2023 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

While driving a 2023 Tesla Model Y at approximately 45-50 mph on the freeway, the vehicle suffered a severe, uncommanded steering failure. The vehicle violently swerved and oscillated left-right-left without any driver provocation. Autopilot and Full Self-Driving (FSD) were NOT engaged at the time; the car was under manual control. The steering wheel pulled hard and physically yanked out of my hands. I had to manually wrestle the steering wheel for several seconds to regain control and avoid a severe accident. Crucially, there were NO visual warnings on the touchscreen, NO audible safety chimes, and NO error codes displayed during or immediately after the event. Dashcam footage of the incident was captured and saved. The vehicle is being turned over to Tesla Service as unsafe to drive.

NHTSA ID

11776371

Incident

Nov 6, 2026

FSD would not disengage when the brakes were applied and also the steering wheel was turned - doing either is supposed to disengage the self-drive so that you can regain control of the vehicle. I was using the FSD software to drive to a location of a home, I have the settings set to pull into the driveway of the destination. The car started to turn right into the driveway but at the last minute, I decided that I wanted to park on the street. I then turned the wheel to the left which typically disengages the FSD but instead the car continued to turn right and accelerated and drive into the yard of the destination home and ran over some landscaping. I was wrenching the wheel to the left to get it back on the street to avoid hitting the home itself. I was also hitting the brakes in an attempt to stop the vehicle. Nothing worked. I finally got it back on the street after the vehicle drove down the sidewalk and flattened two mailboxes. It disengaged shortly thereafter. We called Tesla multiple times asking for footage or the car metrics at the time of the accident on XXX. We have yet to have the investigation that we have been asking for. When we took the vehicle to a Tesla authorized service in Tucson, they told us we were the third in two weeks that the self-drive did not disengage and a crash followed. This is a risk to the safety of others. This neighborhood I was driving in has a lot of people walking on the sidewalks and I am just fortunate a mailbox was all that the car hit. I have never had anything like this happen. I logged enough hours on FSD to know how to disengage it. The software failed and needs to be investigated. We can't get Tesla to respond or investigate so no one has tried to reproduce what happened but I have never used FSD again after this.

NHTSA ID

11775151

Incident

Sep 1, 2026

I am writing to formally escalate the recurring and increasingly serious technical and safety issues with my Tesla Model Y. Since July 2026, my vehicle has experienced multiple system malfunctions despite three service appointments, including the replacement of the vehicle computer during the most recent service. The frequency, severity, and nature of these failures have raised serious concerns regarding the vehicle’s reliability, roadworthiness, and overall safety. What initially appeared to be intermittent system alerts has now escalated to situations involving reduced propulsion, loss of critical vehicle functionality, and the vehicle becoming completely immobile while driving. I am extremely disappointed that these issues continue to occur even after multiple service interventions. I no longer have confidence in the vehicle’s ability to operate safely and reliably. he above incidents, combined with the repeated failures since July 2026, demonstrate a pattern of unresolved and potentially serious vehicle malfunctions. My concerns include: Repeated Park Assist and Adaptive Headlights malfunctions. Camera failures and abnormal vehicle visualizations. Vehicle computer replacement without lasting resolution. Electrical system power reduction and potential vehicle shutdown. Front motor disabling and reduced propulsion. Sudden reduction in acceleration and maximum speed. Windshield wiper failure during rainy weather. Automatic Vehicle Hold becoming unavailable. Automatic Emergency Braking becoming unavailable. Lane Departure Avoidance becoming unavailable. Vehicle becoming completely immobile while driving. Potential inability to restart the vehicle. Failure of driver-side door and trunk access. Unpredictable vehicle behavior and loss of confidence in its safety. These are not merely inconvenience-related issues. They involve fundamental vehicle operating systems and safety-related functions.

