2024 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

As of an OTA update to the Telsa early this summer, a prompt stating "Why did you intervene" appears over critical display information on the infotainment console. FSD v14.3.2 and onward. (released as part of software update 2026.2.9.9) The prompt appears at the instant you retake manual control. It covers or prevents access to navigation/other driving-relevant controls, like shifting, speed display, mileage, other warning indicators. It remains until you interact with it. The screen demand occurs during a potentially safety-critical transition.

NHTSA ID

11766472

Incident

Apr 30, 2026

BOTH FRONT TIRES ON MY 2024 TESLA MODEL 3 PERFORMANCE DEVELOPED STRUCTURAL BULGES ON THE INBOARD SIDEWALL AT UNDER 19,000 MILES. THE TIRES ARE THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT PIRELLI P ZERO 235/35R20 DELIVERED WITH THE VEHICLE ON 12/07/2024. ON 08/05/2026 AT 18,951 MILES, TESLA SERVICE IN DORAL, FLORIDA INSPECTED AND ROAD-TESTED THE VEHICLE FOR A METALLIC RUBBING NOISE THAT INCREASES WITH SPEED AND ALSO OCCURS AT LOW SPEED AT FULL STEERING LOCK UNDER ACCELERATION. TESLA'S OWN REPAIR NOTES ON INVOICE 3000S0017877728 STATE THAT THE NOISE WAS DUPLICATED ON THE ROAD TEST AND APPEARS TO ORIGINATE FROM DEFORMED FRONT TIRES. TESLA TOOK NO ALIGNMENT MEASUREMENT AND THE INVOICE CONTAINS NO CAMBER, CASTER OR TOE READINGS. THE SAME INVOICE RECORDS TIRE PRESSURES OF 40.2, 39.9, 40.6 AND 39.9 PSI, SO UNDERINFLATION IS NOT A FACTOR. THE FAILURES ARE SYMMETRIC: SAME AXLE, SAME INBOARD FACE, BOTH SIDES, AT THE SAME TIME, WHICH IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH ISOLATED INDEPENDENT ROAD HAZARD IMPACTS. THE BULGES ARE ON THE INNER FACE AND ARE NOT VISIBLE DURING A NORMAL WALK-AROUND INSPECTION. TESLA STATES IT PROVIDES NO WARRANTY COVERAGE FOR TIRES AND DECLINED ANY VEHICLE-SIDE DIAGNOSIS. A SIDEWALL BULGE IS A SUDDEN BLOWOUT RISK, AND TWO OF THEM ON THE STEERING AXLE OF A HIGH PERFORMANCE VEHICLE CAPABLE OF HIGHWAY SPEED IS A SAFETY DEFECT CONCERN. OTHER TESLA OWNERS HAVE REPORTED THE SAME INBOARD SIDEWALL BULGE PATTERN AT LOW MILEAGE ON 20-INCH WHEELS, SOME AS EARLY AS 7,000 MILES. I REQUEST THAT NHTSA REVIEW WHETHER FRONT SUSPENSION GEOMETRY OR THE TIRE AND WHEEL PACKAGE ON THIS VEHICLE CONTRIBUTES TO PREMATURE INBOARD SIDEWALL FAILURE. THE VEHICLE REMAINS UNDER ITS 4-YEAR/50,000-MILE BASIC VEHICLE LIMITED WARRANTY.

NHTSA ID

11761946

Incident

Aug 5, 2026

Client left the road and the vehicle hit a tree by the roadside. The vehicle caught fire and client was incapacitated and unable to operate the door handle from the inside or unlock the doors. Bystanders attempted to open all four doors from the outside, but they were all locked. Bystanders noted that the handles themselves were functional and believe it was an electrical issue keeping the doors locked. Bystanders broke the windows and attempted to open the doors from the inside, but they were unable to access the emergency door release because the driver door panel was on fire in proximity to the emergency release. Bystanders began mechanically disassembling the door to get him out and he was eventually extracted by the fire rescue team. The inability to open the door delayed our client being extricated from the vehicle and as a result he suffered severe injuries, including the loss of both legs, due to severe burns. The vehicle is currently being held by Copart Miami South and is available for inspection. So far, it has been inspected by the insurance company and our experts. Warning lamps, symptoms, etc.: UNKNOWN. Vehicle is badly damaged, so we are not able to recreate/confirm the problem at this time.

