2011 Toyota Corolla

From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect.  During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment.  FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW.  These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes.  An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.   In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU.  This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation.  The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage.  There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation.  The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU.  If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC.  Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC.  All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled.  In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024.  With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

This Complaint is not about a specific incident, but about excessively-brilliant (blinding) headlights. In the flow of traffic, the blinded drivers far outnumber the vehicle using blinding headlights. The area those headlights cover spreads out so WIDE, the blinded driver is not able to see the side of the road. Insurance companies may say this problem does not cause accidents; but, I believe that is because many drivers do not dare risk driving at night. Excessively-brilliant, blinding, headlights should be BANNED and Recalled. Those headlights are a terrible safety concern and should have been banned years ago.

NHTSA ID

11738181

Incident

May 15, 2026

Unknown—he only performed the inspection, as I am a Lyft driver and my account was suspended due to a recall issued by the NHTSA.

NHTSA ID

11724617

Incident

Mar 10, 2026

The contact owned a 2011 Toyota Corolla. The contact stated that while he was driving at 40 MPH, another vehicle that was speeding caused a multiple vehicle collision. During the collision, the contact was in the middle lane when the speeding vehicle crashed into a vehicle in the left lane, and that vehicle merged violently into the middle lane, causing the contact to rear-end the vehicle in front due to the driver abruptly stopping. During the attempt to stop, the vehicle failed to decelerate sufficiently. Upon impact, the frontal air bags failed to fully deploy, as they only partially emerged from the housing. The failure experienced was a loss of braking effectiveness at 40 MPH that resulted in a rear-end collision, during which the frontal air bags failed to deploy. The vehicle was towed to a family member's home. The tire pressure warning was the only warning light on at the time of the crash. The driver was injured. Injuries sustained were lower back, right side ribs, and neck pain that required medical attention. The vehicle was deemed totaled by insurance. The vehicle was not repaired. The manufacturer was not notified of the failure. The failure mileage was 124,000.

NHTSA ID

11715996

Incident

Jan 27, 2026

Mileage

124,000 mi

I am submitting a safety concern regarding airbag non-deployment involving my former vehicle, a 2011 Toyota Corolla LE (VIN: [XXX] ). This vehicle was subject to multiple Takata airbag recalls, including a 2018 front airbag recall and a May 2020 Takata non-deployment and seatbelt pretensioner interim recall. Beginning in Spring 2021, the airbag warning light illuminated intermittently. On May 30, 2024, diagnostic trouble codes B1813 and B1818 were recorded, indicating faults involving the driver and passenger airbag squib circuits and potential center airbag sensor assembly involvement. A recall-related repair was completed on June 6, 2024 with installation of a Harness Kit (04009-98112) under extended warranty associated with a class action settlement. Following subsequent service, the airbag warning light was no longer illuminated. After these repairs, the vehicle was later involved in a rear-end collision in which the airbags did not deploy. The vehicle was declared a total loss and is no longer in my possession. Given the vehicle’s documented history of airbag system recalls and prior SRS fault codes, I am submitting this incident for safety documentation and review. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11708696

Incident

Nov 5, 2025

p195 /65r/15 91 h. yokohama avid ascend. i bought 4 tires on 04/11/22 at kinderhook toyota my car had 61008 miles on it. on 08/04/25 brought my car to same dealer was told i needed new tires. multipoint inspection said front tires had 3 32nd of tread and back tires had 4 32nd of tread wear left. my car had 80678 miles on it. the tires lasted less than 20000 miles. they had an 85000 mile warranty on them. i can understand tires lasting maybe 60000 miles or so, but only 20000 miles? was told i can contact your office about this. could not find a different page for a non- accident problem. dealer said to contact yokohama customer service and kinderhook toyota would send the tires back.

NHTSA ID

11683649

Incident

Aug 4, 2025

The contact owns a 2011 Toyota Corolla. The contact stated that while driving at an undisclosed speed, the contact heard a loud knocking sound coming from the engine compartment. There was no warning light illuminated. The vehicle was taken to the dealer, where it was diagnosed and determined that the oil pressure sending unit had failed and needed to be replaced. The vehicle was repaired. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure. The approximate failure mileage was 150,000.

NHTSA ID

11670289

Incident

Jun 30, 2025

Mileage

150,000 mi

Part of a customer support repair program through Toyota. It expired, and Toyota Customer Care at 1-888-270-9371 told me to file a complaint at NHTSA.gov. So I am filing a complaint. The paint is peeling on my car rapidly and I have missed the support program deadline because it was not happening in the timeframe they created for this problem. But there is no reason for my pain to be peeling like it is other than manufacture error.

