2012 Jeep Grand Cherokee

From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE19014 on September 9, 2019, to investigate 128 consumer complaints alleging that the Active Head Rest (AHR) inadvertently deployed without the occurrence of a crash or other rear impact event in model year (MY) 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles.When ODI opened the investigation, ODI was aware of thirteen alleged injuries.A small number of Early Warning Reports identified driver and/or passenger front seat AHR inadvertent deployments without a rear impact event.Reported safety consequences resulting from the AHR deployments include concussions, headaches, soft tissue injuries, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and/or loss of vehicle control as a result of being surprised and distracted by being struck in the head by the inadvertent AHR deployment. On September 24, 2019, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA).ODI requested certain detailed information from FCA related to the following subject vehicles: MY 2010-2014 Dodge Avenger 200, MY 2010-2014 Dodge Calber, MY 2010-2014 Chrysler Sebring, MY 2013-2015 Ram Tradesman, MY 2012 Ram Van, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Grand Caravan, MY 2010-2016 Chrysler Town and Country, MY 2010-2017 Jeep Compass, MY 2011-2020 Dodge Durango, MY 2011-2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Journey, MY 2010-2012 Jeep Liberty, MY 2010-2011 Jeep Nitro, and MY 2010-2011 Jeep Patriot vehicles.On December 2, 2019, ODI received a response from FCA that included vehicle production data, consumer complaints, field reports, warranty claims, manufacturer actions, production changes, and other data related to the alleged defect from the start of production (2010) through September 24, 2019.On January 27, 2020, ODI received an update to the December 2, 2019, IR response from FCA.On September 22, 2020, ODI requested additional subject vehicle AHR information from FCA.ODI received FCA's response on October 21, 2020.ODI subsequently received an update to FCA's October 21, 2020, response on February 16, 2021.During the investigation, ODI requested updates to certain IR questions on two occasions.FCA provided updates to question #2 on March 5, 2021, and questions #2 and #5 on May 26, 2023. FCA’s IR response data identified approximately 7.5 million subject vehicles (with approximately 15 million AHR assemblies).Due to the large number of vehicles and failure reports, ODI focused its analysis on the FCA vehicle model with the highest failure rate to represent the worst-case scenario.For this purpose, ODI focused on MY 2012-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles for its analysis.This population includes 710,890 vehicles that FCA manufactured between August 19, 2011, and August 8, 2015.ODI identified 2,839 alleged AHR failures within this limited population.ODI identified 263 alleged injuries that were caused by AHR failures in MY 2012-2015 Grand Cherokees vehicles.Of these alleged injuries, ODI categorized them as eighty-two (82) soft tissue (neck/whiplash, bruise) injuries, four (4) concussions, fifty-nine (59) headaches, and one hundred eighteen (118) without a specific injury description.Although complainants have alleged injuries, ODI has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate or validate any injuries where medical treatment was required.Consumer outreach was conducted by ODI, where sixty-three (63) FCA complainants with alleged injuries were contacted.Twelve of the sixty-three FCA consumers responded and were interviewed by ODI.ODI requested medical records, however, only one response was provided. Attorneys representing the responding complainant provided a synopsis that indicated they had experienced prior neck-related injuries dating to the mid-1990s.ODI also contacted one hundred (100) consumers who submitted Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) in an attempt to validate alleged injuries. Despite the efforts of ODI, the office has been unsuccessful at obtaining substantive documentation/evidence supporting complaints that allege serious injuries (where pre-existing medical conditions did not already exist). In addition to the low severity of alleged injuries caused by AHR deployments, there have been eleven alleged crashes and two alleged lane departures within the entire subject vehicle population that has been in the field up to sixteen years (with over 8,500 AHR inadvertent deployments).ODI was not able to validate that the alleged crashes were the result of inadvertent head rest deployments, and the crashes were minor in nature. ODI has conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged safety defect and with up to sixteen years of exposure for some vehicles and over 8,500 inadvertent AHR deployments, no serious crashes or injuries could be validated in the sub-population of focus.The lack of serious injuries validated by ODI with such large period of field exposure is consistent with thework done by NHTSA’s Human Injury Research Division and the Biodynamic Research Corporation, which support that an inadvertent AHR deployment is not likely to cause serious injury.In addition to the low risk of injury, FCA released an extended warranty program that covers inadvertent AHR deployment for ten years / unlimited mileage from the vehicle's in-service date. PE19014 is closed with the FCA extended warranty program.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances. To review a complete closing summary, please the attached closing report. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

