2026 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

I purchased my car on 3/23/26. Since delivery I have noticed that the car bounces at low speeds 20-30mph and the steering wheel vibrates at highway speeds 65 - 80mph. I have had the car to tesla service center 6 times since march. They have replaced all 4 tires, found and replaced a bent wheel (rim) on the passenger side. Then this last visit they replaced the passenger right wheel hub. They claim that when comparing it to the 1 other car available to road test my car was the same even though it still has the wheel vibration at highway speeds. they claim it falls within specs and is safe. I do not feel this is acceptable because they dont know what else to do. Now if I want them to check the car they say I must pay for any diagnosis and repairs if needed because they say they fixed the car. I do not feel safe driving at highway speeds as I am not sure what may happen which could endanger myself or passengers

NHTSA ID

11755161

Incident

Apr 2, 2026

The horn system on the new Tesla are not effective. Other drivers cannot hear The unit is facing the ground, and a high speed. Other drivers. Can I hear it specially when it’s raining. The use of the original point was effective and never had a problem on my previous last Tesla, or any other car for that matter. Please help before a serious. Ask her that happens.

NHTSA ID

11754350

Incident

Jun 12, 2026

After a recent Tesla software update, a mandatory Full Self-Driving disengagement feedback window appears every time I disengage FSD while the vehicle is still moving. The feedback window covers a large portion of the display with a black overlay, noticeable enough something popped up. There is no setting to disable it, dismiss it immediately, or postpone the response until the vehicle is stopped. I am required to select a disengagement reason before I can access the controls and information behind the overlay. While this window is displayed, I cannot properly view or control functions such as music and other touchscreen features behind the area. This is especially dangerous because it appears immediately after I take manual control from FSD—a moment when my full attention should be on the road and the vehicle. The system effectively requires me to look away from the road and interact with the touchscreen before I can make another needed adjustment. This occurs every time I disengage FSD and is consistently reproducible. This behavior began after software version FSD v14.3.3. My vehicle is a 2026 Model 3. The problem occurred everytime while traveling at any speed. I believe this mandatory, non-dismissible overlay creates a serious driver-distraction hazard by obstructing the center display and requiring touchscreen interaction while the vehicle is in motion. Tesla should allow the feedback request to be dismissed, delayed until the vehicle is parked, or disabled entirely.

NHTSA ID

11752822

Incident

Jun 8, 2026

Air Suspension Failure - Damping Control Disabled (Code TAS_a313)" Description: "Vehicle is 2 days old. Suspension control module lost communication with CAN bus. Vehicle is in 'fail-safe' mode. Tesla Service Center has refused to assist. Safety risk due to loss of adaptive ride control." Manufacturer Response: "No response / Ignored."

NHTSA ID

11752257

Incident

Jul 22, 2026

Firstly, we were driving in the center lane on I-84W (three lanes), with Full Self Driving (FSD) at 55 mph. The car veered left on it owns (under FSD) into the center median with the front driver side of the vehicle struck the metal beam guardrail causing both air bags to deploy on the driver and left rear passenger sides. The car continued to move forward in the next 4-6 seconds under FSD (approximately 10-20 feet range) and then came to a complete stop with flashing warning screen asking driver to take over the steering wheel immediately.

NHTSA ID

11751300

Incident

Apr 12, 2026

Complaint Title: Defective Horn System on 2026 Tesla Model 3 - Ineffective in Rain or Highway Conditions Description: The horn on my 2026 Tesla Model 3 Highland is dangerously inadequate. It uses a single pedestrian warning speaker instead of a proper horn, which is easily overpowered by road noise, tire noise from large trucks, and especially rain. I cannot reliably alert other drivers, including 18-wheelers, when they are drifting into my lane or failing to yield. This creates a serious safety risk in wet conditions and highway driving. Traditional horns have been effective for decades — this design fails basic safety expectations. I am requesting immediate investigation and a fix.

NHTSA ID

11750177

Incident

Jun 2, 2026

Incident involving my 2026 Tesla Model 3 equipped with HW4 hardware and the latest FSD (Supervised) software. During a garage reverse maneuver performed under FSD supervision, the vehicle had sufficient time to assess the surrounding environment before initiating the maneuver. There were no pedestrians or moving obstacles nearby. An adjacent parked vehicle was present next to the intended reversing path. During the maneuver, the vehicle made initial contact with the adjacent vehicle. At no point did the vehicle provide any collision warning, alert, or indication that a collision had occurred. After the initial contact, the vehicle continued moving and a second impact occurred shortly afterward, resulting in additional damage. Immediately after the second impact, the driver intervened and took control of the vehicle to stop the maneuver, before further damage is caused. My main concerns are: 1. Why did FSD fail to identify the adjacent vehicle before the maneuver? 2. Why was no collision warning provided before or after the initial contact? 3. Why did the vehicle continue the reversing maneuver after the first impact instead of stopping till driver intervention? 4. What if is pediatrician who qualify ADA, children, elder was in the position of the adjacent vehicle, this failed sensing would cause imparable result. I would appreciate a technical review of this event and a detailed explanation of Tesla’s findings.

NHTSA ID

11749677

Incident

Jul 9, 2026

Lane keeping assistance turns on with every drive no matter how many times I set it to off. Where I live there are many potholes and poorly paved roads, along with poorly marked roads. As I am swerving around obstacles the car will fight the steering inputs I am giving it, trying to steer me back into whatever I was avoiding. This is a safety issue, and is not a problem on our older Tesla model 3 performance, as once that vehicle is set to off, it stays off. Now, as I start every drive I am navigating through a couple screens to turn off this "safety" feature.

NHTSA ID

11748263

Incident

Jul 1, 2026

On some vehicles, degraded or excessive glue under the front seat cushion(s) may cause creaking noises during cornering or when pressing on the seat cushion(s). Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework the front seat cushion(s).

On some vehicles, insufficient lubricant at the front seat recliner tube ends may cause creaking noises during weight shifting when the seat is occupied. Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, lubricate the front seat recliner tube ends.