NHTSA ID

11643143

Incident

Aug 1, 2024

I am writing to formally request a recall or resolution for a significant defect in my [2011, Toyota, Corolla] vehicle, which I purchased in 2011. Over time, the paint on my vehicle has begun peeling extensively, affecting not just the aesthetics but also potentially the resale value and durability of the car. This issue appears to be a widespread problem among vehicles of similar make and year, suggesting a potential manufacturing defect. Given the extent of the paint deterioration, I kindly request that Toyota Company acknowledge and address this issue through a recall or appropriate corrective measures. Vehicle Details: Make & Model: Toyota, Corolla Year: 2011 VIN: [XXX] Current Mileage: 80,000 Estimated I would appreciate a prompt response regarding my request. Please let me know the next steps in addressing this concern, including any available remedies Toyota may offer. You may contact me at [XXX] or [XXX] at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. I look forward to your response. Best regards, [XXX] [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ID

11640541

Incident

Feb 1, 2023

Some 2005 – 2026 Toyota vehicles that have undergone water intrusion may exhibit a condition in which a musty odor is present. Follow the procedures in this bulletin to remediate the odor and address this condition. The purpose of this Service Bulletin is to provide general guidelines and procedures for odor remediation. This Service Bulletin provides a guide on how to prepare and treat the interior of the vehicle for odor remediation. Refer to the applicable model and model year Repair Manual and the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) website for the most up-to-date safety and precautionary guidelines.

Acid rain results from rainwater or other airborne moisture that become acidic due to industrial chemical impurities in the atmosphere. If these acidic compounds settle on an exposed vehicle, especially the horizontal areas such as the hood, roof, and decklid, significant damage to the painted surfaces can occur. Acid rain damage can typically be identified on vehicles by the presence of stains on the paint surface that resemble hard water spots. Unlike water spots however, acid rain damage cannot be removed by regular washing procedures. Also, because acid rain can etch and soften the paint, normal buffing or polishing repair procedures should not be attempted. This can cause further damage and result in visible depressions in the paint surface. The following are the three major categories of acid rain damage: •Minor damage: requires only buffing to repair. •Moderate damage: usually requires neutralizing, color sanding, and buffing. •Severe damage: extending beyond 1/2 mil of clearcoat on a pearl, metallic, or solid color, requires neutralization, sanding, and repainting. In cases where acid rain damage is minor, neutralization and buffing with a liquid-type paint finessing product may provide an adequate repair. Only specially formulated products outlined in this bulletin should be used for that purpose. Unfortunately, other than minor damage, there is no simple method of determining the actual extent (depth) of acid penetration other than color sanding a representative affected area until there is no visible etching or depressions, followed by measuring the amount of paint removed with either a magnetic or digital-type film thickness gauge. The procedures in this bulletin are intended for use by qualified body/paint technicians and should not be attempted by inexperienced personnel. It is the dealer’s responsibility to protect and maintain the quality of the vehicle’s paint finish after receipt at the dealership prior to the first sale. Perform frequent vehicle washing, as often as daily, during high heat and humidity periods to minimize the potential for paint damage due to acid rain exposure. This is especially important in geographical areas known for high frequency and concentration of acid rain and industrial fallout.

The condition known as acid rain is caused by airborne chemicals or particles in the atmosphere, which mix with rainwater, nighttime dew, or high humidity to form acidic compounds. If these contaminants settle and remain on a painted vehicle surface, especially the horizonal areas of the hood, roof, and decklid, significant damage can occur. This damage is the result of actual etching of the paint and appears as pitting or water spots. As acid rain droplets on the vehicle surface evaporate, the concentration strength of the acid increases, causing deeper and more rapid damage. This evaporation and corrosive action also occur more rapidly on dark colored cars as direct sun heat increases. It is the dealer’s responsibility to protect and maintain the quality of the vehicle’s paint finish after receipt at the dealership prior to the first sale. In areas known for high frequency and/or concentration of acid rain, frequent vehicle washing during high heat or humidity periods will minimize the potential for paint damage caused by acid rain. It is further recommended that either reverse osmosis or deionized water be used to prevent water spotting.

To prevent brake rotor rust from forming during transportation and storage, wheel film will be used instead of a cardboard type of anti-rust cover. The purpose of the wheel film is to shield the disc brake rotor from weather elements and initial rust before the vehicle is delivered to the customer. Consequently, the film should remain on the wheel for as long as possible.

Toyota vehicles are currently protected with RapgardTM protective film designed to protect the horizontal painted surfaces. This material protects from acid rain, environmental fallout, and rail contamination. Follow the Removal Procedure in this bulletin to remove the RapgardTM protective film within 90 days from initial application.

Vehicles may occasionally be subjected to contamination by airborne iron particles shed from railroad tracks, train wheels, exposure to heavy machinery facilities, grinding, welding, etc. This type of contamination can be identified by the presence of small, red or brown particles on the paint surface. These particles are often difficult to see on dark color paints but can be easily felt when brushing a hand across horizontal body surfaces such as the hood, roof, or deck lid. Follow the Repair Procedure in this bulletin to clean vehicles that may have been subjected to contamination by airborne iron particles such as rail dust during rail transportation or extended storage near industrial areas.