In response to this investigation, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) is conducting a recall to address headliner fires that occur post 14V-391.On December 22, 2015 FCA notified the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of safety recall 15V-879 to remedy potential headliner fires occurring in 389,252 model year (MY) 2011-2013 Dodge Durango and Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from December 3, 2009 to September 1, 2012.Note this recall, which was scoped based on vehicle design level and field events, does not include all MY 2013 or any MY 2014 Durango and Grand Cherokee vehicles; ODI and FCA will continue to monitor the field experience for this population.ODI opened this investigation based on allegations of fires occurring in the headliner area after the remedy for recall 14V-391 had been conducted.Recall 14V-391 involved MY 2011-2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles manufactured by FCA from January 5, 2010 to December 11, 2013.The recall was influenced by ODI investigation EA14-001.During EA14-001, data provided by FCA indicated fires were caused by an electrical short in the vanity lamp wiring for either visor.Visors are mounted to the (metal) roof of the vehicle through the headliner with three screws. EA14-001 determined it was possible for the wiring to be pierced or abraded by one of the screws, or otherwise become electrically shorted either during initial vehicle assembly or subsequent headliner area repairs presenting a fire risk.Most of the fires occurred while the vehicle was being driven.The 14V-391 remedy consisted of installing a plastic guide way on each visor to route wiring away from the attachment screws and prevent electrical shorting.Additionally abrasion resistant tape was installed in key areas to protect the wiring integrity.In order to install the guide, the headliner had to be lowered and the existing visor and headliner wiring rerouted, a somewhat complex procedure that required sufficient service technician care and expertise.FCA modified the 14V-391 remedy multiple times to improve it.ODI has identified a total of 43 NHTSA complaints across affected vehicles indicating a fire occurring after the vehicle had been remedied under 14V-391.FCA reported 159 additional unique complaints of post-remedy fires. The fire events primarily occurred while driving however a few reported fires starting after the vehicle was parked. Ten customers incurred injuries including minor burns and smoke inhalation, no crashes were reported.According to FCA, the vehicles recalled under 15V-879 were manufactured with longer wiring connecting the visors to the main harness in the headliner.Field experience clearly shows these vehicles are experiencing more post 14V-391 fires, 189 out of 202 known incidents to date.Recall 15V-879 addresses any remaining risk of fire after the 14V-391 recall remedy is performed.The 15V-879 remedy installs new design level visor assemblies containing added wire sheathing, shortened wiring, revised wiring retainer and wiring loop relief.In addition, part of the metal structure (body in white) where the wiring is routed will be modified (removed) using a template to allow more clearance.The recall action initiated by the vehicle manufacturer address the safety risks identified by the investigation.Accordingly, the investigation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at SaferCar.gov under the following identification (ODI) numbers:10640524, 10653417, 10684130, 10691520, 10692710, 10703058, 10705802, 10711836, 10715282, 10717265, 10717266, 10723677, 10726438, 10733003, 10733598, 10735042, 10743410, 10744097, 10745129, 1

In a letter dated August 21, 2014, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a defect investigation of alleged failures associated with the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV?s, trucks, and vans beginning in the 2007 model year. The petitioner alleges that TIPM defects may result in engine stall, airbag non-deployment, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended acceleration, fire, and other symptoms. On September 25, 2014, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP14-004 to evaluate the petition for a grant or deny decision. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by CAS as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers. In total, there were 296 complaints submitted by the petitioner in the original petition and five supplements, including 271 complaints related to the subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. Approximately 3 percent of CAS complaints are related to vehicles equipped with TIPM-6 and ODI?s review of these complaints did not identify any safety defect trends. ODI conducted a detailed review of complaints narratives submitted by CAS and consumers including careful analysis of vehicle repair histories, warranty claims obtained from the manufacturer and any available Customer Assistance Inquiry reports (CAIR). Analysis of the field data indicated that MY2011-2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles exhibited significantly higher complaint rates related to fuel pump relay (FPR) failures than other subject vehicles. In a September 3, 2014 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect Information Report (DIR) identifying a defect in the FPR within the TIPM-7 which can result in a no start or stall condition in approximately 188,723 model year (MY) 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee (WK) and Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles manufactured from January 5, 2010 through July 20, 2011 (14V-530).In a February 24, 2015 letter, Chrysler submitted a second DIR expanding the scope of the FPR defect condition to include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 through 2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from September 17, 2010 through August 19, 2013 and MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango vehicles manufactured from January 18, 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V-115).ODI analysis of the CAS allegations of TIPM defects resulting in stall while driving, airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration, fire and other faults identified a single defect condition related to 1 of over 60 different circuits in the TIPM assembly. The most common effect of this defect condition, related to the fuel pump relay, was a no-start concern, but it could also result in stall while driving (76 complaints). No valid evidence was presented in support of claims related to airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire resulting from TIPM faults and these claims were found to be wholly without merit based on review of the field data and design of the relevant systems and components.Except insofar as the petitioner's contentions relate to the defect condition addressed by the Chrysler recalls, the factual bases of the petitioner's contentions that any further investigation is necessary are unsupported. In our view, additional investigation is unlikely to result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the requested investigation. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety mission, the petition is den