NHTSA ID

11775037

Incident

Nov 1, 2026

The vehicle experienced a hardware failure of its primary Autopilot computer module (Hardware 3) while parked overnight. Upon starting the vehicle, all advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) were disabled, including Autosteer, Traffic-Aware Cruise Control, Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB), lane-keep assist, and blind-spot monitoring. The vehicle also completely lost its backup camera functionality, side-repeater camera feeds, and internal safety chimes. Vehicle Service Mode diagnostics showed that the primary processor (ECU Primary A) was stuck in a low-level boot loop, displaying a state of AP IN COREBOOT and a status of INIT. The vehicle gateway active fault code was PM_a041_dasMIA, indicating that the DAS CAN node is missing because the processor was non-responsive on the internal communication network. The failure also disabled the internal cellular modem network, preventing navigation from working unless connected to Wi-Fi. Tesla Service technicians diagnosed the failure as an internal short circuit within a sealed component. Because this module has no moving parts and failed while parked, it represents a premature electrical breakdown of a non-serviceable core component. The sudden loss of Automatic Emergency Braking, forward collision warnings, and the rearview camera creates a safety hazard during operation.

NHTSA ID

11774759

Incident

Oct 8, 2026

Drove approximately 19 miles to my destination. Approximately 15 miles were highway. When I got there I was making a u-turn to park and my steering wheel got stiff and the car could barely move making a loud crunching sound. I got out of the car and looked under and what seems to be the link that connects the steering to my left wheel was hanging off the car. Later I found the two bolts that held it together on the ground. Made me think of the 15 miles I just traveled to get there. We were lucky!

NHTSA ID

11774551

Incident

Oct 19, 2026

I was backing out of a parking spot and as I shifted to driving forward I heard a loud bang from the front driver's side wheel well. I got out to see what had happened, expecting a flat tire, but nothing visually appeared wrong. So I got back into the vehicle and started to drive away again, I could drive straight or turn left, but if I tried to turn right it made loud grinding noises. I slowly drove around the parking but quickly determined the vehicle was unsafe and undriveable at that point. Additionally, I found a large bolt on the ground near where I had driven the vehicle. I no longer have the bolt, because the service center kept it. I arranged to have the vehicle towed to a local Tesla Service Center where they discovered "the front left lower lateral link bolt was missing and the remaining bolt was loose". After having the vehicle repaired, I discovered that this exact issue has been documented and resulted in NHTSA Recall Campaign 22V895000 / Tesla Bulletin SB-22-31-002 (improperly torqued lateral link fasteners). I requested a refund for the towing and repair cost, but was told that there are no active recalls on my VIN. I believe the scope of the active recall is too limited and clearly the issue exists beyond the currently recalled vehicles and should be expanded.

NHTSA ID

11774296

Incident

Oct 23, 2026

The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that while the vehicle was parked, the Full Self-Driving software was downloaded and caused the computer to become inoperable. The contact associated the failure with NHTSA Campaign Number: 25V002000 (Back Over Prevention, Electrical System); however, the VIN was not included in the recall. Additionally, the contact associated the failure with SB-25-00-001. The dealer was contacted. The contact requested a complete diagnostic log from the dealer. However, the dealer had not provided the full log or accompanying pictures due to proprietary terms and conditions. The manufacturer was contacted by phone and made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 67,000.

NHTSA ID

11774018

Incident

Oct 1, 2026

Mileage

67,000 mi

I recall Tesla Full Self-Driving (Supervised) being engaged throughout the trip. While negotiating the curved highway interchange, I experienced an unexpected, sharp steering movement toward the concrete roadway barrier that I did not intend. The vehicle collided with the barrier, multiple airbags deployed, and the vehicle sustained extensive damage, including apparent steering/suspension damage. The vehicle was rendered undrivable. I obtained the dashcam footage and Tesla's vehicle data export. The available records show self-driving features marked "Available" and "Unavailable" in the seconds preceding collision detection, with cruise control recorded as "Standby." A lane-departure/take-control warning was also recorded shortly before impact. These records raise questions about whether FSD unexpectedly disengaged, whether automated steering contributed to the vehicle's movement, and whether adequate warning was provided.

NHTSA ID

11773781

Incident

Oct 25, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On some Model Y vehicles, the center high mounted stop light may cause interference with the power supply line for the High Voltage Controller (HVC), which can falsely trigger High Voltage Interlock Loop (HVIL) alerts HVP_w026_HvilFault or BMS_a036_SW_HvpHvilFault.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.