2026 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The contact owns a 2026 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving at 25 MPH in Full Self-Driving mode, an animal entered the roadway, causing the vehicle to hesitate before the autonomous braking system independently engaged with severe abnormal jerking. The contact stated that the bumper detached; however, the vehicle remained drivable. The dealer was contacted. The vehicle was taken to the dealer, where the contact was informed that paperwork authorization was required prior to diagnostic testing. The contact stated that while driving at night, the auto-dimming rearview and side mirrors failed to dim properly, requiring the driver to wear sunglasses at night. The manufacturer was notified of the failures and informed the contact that diagnostic testing required an out-of-pocket fee. The failure mileage was approximately 57,525.

NHTSA ID

11775622

Incident

Oct 15, 2026

Mileage

57,525 mi

• forward collision warning and automatic emergency breaking failed to work and are still currently an ongoing problem and not functioning. They are and have always Been enabled and can be inspected upon request. • my safety and those in my car and around me put at risk, by the system and software not functioning as intended and providing extra alertness and reaction to avoid collision. •the earliest service date I could get from Tesla is Nov 11. I have requested they preserve all data from dates Oct 20-27 2026 •no, my car has not been inspected yet. I have taken, Videos and have saved in car camera footage to show the ongoing defect. •no warnings lights or alerts prior to the incident. The problem first became apparent and clear Oct 26, 2026. I had FSD subscription that ended Oct 24, 2026 and the system warnings worked just fine during that time even while driving manually.

NHTSA ID

11774044

Incident

Oct 26, 2026

On [XXX], the owner of a 2026 Tesla Model 3, left the garage of her house in the Tesla, and engaged the self-driving as the driver has done dozens of time in the past. The car proceeded down the driveway, as it has always done in the past. However, in an instant, before the driver had time to react, the car went straight where the driveway curved, and the car hit a tree. The video from the Tesla cameras was saved and confirms that the car was in self driving mode, there was no driver intervention causing the accident, and the driver did not have time to react and prevent the accident. This accident was due to a failure of the Tesla self-driving. The encrypted dashcam video was copied from the USB drive named [XXX], from the folder [XXX], and then accessed by logging into [XXX] and dragging and dropping the video file into the dashcam app. That was saved to our PC as [XXX}. Since the saved video did not show the telemetry data, the video was loaded into [XXX] and saved with the telemetry information visible. Another video was saved capturing the whole ExportDash.cam interface. That has bars showing where the car was actively steering, braking, or applying acceleration (“gas pedal”). This shows that the car was actively steering a second before the collision, but then stopped. There was no time for the driver to react to the car's failure to properly steer. The video showing the car in self-driving mode and failing to navigate a turn on the driveway can be accessed at this youtube link: [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11771457

Incident

Oct 13, 2026

The contact owns a 2026 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 65 MPH, the steering wheel independently turned to the left and the right. The brake pedal was depressed; however, the vehicle failed to stop as intended. The contact stated that the vehicle was shaking and uncontrollable. The contact depressed the brake pedal down, unbuckled, the seat belt and opened the door and the vehicle came to a stop. The Police was contacted and arrived on the scene. The Police removed the vehicle from the roadway onto the shoulder of the road. The contact was advised to tow the vehicle to the dealer. The vehicle was towed to the dealer, but the diagnostic test report was not provided to the contact. The contact was informed that the information was reported to the engineers. The contact was advised to contact the NHTSA Hotline to report the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 450.

NHTSA ID

11769327

Incident

Oct 2, 2026

Mileage

450 mi

Car was in self-driving and struck a piece of concrete. The car was in hands free and was being monitored by me, the driver. This obstruction was in the left side of the lane, about 2" tall, a foot wide and 6" across. I thought the car would see it and miss it but I was wrong, it clipped the concrete, punctured the tires side wall and damaged the tire rim. Tesls'a position was that I shouldn't have trusted the car abilities to avoid the obstruction. This is a basic for collision avoidance, and this system should not be allowed to run in self-drive without hands on the wheel unless the car is capable of avoidance of obstructions large enough to disable the car. This car is dangerous if it can operate at freeway speeds, hands free, and not have the ability to avoid obstructions that could cause it to be out of control.

