driver's preferences should operate within an explicit speed ceiling. I believe Tesla has the engineering capability to develop and validate a solution that preserves both FSD functionality and effective driver control. I request NHTSA investigate and require a remedy if a safety defect is established. My position is that affected FSD systems should not operate on public roads without an enforceable driver-selected maximum speed, independent of driving profile. Manual braking and disengagement remain necessary but do not replace this preventive safeguard. I welcome contact from Tesla and am willing to collaborate on a solution. My willingness to help does not diminish my request for restoration of this safety control. Contact details are provided separately in this complaint. Exact software version and change date: UNKNOWN. Dealer/service-center confirmation: UNKNOWN. Inspection by Tesla, police, an insurer, or others: UNKNOWN. Prior warning lamps/messages: UNKNOWN. Availability for inspection: UNKNOWN.

NHTSA ID

11774891

Incident

Oct 31, 2026

I am reporting a premature and severe multi-component front suspension failure on my 2020 Tesla Model 3 that poses a serious steering and control safety hazard. While driving and turning at low speeds (such as parking), the front end began emitting a loud mechanical clicking and popping sound. A certified technician diagnosed the vehicle and found that multiple critical suspension components had failed or worn prematurely at just 55,089 miles. The failures include the front lower lateral links, front lower compliance links, front upper control arms, stabilizer bar and front end hubs failing completely and simultaneously. This is a well-documented issue among 2018–2020 Model 3 vehicles and is currently the subject of an active NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation investigation regarding front lower lateral link detachment. Premature failure of these load-bearing suspension components compromises the vehicle’s structural integrity, accelerates extreme tire wear, and presents an immediate risk of component separation or sudden loss of steering control at high speeds. Tesla should issue a safety recall for these defective suspension components and compensate owners for out-of-pocket repairs.

NHTSA ID

11774757

Incident

Oct 30, 2026

I have a 2020 Tesla Model 3 with Full Self Driving (FSD) and am having trouble with "limited visibility" warnings daily on all cameras in direct sunlight since getting the V14 Lite software. I am aware that here is an NTSB investigation, EA26-002, that specifically raised concerns about Tesla's visibility-degradation detection software, including updates to that system. I have a 2020 Tesla Model 3 with old cameras using software for new, better by far, cameras. Tesla also acknowledges in its July 2026 investor materials that FSD v14 Lite transfers behavior developed for AI4 into the camera and computing configuration of AI3/HW3.

NHTSA ID

11774287

Incident

Aug 4, 2026

VEHICLE INFORMATION Make/Model/Year: Tesla Model 3 (2020) Component: Steering / Autonomous Control (ADAS) INCIDENT SUMMARY While driving on Autopilot/FSD southbound from [XXX], the vehicle experienced a sudden, uncommanded lateral steering excursion (phantom steering actuation) pulling abruptly toward the roadside shoulder. The driver had to immediately apply manual counter-steering torque to override the system and prevent a major collision. This unprompted steering correction caused the passenger side mirror structure to strike a roadside utility pole. KEY SAFETY FACTORS Sudden loss of directional control caused by computer-generated steering inputs rather than driver command or road obstruction. Quick driver intervention prevented a severe collision, but resulted in structural impact to the entire passenger mirror assembly. An official service ticket has been filed with the manufacturer requesting an immediate engineering telematics log pull (Steering Angle Sensor inputs vs. manual override torque, FSD state logs, and camera arrays) for the specific timestamp. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11771534

Incident

Oct 15, 2026

The steering assist reduced alert popped up on the tesla screen. While attempting to turn into a parking garage, a "steering assist reduced" alert suddenly appeared on the tesla screen, and the steering wheel locked up/became extremely heavy and unable to steer left or right. Because the steering assist failed in active traffic at the entrance, the vehicle was temporarily stranded, exposing to oncoming traffic and created an immediate risk. Failed component: electronic power-assisted steering (EPAs) rack and steering gear assembly. The failed component was replaced by Tesla and is not available for personal inspection. Safety risk: The sudden loss of steering ability in active traffic prevented normal maneuvering, forcing the vehicle into a hazardous position where passing vehicles could have collided with it. The issue was confirmed by Tesla Service, who performed a full steering rack replacement. The vehicle was inspected and repaired directly by the manufacturer (Tesla Service Center). There were no warning lights or symptoms prior to the incident; the failure and "steering assist reduced" error appeared abruptly during the turn.

NHTSA ID

11764589

Incident

Sep 12, 2026

Lower Lateral Link Fronts and front lower compliance link assembly for both right and left. There have apparently been on going issues for the Tesla Model 3 suspension links. I first started hearing noises from the suspension last month, I was booked for a weekend service and then rescheduled for today. I stopped by for a formal comprehensive inspection and was informed that there is tearing in the suspension. I already had this vehicle brought in for warranty earlier this year, how was this not brought up to me during that time frame? Did the suspension suddenly start tearing after 6 months?

NHTSA ID

11763382

Incident

Sep 10, 2026

I own a 2020 Tesla Model 3. Over approximately the past 2–3 weeks, the vehicle has developed a noticeable rattle/creaking noise coming from the left-front suspension area. The noise was not previously present and appears to be getting my attention as a potential suspension-related safety issue. I am concerned because my vehicle falls within the model-year range of Tesla Model 3 vehicles associated with reported front suspension/lateral-link issues. I understand NHTSA is investigating reports involving front suspension component failures that could potentially affect vehicle control. I contacted Tesla through the Tesla app and requested that the vehicle be inspected because of the suspension noise and my safety concern. Tesla provided an estimate requiring approximately $240 for diagnosis/inspection before determining the cause. At this time, I have not experienced a suspension separation, crash, injury, or loss of vehicle control. However, because the vehicle is producing a new and persistent noise from the left-front suspension area, I am concerned that this could be an early indication of a suspension component problem. I am submitting this complaint so NHTSA has a record of the symptoms on my vehicle and can determine whether they may be related to other reported front suspension failures. I am also requesting that this complaint be considered in connection with any ongoing investigation involving front suspension/lateral-link failures in 2020 Tesla Model 3 vehicles. I will retain Tesla service records and any inspection findings and can provide additional information if requested.

NHTSA ID

11762629

Incident

Aug 27, 2026

The contact owned a 2020 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 50 MPH in traffic on a sunny day, the vehicle drove over a pothole, and the traction control and ABS warning lights illuminated. The brake pedal was checked; however, fifteen minutes later the vehicle crashed into a 26-foot box truck. The contact stated that the box truck left the scene of the crash. The tire skid marks were 100 feet long. The air bags failed to deploy. The contact stated there was an electrical failure which caused the brakes to become inoperable. Additionally, the alerts were late. The contact stated that the battery might need to be replaced. The driver and his daughter, who was seated inside the vehicle, sustained back pain, whiplash, and knee injuries. The driver was transported by ambulance. Medical attention was provided. The contact stated that surgery might be needed in the future. The daughter was taken to the hospital, and medical attention was provided. A Police report was filed. The vehicle was towed to an auto body shop. The EDR was requested on the manufacturer website. The failure mileage was approximately 119,730.

NHTSA ID

11761825

Incident

Jul 31, 2026

Mileage

119,730 mi

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.