2023 Tesla Model 3

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

1. Full Self Driving computer complete system failure. Happens everyday. 8 days still has same problem. 2. Problem showed itself 30 minutes after taking possession of the car. Gave me a panic attack because the car was driving itself and then "TAKE CONTROL IMMEDIATELY!!" was on the monitor. This caused me to jerk the wheel while in heavy traffic on [XXX] and I hit the brakes and almost caused an accident because I thought the car was going to crash. 3. Problem has happened everyday/3-5 times a day since taking ownership [XXX]. I checked the fault logs on [XXX] and there are over 100 incidents of the Full Self Driving computer overheating with system errors. 4.Car is currently as of [XXX] at the Norfolk VA Tesla dealership. And I am in a loaner. 5.There were no pre warning lamps or messages when I got the car. The problem appeared 30 minutes into my ride back to Hampton VA. It started with loud alerts and saying "TAKE CONTROL IMMEDIATELY". The photos attached are just a sample of how many times this problem has occured. The last photo is a log of faults. I was able to reach this data [XXX] and the faults happen frequent like this every day I have had the car. There are about 100 faults as of [XXX]. Tesla Norfolk Service Department has the car as of [XXX]. I feel they sold me a car with a DEFECTIVE CRITICAL SAFETY DEVICE. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11776730

Incident

Nov 1, 2026

The steering wheel makes a grinding noise when it automatically adjusts (when the car starts). It also makes the same grinding noise when I adjust it

NHTSA ID

11774022

Incident

Sep 29, 2026

Vehicle: 2023 Tesla Model 3 RWD, VIN 5YJ3E1EA3PF556059. Since the FSD software update from V12 to V14.1 (Supervised v14.1 Lite) in early August 2026, the vehicle repeatedly issues false 'apply steering wheel force' warnings while my hands are on the wheel, followed by sudden disengagement of Full Self-Driving without apparent cause. This has happened multiple times, including at highway speeds, which I consider a safety hazard. The Tesla service center in Miami Gardens has been unable to fix the problem after multiple visits. I emailed Tesla's North America service team on September 23, 2026 (with a photo of the in-car warning) and sent a follow-up on September 30, 2026; I have received no response.

NHTSA ID

11768933

Incident

Aug 1, 2026

Tesla has done away with a set maximum speed control when on FSD and uses speed profiles. These profiles can have the car speed at huge differences from the actual speed limit. Tesla previously gave the driver the option to control the maximum speed but eliminated it with version 14 FSD software.

NHTSA ID

11767747

Incident

Sep 29, 2026

On September 23 2026 at night I was driving my car under FSD and am in full control of vehicle my car is on speed of 54-55mph and in the middle of the road without any obstacle present on the road the car did the super ghost breaking and my car stopped 100% with the screen turning red with a warning of collision w am thankful to god that no one is coming from behind otherwise it might be loss of lid or serious medical emergency . We are aware and keeping on checking the surroundings but it’s very hard or nearly impossible to go to 50 mph from 0 mph in 0 seconds.

NHTSA ID

11766979

Incident

Sep 23, 2026

On September 20, 2026, at approximately 10:26 AM EDT, I was driving my Tesla on ON I-76 E MM 332.4 with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged. It was raining, the pavement was wet, and there was heavy road spray. The vehicle's front dashcam recording, time-stamped "Sep 20, 2026, 10:26:02 AM," shows the car traveling in the right lane at about 55-56 mph with the on-screen indicator reading "Self Driving." The vehicle then steered to the right, out of its lane, toward the concrete barrier and roadside embankment. The "Self Driving" indicator disappears about half a second before the vehicle leaves the lane, at about 54 mph. I did not steer or brake before the vehicle left the lane. The vehicle then lost stability, spun across the roadway, and slowed from about 53 mph to nearly a stop, facing against the direction of traffic. While facing oncoming traffic, it was struck by an oncoming white sedan, which sustained front-end damage my car had been declared a total loss. I believe the Full Self-Driving system failed to keep the vehicle in its lane in rain and gave too little or no warning before handing control back to me, leaving no reasonable time to recover. I have kept the original dashcam footage and have sent Tesla a written request to preserve and release all vehicle data for this event, including FSD engagement and disengagement logs, driver-input data, and stability control data. I can provide the footage and any records Tesla releases to NHTSA on request.

NHTSA ID

11766760

Incident

Sep 20, 2026

Bought a 2023 Tesla model 3 from Carvawna on aug 30th drove car steering wheel was shaking at 70 mph or more; took to tire shop 3 tire were bad and unsafe,tires were worn below 3/32nds in the center, 2 tires foam was detached and broke tire sensor 4th tire was barley legal cannot believe vehical passed 150 inspection; silver rock only paid 1300,00 bill was 1714.00 left me with 396.00 out of pocket tires were very bad should never be sold Carvawna refuses to reimburse me for out of pocket completely unaccepticl from a car sales company pls help will try to send copy of repair order they would only pay for what they can buy for and were not ev rated

NHTSA ID

11764595

Incident

Aug 30, 2026

Steering becomes very stiff or notchy where you have to pull it out of position or correct it constantly. Doesn't want to return to center! When you stop it returns to normal feeling then as soon as you get up to speed it becomes stiff again.

NHTSA ID

11764562

Incident

Sep 15, 2026

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

On certain Model 3 vehicles, brake lines may be corroded beyond acceptable limits, which may result in loss of brake fluid. Loss of brake fluid will result in a customer facing alert if the fluid reaches the predetermined level to trigger an alert. Upon customer complaint of a low brake fluid alert, evidence of a brake fluid leak, or a failed periodic roadworthiness inspection, inspect the brake lines. If corrosion is found on any of the brake lines, replace all brake lines on the vehicle with new corrosion-resistant parts, in one combined repair. NOTE: Due to dual reduncancy, vehicle safety is not impacted by corrosion on the brake lines.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.

Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies. Instead, all available owner’s manual content is integrated into the vehicle software, and only the content relevant for a given vehicle, based on vehicle configuration and software version installed, is displayed on its touchscreen. This file contains all available owner’s manual content for the vehicle converted to PDF format, and given the distribution method and NHTSA’s submission format requirements, it is the best available representative copy of owner’s manual content. However, a customer who accesses the owner’s manual via their vehicle’s touchscreen would only see the parts of this PDF file that are relevant to their vehicle.