NHTSA ID

11769065

Incident

Oct 1, 2026

The contact owns a 2026 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 35 MPH with the Autonomous Self-Driving feature enabled, the vehicle was driving in the left-turn lane and jerked over into the oncoming traffic. The failure mileage was approximately 9,999.

NHTSA ID

11768125

Incident

Sep 30, 2026

Mileage

9,999 mi

I had FSD (Full Self Driving) (Supervised) enabled. The navigation map and turn instructions (which appear on the right side of the touchscreen) indicated that my car was to make a left turn at the upcoming intersection. After a full stop (at the Stop sign), my car crept out into the intersection, preparing to make an unprotected left turn (UPL) onto a major street (2 lanes of traffic in each direction). My car stopped (creeping out) when FSD “realized” that it was not yet safe to make the turn. My car, however had crept out far enough so that other vehicles coming from my left (in the right lane) had to swerve left to avoid hitting my car. There was another car behind my car so I could not “manually” back up (taking over from FSD) to remove the front of my car from the path of vehicles coming from my left. (If just one of the drivers of those vehicles coming from my left had been distracted, a likely collision with the front of my car could have occurred!) Eventually, there was a sufficient gap that I could (manually) make a right turn instead. Since this incident, I have had to preview the navigation map for every trip (before enabling FSD) and be prepared to route around any UPLs. After driving this car over 6500 miles (98 % on FSD), I have found FSD to be very safe overall! My only notable “risk of collision” event was the above-described UPL attempt! I have contacted Tesla Customer Service (via phone calls and online) on several occasions to report this hazard, but nothing has been done; (although on a live phone call, the representative acknowledged that others had also voiced my concern!) During a chat with Tesla’s “Grok” chatbot, Grok stated that a ‘Prefer Protected Turns’ option would be a low complexity addition that could coexist with continued UPL improvement”. Given this information, I think Tesla is being negligent by not adding the “Prefer Protected Turns” option to the vehicle user interface.

NHTSA ID

11767200

Incident

Sep 8, 2026

On Sept 22 2026at approximately 10:26 AM, my Tesla vehicle was involved in a low-speed, 5 -10 mph rear-end collision while the Full Self-Driving (FSD) Supervised automation system was engaged. The vehicle failed to initiate a timely braking sequence for a lead vehicle, resulting in an impact. There was a sudden accleration right before the hit along with a sudden braking. Critical Safety Failures & Discrepancies: 1. Unwarned System Degradation: Following the incident, Tesla Service technicians reviewed my vehicle diagnostics and explicitly stated that internal logs flagged the FSD system performance as degraded or "suspect" since the beginning of September 2026. However, prior to the crash, the vehicle provided zero driver-facing warning messages, dashboard alerts, or mobile application notifications indicating that the automated safety systems were compromised or operating with a defect. 2. Telemetry Log Contradiction: Tesla's initial internal review claims that the vehicle's telemetry indicates an accelerator pedal override by the driver. I explicitly state that my foot was not on the accelerator pedal and no such override was physically made. There is an active sensor tracking or system logging discrepancy regarding driver inputs during this FSD failure. Evidence Maintained: I have preserved the complete, 4-angle synchronized TeslaCam dashcam footage of the incident on my computer as visual proof of the vehicle's un-accelerated 5 mph forward creep. Furthermore, I have submitted an official Data Privacy Request to Tesla to force the extraction of the raw, unredacted vehicle telemetry logs (DI_accelPedalPos) to legally dispute their pedal position claims. I am filing this report to assist NHTSA's active investigations into Tesla Autopilot/FSD traffic safety violations, specifically concerning automated braking failures and inaccurate driver-override telemetry classification.

NHTSA ID

11766182

Incident

Sep 22, 2026

On some vehicles, degraded or excessive glue under the front seat cushion(s) may cause creaking noises during cornering or when pressing on the seat cushion(s). Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework the front seat cushion(s).

On some vehicles, insufficient lubricant at the front seat recliner tube ends may cause creaking noises during weight shifting when the seat is occupied. Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, lubricate the front seat recliner tube ends.