2018 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

- When I start my car, I see the following error message appear: Front Left Safety Restraint System Fault. Also, the air bag disabled alert is displayed. Since the air bag is disabled, it puts me at grave risk if I were to get into an accident. - Many other Tesla owners have reported the same exact issue (RCM_a021 Front Left Safety Restraint System Fault). - Today, I took the car into the Tesla Service Center, they had to replace the entire harness. - No other symptoms were apparent...just all of a sudden the alert appeared.

NHTSA ID

11766272

Incident

Sep 22, 2026

Clunking noise when in reverse and turning.

NHTSA ID

11765961

Incident

May 1, 2026

AMENDMENT / SUPPLEMENT TO VOQ #11763975 regarding PE26006. Following my initial report of a catastrophic lower lateral link detachment, Tesla Service Center Santa Rosa has provided a highly sanitized and misleading repair report. The official invoice completely omits the physical structural detachment and missing subframe nut, recharacterizing a severe mechanical failure as a simple 'steering alignment adjustment.' Furthermore, the technician took misleading photographs (omitting the damaged side of the vehicle or using obscuring angles). I possess dated photographic evidence of the complete link separation prior to tow-in on a flatbed, which directly contradicts Tesla's service records. This is submitted to alert investigators that field incidents for PE26006 are actively being mislabeled and obscured in Tesla's internal repair databases.

NHTSA ID

11765657

Incident

Sep 15, 2026

On August 6, 2026, my spouse was driving our 2018 Model 3 at low speed while making a U-turn out of The Village at Pacific Highlands Ranch when she heard a clunk from the front of the car and the car felt as though it had dropped down. Steering was not affected. The car began to slow, and she drove it at low speed into a nearby parking lot, where it stopped and would not move forward even with the accelerator pressed. It had to be towed. She did not strike a curb, pothole, debris, or any other object, and there was no impact of any kind. Inspection at the scene showed that the driver's side front lower lateral link had separated at its inboard, subframe end. The link was hanging down and resting on the pavement, still attached at the wheel end. A close-up photo shows the bushing inner core with two bolt ears and empty bolt holes: no fastener present and no broken fastener remnant. The link is not bent, gouged, or scraped. The left front wheel was pushed rearward in the wheel arch and was pressed against the rear edge of the fender, which damaged the fender and a brake line. The tire and wheel have no curb rash or impact marks. The vehicle was not included in recall 23V-235, and Tesla's VIN recall lookup shows all recalls issued for it as completed. Mileage at the time was approximately 108,043 miles. The vehicle was declared a total loss and has since gone to salvage. This failure appears to match Preliminary Evaluation PE26006.

NHTSA ID

11765550

Incident

Aug 6, 2026

The contact owns a 2018 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while reversing approximately 5 MPH, there was a loud screeching sound coming from the vehicle without warning. Upon inspecting the vehicle, the contact became aware that a bolt had detached from the subframe. The vehicle was towed to the residence. The dealer was contacted. The manufacturer was made aware of the failure by telephone. The approximate failure mileage was 82,678.

NHTSA ID

11764800

Incident

Sep 12, 2026

Mileage

82,678 mi

Vehicle Information: Year/Make/Model: 2018 Tesla Model 3 Mileage at Incident: 45,000 miles Description of Safety Defect: A sudden and persistent "Safety Restraint System Fault" / "Front Passenger Safety Restraint System Fault" warning illuminated on the vehicle's primary touchscreen interface, indicating a complete compromise of the supplemental restraint and airbag system. Upon inspection by Tesla Service, the root cause was identified as physically broken/severed internal copper wiring within the first-row passenger seat harness assemblies. This breakage occurred purely due to the mechanical wear-and-tear of normal fore-and-aft seat tracking (including the standard vehicle "Easy Entry" setting). Because the electrical line cleanly severed, communication to the Occupant Classification System (OCS) sensor was totally cut off, preventing the vehicle from accurately detecting passenger occupancy or correctly configuring front passenger airbag deployment logic in a collision. Tesla has addressed this known design vulnerability internally via Service Bulletin SB-23-20-002, replacing the weak early-production parts with ruggedized components. However, because the vehicle was past its calendar warranty period despite having only 45,000 miles, I was forced to pay $1,322.00 out of pocket to restore critical safety systems. Because a severed seat harness disables essential airbag safety constraints through normal everyday use, this represents a systemic manufacturing defect that should be escalated from a Technical Service Bulletin to a mandatory Safety Recall to protect all owners. Specific Component Part Numbers Replaced: First Row Seat Harness Assemblies: P/N 1489060-02-G & 1489060-03-G Passenger Airbag Assembly Module: P/N 1077323-00-G Seat Position / Occupancy Sensor Module: P/N 1099592-00-F

NHTSA ID

11764720

Incident

Sep 10, 2026

The contact owns a 2018 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 4 MPH, the front sway bar detached from the vehicle, and the contact lost steering control. The vehicle was towed, and a service center was contacted but informed the contact that the repair was not covered because the VIN was not included in a recall associated with the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 81,000.

NHTSA ID

11764522

Incident

Sep 14, 2026

Mileage

81,000 mi

Vehicle: 2018 Tesla Model 3 Safety Issue: The rearview camera display has failed and shows a black screen when the vehicle is shifted into reverse. This reduces rearward visibility and creates a safety concern while backing up. Recall History: My vehicle was previously repaired under the Tesla Model 3 trunk lid harness recall on March 31, 2023. The recall addressed wear and damage to the trunk harness wiring that could result in loss of the rearview camera display. Tesla installed recall retrofit components during that repair. The current failure presents the same symptom that the recall was intended to correct: loss of the backup camera image. Current Problem: In September 2026, the rearview camera again began displaying a black screen. Tesla Service has diagnosed the vehicle and quoted approximately $439 for repair. Tesla advised that the recall was completed in 2023 and that the repair warranty has expired, therefore the current repair is not covered. Reason for Complaint: I believe this may be a recurrence of the same safety-related defect addressed by the original recall. Although the recall repair was completed, the same safety condition has reoccurred. I am requesting that NHTSA review whether the recall remedy adequately resolved the defect and whether owners should be responsible for subsequent repairs involving the same failure mode.

NHTSA ID

11764371

Incident

Aug 29, 2026

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.