NHTSA ID

11761374

Incident

May 30, 2026

On XXX at approximately 12:56 PM Pacific on [XXX], my 2024 Tesla Model 3 VIN [XXX] was operating in Full Self-Driving (Supervised). The system detected oncoming traffic, stopped, then reversed to yield and backed into a parked 2015 Ford Transit van that had an occupant inside. I am the registered owner. [XXX] was the driver. TeslaCam saved events at 12:56:33 and 12:56:43. There was little visible damage, no injuries logged, and no police report. Tesla's consumer privacy form does not accept a crash narrative. I requested a Vehicle Data Report / copy of my data on XXX. USAA/[XXX] claim XXX later assigned 100 percent fault to the Tesla driver for backing, treating this as a conventional reverse collision rather than an FSD commanded maneuver. I am reporting this as a safety defect in FSD (Supervised) because the vehicle reversed into a parked occupied vehicle while the feature was engaged. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11759977

Incident

Aug 24, 2026

Muffled or significantly quieter horn during rain. Users on Reddit generally agree that the sound typically returns to normal once the area dries out. Why This Happens: Speaker Design: Newer models (such as recent Tesla Model 3 and Tesla Model Y versions) utilize electronic pedestrian warning speakers or integrated units for the horn function rather than traditional enclosed metal horns. I have an issue with my car where every time I wash it or drive it even in light rain, the horn is extremely muffled. So muffled that I was sounding it driving down my road with people out walking, and no one heard it. I took it to the service center and they basically said “we confirmed your complaint, it’ll work when it dries out”. My car now has two notations on file from two visits to service center. This is a very wide spread problem - hundreds of comments online. Google: Tesla horn rain.

NHTSA ID

11758408

Incident

Aug 20, 2026

On June 16, 2026, while operating the "Autopilot" self-driving system, my vehicle autonomously activated the right turn signal to enter a parking space. Subsequently, the vehicle experienced an unexpected acceleration. Despite my immediate application of the brakes, the vehicle collided with a storefront window, resulting in property damage. My insurance provider covered all associated damages, including vehicle repairs. Immediately following the incident, I informed Tesla and requested access to the vehicle's electronic records, which were made available at a Tesla service center. Tesla is currently rescheduling my vehicle, acknowledging the severity of the self-driving system's malfunction. Concurrently, Tesla continues to charge me for the self-driving capability, despite having advised me to refrain from using it until all necessary vehicle tests have been completed. What further actions should I undertake, and how can the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) provide assistance in this matter? Thank you.

NHTSA ID

11757620

Incident

Jun 16, 2026

Tesla’s replacement of physical steering column turn signal stalks with capacitive touch buttons on the steering wheel face creates an active safety hazard. First, the capacitive sensors frequently become entirely unresponsive. If a driver rests a finger near the buttons, the system triggers a timeout/lockout, rendering the signals non-functional for several seconds when pressed. They also fail to register inputs under normal pressure or when wearing gloves. Second, because the buttons rotate dynamically with the steering wheel, it is structurally impossible to signal by muscle memory during sharp or sequential maneuvers, like navigating roundabouts. To signal while the wheel is turning or when buttons fail to respond, the driver must repeatedly look away from the road to visually target the wheel. This defective layout causes delayed signaling, severe driver distraction, and elevates the risk of a collision.

NHTSA ID

11757541

Incident

Aug 3, 2026

Date: XXX, Time: 5.09.2026 State: [XXX] Location: [XXX] We were on Full Self Service Driving Mode A [XXX] came and hit my car in the passenger side behind the front wheel and front buffer. We were on left/fast moving lane and two semi-trucks were in the right lanes slight ahead of us (one had overweight sign). Something came out of the direction of trucks and hit our car with a big sound (moving object). When we stopped and checked the car later, it was evident that the damage was a sizable, it would have been something solid or heavy. Our concern is the Tesla was on Full Self Driving Mode, and it did not generate any alert, recording or more importantly, it did not break, change the driving direction nor try to avoid being hit by the object. This diminishes the reliability of Tesla FSD and raises serious safety concerns. We are in the process of filling insurance claim. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11757257

Incident

Aug 10, 2026

On some vehicles, degraded or excessive glue under the front seat cushion(s) may cause creaking noises during cornering or when pressing on the seat cushion(s). Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, rework the front seat cushion(s).

On some vehicles, insufficient lubricant at the front seat recliner tube ends may cause creaking noises during weight shifting when the seat is occupied. Upon customer complaint, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, lubricate the front seat recliner tube ends.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Certain Model 3 and Model Y vehicles were manufactured with High Voltage (HV) batteries containing cell modules that do not meet Tesla’s internal quality standards, potentially resulting in a reduction of range.

On some Model 3 vehicles, the RH front Wheel Speed Sensor (WSS) might have been misrouted, which may cause damage to the WSS harness.

On some Model 3 vehicles, the RH front Wheel Speed Sensor (WSS) might have been misrouted, which may cause damage to the WSS harness.