Problem was Oil Filter housing made of plastic. It was cracked and no warning light that oil had leaked out. Car SUDDENLY DECELERATED as I was merging into traffic on freeway causing vehicles coming up behind to brake rapidly including a semi truck which had been 200 yards back. I rolled onto shoulder with warning lights activated. Pure luck it was not a major accident. Had it fixed at local mechanic in area and was told it is common problem on several makes of vehicles. Mechanic replaced with aluminum one. Gave me a reduced price of $1200.

NHTSA ID

11754074

Incident

Jul 24, 2026

I was caught driving in a hailstorm when hail impacted and broke the panoramic sunroof of my vehicle. I understand that hail can break automotive glass and that the sunroof is constructed from safety glass. My concern is not that the glass broke, but how it shattered. When the sunroof failed, it fragmented into extremely fine particles and powdered glass. The glass was so fine that it became embedded in the vehicle's seats and interior surfaces. It was in my hair and clothing. Fortunately, the interior cloth sunshade was partially closed at the time and contained much of the debris. Had the shade been open, the glass particles would have fallen directly into the cabin while I was driving. My concern is that the shattered glass created a large volume of fine particulate debris that could have been dispersed throughout the cabin and potentially into occupants' eyes, skin, and airways. This is particularly concerning when considering the possibility of children or other passengers seated beneath the sunroof at the time of failure. Given how fine the resulting particles were, I question whether additional protective measures, such as a laminated layer or other containment system, should be required to prevent shattered glass from entering the passenger compartment when a panoramic sunroof fails. I believe this issue warrants review because the manner in which the glass disintegrated may present a safety risk beyond the initial breakage itself.

NHTSA ID

11745878

Incident

Jun 20, 2026

The engine power cuts of randomly while driving with no warning at all. When it happens the steering locks up veering the vehicle to the left so you have no control and at the same time the power brakes lock up and you are unable to stop the vehicle. Everything else works when this happens lights, radio, heater, air conditioning. No warning lights display. I had the vehicle with a mechanic that kept it for over 4 months to test drive and see if it would occur. It happened while he drove it but no codes show up to determine the cause. I had it towed back to my home and contacted Jeep Chrysler and they gave me a claim number to bring to my local Jeep dealer. They had it for over a week and unfortunately the jeep ran fine so once again no resolution to be able to fix. I bought the Jeep from Carvana 9/7/24 and am still paying it off but yet haven't been able to drive it for the past 15 months because it is unsafe for myself and anyone else on the roadway.

NHTSA ID

11744558

Incident

Mar 26, 2026

Upon starting my Jeep on the coldest day of the year back in January when I pressed the brake pedal to start it there was a loud and it reminded me, there was a recall out for the break booster pop and the pedal went all the way to the floor. It was fifteen below zero out.So I thought that it blew a brake line. I checked the lines going to all four.Wheels and could not find any fluid. I could not figure out where all the fluid went. I refilled the reservoir with two full cans of brake fluid. Tried pumping the pedal and again it went to the floor. Got out and inspected all lines and the reservoir itself.... Still could not find a leak. I googled the problem and saw a recall for the brake booster. Said it was installed incorrectly and water could enter the booster and master cylinder and freeze if cold outside and cause a serious accident causing serious injury or death. I inspected the system and water had entered the booster and master cylinder and froze. It ruined the master cylinder. I asked the dealership if they would pick up the vehicle and repair it. First they said yes then no they don't pick vehicles up. They ordered only a little shield to fix the booster per the recall but said that's all they would do. Why would I pay $200 out of my pocket to have the vehicle taken to them.Only to have them put a shield on the booster. I still would have no brakes. That is ridiculous. This is supposed to be a major safety issue.And it is! If I had been driving when I pressed on the brake pedal and it went to the floor I could have been killed or other innocent people could have been killed. You the NHTSA 's answer said Chrysler is contractually. Obligated to not only pick up my vehicle but to repair any and all components of the brake system to return the vehicle to previous safety operation at no charge to me. You also said that I should be given a loaner vehicle to use while mine is repaired. Dealership is refusing. I could be dead and so could other innocent people

NHTSA ID

11741339

Incident

Jan 14, 2026

Alternator overheated and vehicle stalled. Smoke was seen coming out from alternator. Incidentbandbvehicke details are consistent with FCA Recall T36. Looking to include vehicle in recall.

