2023 Tesla Model Y

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that while driving at slower speeds, there was an abnormal clicking sound coming from under the vehicle. The vehicle was towed to a local dealer, where it was determined that the front lateral link assembly and full body suspension needed to be replaced. While a USB cord was connected to the USB port, the USB cord overheated and almost burned out due to a battery surcharge, and the air was leaking into the front passenger’s side door. The vehicle was repaired. The contact stated that while attempting to make a left turn at an undisclosed speed, the steering wheel became stiff and failed to turn as intended. In addition, the contact stated that the trunk door latch was rusted and the front windshield wipers activated independently. The manufacturer was made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 9,149.

NHTSA ID

11766380

Incident

May 15, 2024

Mileage

9,149 mi

See attached document for complaint.

NHTSA ID

11766342

Incident

Aug 27, 2026

While driving and making a left turn the wheels pulled hard to the left and a major grinding noise started and at the same time the steering wheel locked up. I was just shy of crashing into a curb area and sitting in oncoming traffic lane. I pulled on the steering wheel and it broke free but still had a grinding noise and this happens a handful of times. I took to Tesla service and they said the lower steering link was completely hanging free. No advance notice just major failure.

NHTSA ID

11766338

Incident

Sep 23, 2026

Recurring 'Front passenger safety restraint system fault' warning on 2023 Tesla Model Y. The fault has appeared 5 times: July 2024, November 2024, December 2024, August 2025, and September 2026. The vehicle was serviced by Tesla after each of the earlier occurrences, but the fault keeps returning. This is a safety concern because the front passenger restraint system (airbag/seat belt) may not function correctly in a crash.

NHTSA ID

11766257

Incident

Sep 22, 2026

On September 13, 2026, my 2023 Tesla Model Y (13,300 miles) displayed a High Voltage System alert stating the vehicle may not restart and service was required. I brought the vehicle to the Tesla Service Center for diagnosis. The technician found the alert occurred when the brake pedal was applied and identified electromagnetic interference affecting signal integrity in that circuit. On September 17, 2026, a ferrite suppressor was installed to address the interference, and the technician noted the alert cleared. He advised that if the concern returned, replacement of the CHMSL (Center High Mount Stop Lamp) may be required. The same day I picked up the vehicle after this repair, the High Voltage System alert recurred. Both occurrences happened while the vehicle was operating under Full Self-Driving (FSD), not under manual braking. My foot was not on the brake pedal either time. This detail was not accounted for in the original diagnosis, which was based on manual pedal actuation as the trigger. I have raised this discrepancy with Tesla and requested a re-diagnosis based on FSD-commanded brake actuation, including review of vehicle logs for both incident timestamps. My safety concern is that the alert explicitly warns the vehicle may not restart, and the underlying cause has not yet been correctly identified, since the initial repair did not resolve the issue and failed the same day. The vehicle and its diagnostic logs are available for inspection upon request. The problem has been reproduced and confirmed by the Tesla Service Center (two visits, same fault). It has not been inspected by NHTSA, police, or insurance. No warning lamps or symptoms were noted prior to the first occurrence on September 13, 2026.

NHTSA ID

11766118

Incident

Sep 13, 2026

I run FSD 96% of the time. It’s so good that I get somewhat complacent. That’s not a character flaw. That’s what a reliable system does to people. The failure mode is simple. Car is holding a curve. Foot accidently brushes the brake. Autosteer disengages. Assist steering torque goes to zero. Wheel unloads. At speed the path goes straight, worst cases, into barrier, pole, or oncoming lane. A heavy Tesla in that geometry is ugly. Tesla’s answer is always the same: the driver disengaged, so it’s not on us. The accident is losing lateral control because of another control (braking) that should only change speed. Brake pedal grazes are easy and inevitable. I can recover a braking event. But I may not recover an instant straight-line on a bend if my hands weren’t on the wheel. Simple fix: Disengage traction but don’t have FSD disengage AutoSteer until I force the wheel. That way FSD knows I have control instead of only assuming that. I love FSD but always feel there is a suicide/killer stick just inches away from my feet. To answer your question, there is no component failure and safety risk is obvious. I can reproduce the scenario by simply tapping the brake on a curve and feel the wheel try to jerk out of my hands. Tesla acknowledges that this is the way the system was designed: complete instant manual takeover. The normal FSD disengagement tone rings. But that is too little, too late for a surprised driver.

NHTSA ID

11765779

Incident

Sep 21, 2026

The windshield fogs up in front of the front facing camera. It can get dirty such that it is not just a matter of waiting for it to defog. During this time the self driving feature is impaired. The camera should be sealed to the window such that it can not fog up on the inside. The date of incident is the day tesla technician cleaned my camera and I learned how fragile this system is.

NHTSA ID

11765732

Incident

Sep 14, 2026

On September 18, 2026, at approximately 7:30 PM, I was driving a 2023 Tesla Model Y with approximately 31,187 miles. While traveling at low speed and making a slow right-hand turn on a winding, heavily trafficked, single-lane section of roadway, the steering suddenly became functionally unusable and I could no longer safely steer the vehicle. At the same time, multiple active warning messages appeared on the vehicle display. They included: GTW_w075 – “Steering assist reduced – Steering may require increased effort” GTW_w074 – “Steering assist reduced – Steering may require increased effort” APP_w264 – Lane Departure Avoidance features unavailable DI_a246 – Automatic vehicle hold disabled APP_w009 – Automatic Emergency Braking is unavailable. I was able to bring the vehicle to a stop. I then powered the vehicle down, waited several minutes, and restarted it in an attempt to restore normal steering. The steering problem did not resolve and the vehicle remained unsafe to drive. This was not a brief or temporary issue. The vehicle could not be safely driven and ultimately had to be towed by Tesla Roadside Assistance to a Tesla Service Center. I am reporting this incident because the sudden loss or substantial reduction of usable steering assistance while the vehicle was being driven created a serious safety risk. Had the same failure occurred at highway speed, during a lane change, or in circumstances where the vehicle could not be safely stopped, the consequences could have been much more serious.

NHTSA ID

11765617

Incident

Sep 18, 2026

On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to water ingress into the air filter and/or vehicle interior. If the vehicle is brought into Service for cabin air filter replacement due to a musty or moldy smell from the HVAC system, water dripping from the vents or water pooling into the RH footwell carpet, inspect the vehicle for symptoms related to the condition. If symptoms are present, replace the HVAC inlet duct with an updated part or rework the existing HVAC duct, and replace the cabin air filters.

A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel alignment over time. This feature detects changes in wheel alignment that may be related to incorrect tire pressures, degraded ball joints, bushings or damaged suspension links. If the feature determines that an inspection at a Tesla Service Center is required, a customer-facing alert will appear on the touchscreen.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On some Model Y vehicles, the center high mounted stop light may cause interference with the power supply line for the High Voltage Controller (HVC), which can falsely trigger High Voltage Interlock Loop (HVIL) alerts HVP_w026_HvilFault or BMS_a036_SW_HvpHvilFault.

On certain Model S, Model X and Model Y vehicles, the interior camera requires replacement to mitigate reduced driver attentiveness detection performance in low-light conditions.

On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might cause wind noise in the cabin.