NHTSA ID

11740024

Incident

May 24, 2026

The vehicle is a 2012 Jeep Grand Cherokee with open safety recalls T59 and V62. The brake warning light is currently illuminated, and based on the symptoms I believe the brake booster may be failing. The braking system is available for inspection upon request. The safety concern is that the vehicle may have reduced braking assist or impaired braking performance while being driven. This creates a risk of increased stopping distance, loss of braking confidence, or inability to stop safely in traffic. I contacted the FCA/Stellantis-recommended Jeep dealership in Lapeer, Michigan multiple times this week to schedule recall-related service. I was repeatedly transferred to service voicemail and did not receive return calls. When I called back and asked to speak with someone else, I reached the service manager. I explained that the vehicle has an illuminated brake warning light and that I suspect the brake booster may be failing. The service manager focused on where I lived, why I was not using a closer dealer, and mentioned that the vehicle is 14 years old, rather than clearly arranging recall service or addressing the brake safety concern. The problem has not yet been inspected or confirmed by a dealer because I have been unable to obtain timely service despite repeated attempts. The vehicle has not been inspected by the manufacturer, police, insurance representatives, or others. The warning lamp currently present is the brake warning light. The exact first date the warning light appeared was within the last 2 weeks.

NHTSA ID

11735121

Incident

May 1, 2026

Vehicle has two open unrepaired recalls: T59 (NHTSA 17V-572, brake booster water shield) and V62 (NHTSA 19V-813, fuel pump relay). The brake booster is currently symptomatic — an audible humming noise is present when the vehicle is stopped and idling, consistent with vacuum loss in the brake booster system. I contacted LaFontaine Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Fenton, Michigan to schedule the recall repairs. An appointment was set for 8:15 AM on April 24, 2026. I requested a loaner or rental vehicle as the dealer indicated they would need to keep the vehicle over the weekend for the work. The dealer never followed up regarding the rental. Instead, the dealer contacted me to appraise my current vehicle and discuss new vehicle inventory. The recall work was never discussed. When I did not appear for the appointment, the dealer did not follow up or offer to reschedule. I then contacted Stellantis customer service directly and explained the situation, including the active brake booster symptom. The Stellantis representative connected me with a second dealership, Bill Snethkamp Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram on Woodward Avenue in Detroit, Michigan, then disconnected from the call without notice. I was left explaining the situation a second time to a dealership that informed me they do not provide loaner vehicles. The rental option requires me to pay out of pocket upfront and then seek reimbursement from the manufacturer in the form of a check. This is not a viable option. Additionally, this dealership is located approximately one hour from my residence in Flint, making it logistically impractical for recall service. I am currently driving a vehicle with an active safety defect affecting the braking system. The recall remedy language states that limited braking ability can cause a crash without prior warning. Neither the manufacturer nor two dealerships have provided adequate accommodation to complete the recall repair while ensuring I have safe transportation during the service per

NHTSA ID

11733588

Incident

Apr 22, 2026

Check Engine light came on & Auto shop says when they checked under dash, computer says “Emissions” problem. They have to do a “smoke test” to see where there is a leak!!!

NHTSA ID

11731600

Incident

Apr 14, 2026

Verify Reman part number availability. Order the "R" part number for all orders: Warranty, Mopar, customer pay and service contract. Order "68" part number for New unsold units only.

TUBE - FUEL INJECTOR SUPPLY & GASKET - NONE

TUBE - FUEL INJECTOR SUPPLY & GASKET - NONE

RAIL - FUEL

FUEL PUMP/LEVEL UNIT MODULE For vehicles with Saddle Fuel Tanks, need to determine if there are any DTCs in wiTECH. Follow Service Diagnostics published prior to making any changes. Review any existing SOL or TSBs published for customer complaint issue. Only the Fuel Pump Module should be replaced if there are DTCs associated with the Fuel Level Sensor number 1. Only the Auxiliary Level Sender should be replaced if there are DTCs associated with the Fuel Level Sensor number 2. If there is a mixture of DTCs between the Fuel Pump Module and the Auxiliary Level Sensor, then investigate if there is a Jumper Harness or circuit issue between the Level Sender and the PCM. Verify fuel transfer between auxiliary tank and the primary tank by monitoring the auxiliary level sensor to verify it drops after driving.

HEADREST Incoming Vehicles with Deployed Active Head Rest (AHR) should have a through enquiry. If there is no Broken Pieces or Electrical failure, Direction to follow the RESET Procedure in service Library to RESET the AHR